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THE ANOMALY OF EXECUTIONS: THE CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS CLAUSE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

] ohn D. Bessler*
University of Baltimore School of Law

ABSTRACT
This Article describes the anomaly of executions in the context of the U.S.
Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. While the Supreme
Court routinely reads the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to protect prisoners from harm, the Court simultaneously interprets the Eighth
Amendment to allow inmates to be executed. Corporal punishments short
of death have long been abandoned in America's penal system, yet executions-at least in a few locales, heavily concentrated in the South-persist.
This Article, which seeks a principled and much more consistent interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, argues that executions should be declared
unconstitutional as "cruel and unusual punishments." In so doing, the Article explores the history of the "cruel and unusual" catchphrase in English
and American law and critiques the Supreme Court's "evolving standards
of decency" test. The Article also describes the abandonment of corporal
punishments as penal sanctions and discusses existing Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence on that topic. The Article explains how executions are cruel-and were thought to be so even by some of America's founders-and
have, over time, become unusual. The Article further highlights how the
U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment fundamentally transformed the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause calculus, making modern-day executions unusual in the extreme because of the arbitrary and discriminatory
way in which they are carried out.
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The Anomaly of Executions

I. INTRODUCTION
The Eighth Amendment, ratified in 1791/ contains just sixteen words:
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted." 2 That amendment, however, has generated enormous controversy, spawning thousands of court cases3 and
caustic reactions to U.S. Supreme Court decisions construing it. 4 Courts
have wrestled over the meaning of "excessive," 5 and jurists, lawyers, and
scholars alike have spilled gallons of ink fiercely debating how to interpret
the phrase "cruel and unusual punishments." 6 There is relatively little legislative history from the First Congress7 and the state ratification debates 8

1

United States v. Austin, 614 F. Supp. 1208, 1212 (D. N.M. 1985) ("The eighth
amendment ... was proposed in 1789 and ratified two years later in 1791.").
2 U.S. CONST., amend. VIII (ratified Dec. 15, 1791).
3 "ALLFEDS" and "ALLSTATES" Westlaw database searches for "Eighth Amendment"
both yielded "10000 Documents"-the maximum retrievable number-as "Results."
4 In 2005, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit
the execution of juvenile offenders. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). In 2008, the
Court also held that those provisions prohibit the death penalty for non-homicidal child
rape. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008). Both decisions generated heated and
sustained public debate.
5 E.g., United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 335 (1998) ("Excessive means
surpassing the usual, the proper, or a normal measure of proportion."); Alexander v.
United States, 509 U.S. 544, 559 (1993) (commenting on "excessive" penalties within the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause); United States ex rel.
Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 435 (1921) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It was assumed in Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas (No. 1), 212 U.S. 86, Ill
... that an excessive fine, even if definite, would violate the Eighth Amendment.").
6 E.g., Michael J. Zydney Mannheirner, Cruel and Unusual Federal Punishments, 98
IowAL. REv. 69 (2012); Kevin White, The Constitutional Limits of the "National
Consensus" Doctrine in Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 2012 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1371
(2012); John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REv. 899 (2011); Aimee Logan, Who Says So? Defining
Cruel and Unusual Punishment by Science, Sentiment, and Consensus, 35 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 195 (2008); Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, When the Federal Death
Penalty Is "Cruel and Unusual," 74 U. CIN. L. REv. 819 (2006); Susan M. Raeker-Jordan,
Parsing Personal Predilections: A Fresh Look at the Supreme Court's Cruel and Unusual
Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 58 ME. L. REv. 99 (2006); Douglas L. Simon, Making
Sense of Cruel and Unusual Punishment: A New Approach to Reconciling Military and
Civilian Eighth Amendment Law, 184 MIL. L. REv. 66 (2005); Shannon D. Gilreath, Cruel
and Unusual Punishment and the Eighth Amendment as a Mandate for Human Dignity:
Another Look at Original intent, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 559 (2003); Stephen T. Parr,
Symmetric Proportionality: A New Perspective on the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, 68 TENN. L. REv. 41 (2000).
7 JOHN D. BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY AND THE
FOUNDERS' EIGHTH AMENDMENT 186 (2012) (quoting the statements of Representatives
William Loughton Smith and Samuel Livermore at the First Congress).
8 I d. at 186-87 (discussing the comments of Abraham Holmes at the Massachusetts
convention and Patrick Henry's comments at Virginia's convention).
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concerning the Eighth Amendment, further fueling the contentious public
debate over the text. 9
The Eighth Amendment-the subject of multiple books 10 and countless law review articles 11 -has been described as "something of an enigma.'m American judges rarely considered that amendment and state-law
equivalents in the decades following the ratification of the U.S. Bill of
Rights, so for generations the American people have wrestled mightily over
the meaning of the bar on "cruel and unusual punishments.'' 13 Because
what is "cruel and unusual" is largely a subjective determination, that
long-standing debate is almost certain to continue. 14 What is "cruel and

9

The death penalty itself has been a major focus of the Eighth Amendment debate.

Compare John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria's Vision: The Enlightenment, America's
Death Penalty, and the Abolition Movement, 4 Nw. J. L. & Soc. POL'Y 195, 254 (2009)
with RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE
(2001).
10 E.g., BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7; MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (20 11) ( 1973 ); VINCENT
BURANELLI, THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT: THE AMERICAN HERITAGE HISTORY OF THE BILL OF
RIGHTS (1991 ); MICHAEL L. RADELET, FACING THE DEATH PENALTY: ESSAYS ON A CRUEL
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT (1990); LARRY CHARLES BERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT (1975).
11 E.g., Laurence Claus, Methodology, Proportionality, Equality: Which Question Does
the Eighth Amendment Pose?, 31 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 35 (2008); John F. Stinneford,

The Original Meaning of "Unusual": The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel
Innovation, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1739 (2008); Laurence Claus, The Antidiscrimination
Eighth Amendment, 28 HARv. J.L. & Soc. PoL'Y 119 (2004); Celia Rumann, Tortured
History: Finding Our Way Back to the Lost Origins of the Eighth Amendment, 31 PEPP. L.
REv. 661 (2004); Hugo Adam Bedau, Interpreting the Eighth Amendment: Principled vs.
Populist Strategies, 13 T.M. CooLEY L. REv. 789 (1996); Deborah A. Schwartz & Jay
Wishingrad, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment: An Historical
Justification for the Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BUFF. L.
REv. 783 (1975); Note, What Is Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 24 HARv. L. REv. 54
(1910).
12 JoLee Adamich, Nick Chase, Jennifer Nestle & Evan Rice, The Selected Cases of
Myron H Bright: Thirty Years ofHis Jurisprudence, 83 MINN. L. REv. 239, 254 (1998).
13 U.S. CONST., amend. VIII (ratified Dec. 15, 1791).
14 Compare Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 398 (1989) ("the terms 'cruel' and
'punishments' clearly suggest some inquiry into subjective state of mind") and Bland v.
State, 164 P.3d 1076, 1082 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007) (Chapel, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is
simply unavoidable and inevitable that we turn to our societal conceptions of what is
moral and appropriate to fill in the contours of constitutional terms that are as subjective
and indeterminate as 'cruel' and 'unusual."') with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,608
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Because I do not believe that the meaning of our Eighth
Amendment, any more than the meaning of other provisions of our Constitution, should
be determined by the subjective views of five Members of this Court and like-minded
foreigners, I dissent.").
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unusual" to one Justice may not be to another, leading to a plethora of
five-to-four decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court in this area of lawY
The Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence-in a state of
flux in recent years 16-has aptly been described as a "mess." 17 Even the
Justices-who grapple with capital cases every year-seem dissatisfied and
uneasy with the state of the law. For example, in a 2008 decision outlawing executions for non-homicidal child rape, the Court forthrightly
acknowledged that its Eighth Amendment case law pertaining to capital
punishment "is still in search of a unifying principle." 18 "When the law
punishes by death," Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote in that case, "it risks
its own sudden descent into brutality, transgressing the constitutional
commitment to decency and restraint." 19
Judges are prone to interpret provisions of the U.S. Constitution differently, and the Eighth Amendment is no exception. The meaning of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause-already the subject of uncertainty
in the founding era and the decades that followed-was complicated even
further by the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification in 1868.20 "At most,"
law professor Akhil Amar writes of 1789, when the First Congress originally debated the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, "the clause
seemed to disfavor the odd-ball statute, wholly out of sync with other congressional criminal laws. " 21 But after the Fourteenth Amendment's postCivil War ratification, the Eighth Amendment was held to apply to the
states. 22 In prior times, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause only
constrained the federal government's actions. 23 "Once applied against
states," Amar notes of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, "the
clause might have more judicially enforceable bite against state legisla-

15 E.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496
(1987), overruled, Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972).
16 E.g., Richard M. Re, Can Congress Overturn Graham v. Florida?, 34 HARv. J.L. &
PuB. POL'Y 367, 371 (2011).
17 Tom Stacy, Cleaning up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. &MARYBILLRTS. J.
475 (2005); John "Evan" Gibbs, Jurisprudential Juxtaposition: Application of Graham v.
Florida to Adult Sentences, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 957, 968 (2011); John D. Castiglione,
Qualitative and Quantitative Proportionality: A Specific Critique ofRetributivism, 71
OHIO ST. L.J. 71, 75 (2010); J. Richard Broughton, Some Reflections on Conservative
Politics and the Limits ofthe Criminal Sanction, 4 CHARLESTON L. REv. 537, 543 (201 0).
18 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 437 (2008).
19 Id. at 420.
20 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV (ratified July 9, 1868).
21 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 279 (1998).
22 See generally GARRETT EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA (2006).
23 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833); Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. (5
Wall.) 475 (1866).
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tures." 24 "[T]he meaning of the Bill of Rights," Amar sagely notes, "shifted
when its words and principles were refracted through the prism of the
Fourteenth Amendment. " 25
Not surprisingly, the "cruel and unusual punishments" language has
been subject to varied constructions and interpretations over time. 26 But
only in the late nineteenth century, in the post-Reconstruction Era, did the
U.S. Supreme Court finally weigh in on the murkily understood27 text.
When it did, the Court held-in dicta, no less-that the language only
barred gruesome "punishments of torture" such as breaking on the wheel,
burning at the stake, crucifixion, emboweling alive, beheading, drawing
and quartering, and public dissection for murder. 28 The "cruel and unusual" proscription, one Justice emphasized in 1892, was "usually applied to
punishments which inflict torture, such as the rack, the thumb-screw, the

AMAR, supra note 21, at 171, 279. As Amar explains: "When judged against a national
baseline, perhaps a single state legislature, or the legislatures of an entire region, might
indeed be 'unusual' and out of sync with general national sentiment and national
morality." Id. at 279-80.
25 Akhil Reed Amar, America's Lived Constitution, 20 YALE L.J. 1734, 1779 (20 11 ).
26 In The Morality of Law, the noted Harvard law professor, Lon L. Fuller, wrote that the
"cruel and unusual punishments" phrase "calls to mind at once the whipping post and the
ducking stool." LON L. FuLLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 105 (1964 ). However, earlier
judicial decisions once held that whipping-a once popular form of punishment,
especially as regards slaves-was not a cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Cannon,
190 A.2d 514, 517 (Del. 1963) (refusing to hold that whipping was a cruel and unusual
punishment); In re Candido, 31 Haw. 982, 1931 WL 2830 *9 (Haw. Terr. 1931)
("whipping with a cat-o' -nine-tails" did not constitute a cruel and unusual punishment);
Garcia v. Territory ofNew Mexico, 1 N.M. 415, 1869 WL 2421 *2 (N.M. Terr. 1869)
(the punishment of the crime of stealing mules by the infliction oflashes on the bare back
did not constitute a cruel and unusual punishment).
27 The "cruell and unusuall Punishments" provision of the English Declaration of Rights
of 1688 was prompted by abuses of the infamous Lord Chief Justice George Jeffreys of
the King's Bench during the Stuart reign of James II. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.
957, 967-69 (1991). Historians, however, do not agree on which abuses. Id. One of the
seminal studies of the Eighth Amendment pointed out that many early Americans (who
often focused on the mode of punishment) may have misunderstood the original meaning
of the English Declaration-later enacted by Parliament as the English Bill of Rights of
1689. Anthony Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The Original
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 839, 843-44, 860 (1969). As Anthony Granucci wrote:
"Executing male rebels by drawing and quartering continued with all its embellishments
until1814, when disembowelling was eliminated by statute. Beheading and quartering
were not abolished until1870. The burning of female felons continued in England until
the penalty was repealed in 1790." I d. at 855-56. Compare Stephen E. Meltzer, Harmelin
v. Michigan: Contemporary Morality and Constitutional Objectivity, 27 NEW ENG. L.
REv. 749, 760 n.95 (1993) ("It is asserted by some historians that the framers of the
American Constitution misinterpreted the meaning of the cruel and unusual punishments
clause of the English Bill of Rights. The clause was not misunderstood, nor was it meant
differently than it was shown to mean in the English Bill of Rights.").
28 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446
(1890).
24
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iron boot, and the like, which are attended with acute pain and suffering."29 The proscription was thus read-as it still is by Justice Antonin
Scalia and others30-to restrict only a small subset of cruel punishments:
those involving torture, a lingering death, or especially severe bodily pain.Jl

29 O'Neil v. State of Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting). The Eighth
Amendment itself, of course, contains no reference to "methods" or "modes" of
punishment.
30 "The Eighth Amendment," Justice Scalia has written, "is addressed to always-andeverywhere 'cruel' punishments, such as the rack and the thumbscrew." Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 349 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). He and some of his
colleagues-unhappy with the Supreme Court's "evolving standards of decency" testthus read the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to bar only certain "modes" of
punishment, but not death itself. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 981 (opinion of Scalia, J.)
("The early commentary on the Clause contains no reference to disproportionate or
excessive sentences, and again indicates that it was designed to outlaw particular modes of
punishment.") (italics in original); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of 'cruel and unusual punishments'
was aimed at excluding only certain modes of punishment") (italics in original); see also
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2049 n.3 (Thomas, J. dissenting) ("The Court ignores entirely the
threshold inquiry of whether subjecting juvenile offenders to adult penalties was one of
the 'modes or acts of punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time
that the Bill of Rights was adopted."') (citation omitted); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 99
(2008) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Consistent with the original understanding of the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause, this Court's cases have repeatedly taken the view that
the Framers intended to prohibit torturous modes of punishment akin to those that formed
the historical backdrop of the Eighth Amendment."); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
608 n.l (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court ignores entirely the threshold inquiry in
determining whether a particular punishment complies with the Eighth Amendment:
whether it is one of the 'modes or acts of punishment that had been considered cruel and
unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted."') (citation omitted); see also J.
Amy Dillard, And Death Shall Have No Dominion: How to Achieve the Categorical
Exemption ofMentally Retarded Defendants from Execution, 45 U. RicH. L. REv. 961,
987 (2011) ("In the opening lines of his dissenting opinion in Atkins, Justice Scalia
condenms the 'evolving standards of decency' rationale supporting the majority's
declaration that the execution of mentally retarded defendants would abridge the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against 'cruel and unusual punishment."').
31 See, e.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 983 ("Throughout the 19th century, state courts
interpreting state constitutional provisions with identical or more expansive wording (i.e.,
'cruel or unusual') concluded that these provisions did not proscribe disproportionality
but only certain modes of punishment.") (italics in original); see also People ex rel.
Kemmler v. Durston, 55 Hun 64, 7 N.Y.S. 813, 815 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1889):
We have no doubt that if the legislature of this state should undertake to prescribe, for any
offense against its laws, the punishment of burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel,
disembowelling, or hanging in chains, to perish by exhaustion, it would be the duty of the
courts to pronounce upon such attempt the condenmation of the constitution. In the case
supposed, no doubt could exist, because the statute would be, on its face, repugnant to the
provision of the constitution against cruel and unusual punishments. It is common
knowledge that the punishments mentioned are unusual, and, by the common consent of
mankind, they are cruel punishments, because they involve torture and a lingering death.
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Yet, for decades now, the Eighth Amendment has been used to strike
down a variety of prison abuses and an array of punishments other than
physically torturous ones. 32 Indeed, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause has long been used to invalidate punishments less severe than
death. 33 For example, in Jackson v. Bishop, 34 the late Justice Harry
Blackmun-then writing for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit-held in 1968 that whipping a prisoner with a strap in order to maintain discipline is prohibited. 35
That ruling by Justice Blackmun-who later came to view capital punishment as unconstitutionaP 6-shows that non-lethal corporal punishments
have also been in the Eighth Amendment's crosshairs. "[W]e have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion," Blackmun wrote, "that the use of the
strap in the penitentiaries of Arkansas is punishment which, in this last
third of the 20th century, runs afoul of the Eighth Amendment." 37 "[T]he
strap's use, irrespective of any precautionary conditions which may be imposed," he concluded, "offends contemporary concepts of decency and
human dignity and precepts of civilization which we profess to possess. " 38
"Corporal punishment," he emphasized, "is degrading to the punisher and
to the punished alike." 39

32

Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (a California statute criminalizing
narcotics addition constituted a cruel and unusual punislunent). The Eighth Amendment
has also been read to strictly regulate certain aspects of capital trials even before the
punishment itself. Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 584 (1988) ("The fundamental
respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punislunent gives rise to a special '"need for reliability in the determination that
death is the appropriate punishment'" in any capital case."); Sue Ann Gerald Shannon,
Atkins v. Virginia: Commutation for the Mentally Retarded?, 54 S.C. L. REv. 809 (2003)
("courts have repeatedly remarked that 'death is different' and ... have placed significant
procedural and substantive safeguards on capital trials").
33 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002) (prison guards violated the Eighth
Amendment by handcuffing shirtless prisoner to hitching post for seven hours).
34 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
35 Id. at 579.
36 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of
cert.) ("Experience has taught us that the constitutional goal of eliminating arbitrariness
and discrimination from the administration of death can never be achieved without
compromising an equally essential component of fundamental fairness-individualized
sentencing.").
37 Jackson, 404 F.2d at 579.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 580. A Treatise on the Office of the Justice of the Peace, published in 1581, stated
that corporal punislunents are either capital or not capital. Capital punislunents, that
treatise reported, are inflicted "in sundrie ways; as by hanging, burning, boiling, pressing:
not capital," the treatise added, "are of divers sorts, as cutting off the hand or ear, burning
or branding the hand, face, shoulders, whipping, imprisonment, stocking, sitting in the
pillory, or on the cucking-stool." James v. Commonwealth, 1825 WL 1899 *8 (Pa. 1825).
Of the non-lethal kinds of corporal punishments, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court wrote
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The modern debate over the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clausecentered for more than fifty years on the U.S. Supreme Court's "evolving
standards of decency" test40-has often focused on the concept of proportionality.41 That concept was popularized in America by Cesare Beccaria's
bestselling 1760s treatise, On Crimes and Punishments, a book admired by
many of America's founders. 42 While the founders embraced the concept of
proportionality, the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court remain divided as
to whether that concept should be relevant to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence at all, 43 with a tug of war simultaneously taking place as to whether
the Eighth Amendment should be read in an "originalist" or a contemporary manner. 44 The latter divide is emblematic of the larger debate over
in 1825, "our old laws had more sorts than we now have; as pulling out the tongue for
false rumors, cutting off the nose, and for adultery, taking away the priyy parts." Id.
40 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
41 See generally E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARDS. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY
PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW: CONTROLLING EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS (2008).
The concept of proportionality, a major topic of Cesare Beccaria's famous 1760s treatise,
On Crimes and Punishments, dates back to even before America's founding. Bessler,
supra note 9, at 196. A whole chapter ofMontesquieu's influential1748 treatise, The
Spirit of the Laws, is devoted to that very subject. CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT
OF THE LAWS 91 (Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Millier & Harold Samuel Stone, eds.,
trans. 1989) (1748) (in Chapter 16, titled "On the just proportion between the penalties
and the crime," Montesquieu writes: "Among ourselves, it is a great ill that the same
penalty is inflicted on the highway robber and on the one who robs and murders.") (italics
in original).
42 See generally BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7; Bessler, Revisiting
Beccaria's Vision, supra note 9.
43 Compare Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010) ("The concept of
proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment.") (opinion of Justice Kennedy, joined
by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor) with id. at 2039 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) ("Applying the 'narrow proportionality' framework to the particular facts of
this case, I conclude that Graham's sentence of life without parole violates the Eighth
Amendment."); id. at 2044 (Thomas, J., dissenting; joined by Justices Scalia and Alito)
("[T]he Court has held that the Clause authorizes it to proscribe not only methods of
punishment that qualify as 'cruel and unusual,' but also any punishment that the Court
deems 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime committed. This latter interpretation is
entirely the Court's creation. As has been described elsewhere at length, there is virtually
no indication that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause originally was understood to
require proportionality in sentencing.") (citations omitted).
44 Chief Justice John Roberts-as well as Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito-have
written or joined opinions making reference to the "original meaning" of the Eighth
Amendment. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 447, 469 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting;
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas) (arguing that the Court's
holding "is not supported by the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment"); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 607-8 (2005)(Scalia, J., dissenting; joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Thomas) ("The Court reaches this implausible result by purporting to
advert, not to the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment, but to 'the evolving
standards of decency' of our national society.") (citation omitted); id. at 626 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("The Court has, however-! think wrongly-long rejected a purely
originalist approach to our Eighth Amendment .... "); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
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how the Constitution, as a whole, should be read. 45 While originalists look
to historical understandings, "living constitutionalists" 46 view the "cruel
and unusual punishments" prohibition as part of what one scholar calls the
nation's "breathtakingly abstract, principled constitution. " 47
This ongoing Eighth Amendment debate might well determine the fate
of America's 3,000 plus death row inmates. 48 If "cruel and unusual punishments" is read in line with eighteenth-century attitudes, their fate is
sealed. In 1791, an array of crimes, including murder and other felonies,
were punishable by death, with death sentences being mandatory for such
crimes. 49 In that slave-holding era, brutal corporal punishments were also

337, 340, 348 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting; joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas) ("Beyond the empty talk of a "national consensus," the Court gives us a brief
glimpse of what really underlies today's decision: pretension to a power confined neither
by the moral sentiments originally enshrined in the Eighth Amendment (its original
meaning) nor even by the current moral sentiments of the American people.") (emphasis
in original); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36, 40 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting;
joined by Justice Scalia) ("[A]lthough the evidence is not overwhelming, I believe that the
text and history of the Eighth Amendment, together with the decisions interpreting it,
support the view that judges or juries-but not jailers-impose 'punishment.' At a
minimum, I believe that the original meaning of 'punishment,' the silence in the historical
record, and the 185 years of uniform precedent shift the burden of persuasion to those
who would apply the Eighth Amendment to prison conditions.").
45 Compare CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDs: WHY THE FOUNDING
DOCUMENT DOESN'T MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE 37 (2009) ("originalists, including
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, believe that the Constitution should be
understood to mean what it meant at the time that it was ratified") with id. at I 0 (noting
that Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall "were willing to use their own
judgments about the requirements of justice in order to move constitutional law in bold
new directions--protecting privacy, banning discrimination, and striking down capital
punishment").
46 LisaK. Parshall, Embracing the Living Constitution: Justice Anthony M Kennedy's
Move away from a Conservative Methodology of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 N.C.
CENT. L. REv. 25, 44 (2007) ("The interpretation of the Eighth Amendment exemplifies
the division between adherents and opponents of a 'living Constitution."').
47 RONALD DWORKIN: LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA,
AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 127-28 (1993).
48 Facts about the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (Aug. 6, 2013).
49 A federal law approved by Congress in 1790 made the following crimes capital
offenses: treason, murder, piracy, robbery, forgery, counterfeiting, and rescuing any
capital offender from the gallows. An Act for the Punishment of certain Crimes against
the United States, §§ 1, 3, 8, I 0, 14, 23 (approved Apr. 30, 1790). The law itself provided
that any such offender "shall suffer death," making death sentences mandatory. !d. §§ I,
3, 8, 10, 14, 23. That same law-invoked so often by Justice Scalia in defense of
executions (see, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 88 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring)}-also
allowed murderers' bodies to be "delivered to a surgeon for dissection"; permitted the use
of the pillory for perjurers; allowed public whipping of certain offenders "not exceeding
thirty-nine stripes"; and authorized up to a seven-year term of imprisonment and a fine not
exceeding one thousand dollars for "any person or persons" who "shall unlawfully cut off
the ear or ears, or cut out or disable the tongue, put out an eye, slit the nose, cut off the
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then commonly inflicted by slaveholders, the military, and judicial systems
alike. 50
Conversely, if current conceptions of justice, human rights and morality are considered, a different result might be reached as regards the constitutionality of executions. This is especially so if Supreme Court Justices
stop deferring excessively to legislative judgments and focus on the Constitution's text to independently decide what constitutes a "cruel and unusual" punishment. 51 In the founding era, it must be recalled, executions were
the ordinary-or usual-punishment for many categories of offenders; today, however, life-without-parole sentences have far eclipsed executions as
the public's preferred punishment for felony murders and first-degree murderers.52
The prior decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, where the Justices
have sparred over these issues, frame the current, highly contentious debate. In Ingraham v. Wright, 53 a 1977 decision finding the Eighth Amendment inapplicable to public school discipline, 54 the majority opinion noted

nose or a lip, or cut off or disable any limb or member of any person, with intention in so
doing to maim or disfigure such person." !d. at§§ 4, 13, 15-16, 18 (emphasis added).
50 In re Candido, 31 Haw. 982, 1931 WL 2830 *8 (1931) ("There can be no doubt that in
1791 when the Eighth Amendment was framed and adopted whipping was a well known
form of punishment commonly used by the executive departments of the federal
government and of some of the states.").
51 The concepts of deference and independence are mutually exclusive. "Deference" is
defined as "the act or attitude of deferring: a yielding of judgment or preference out of
respect for the position, wish, or known opinion of another." WEBSTER'S THIRD
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 591 (2002). "Independence," in
common parlance, refers to "the quality or state of being independent." /d. at 1148. To be
"independent" means to be "not subject to control by others: not subordinate." !d.
52 At common law in 1791, even offenders as young as seven years of age could be
executed. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 587 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("Perhaps even more important than our specific holding today is our reaffirmation of the
basic principle that informs the Court's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. If the
meaning of that Amendment had been frozen when it was originally drafted, it would
impose no impediment to the execution of7-year-{)ld children today. The evolving
standards of decency that have driven our construction of this critically important part of
the Bill of Rights foreclose any such reading of the Amendment.") (citing Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368 (1989)).
53 430 u.s. 651 (1977).
54 !d. at 669, 671. The majority opinion in Ingraham ruled that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause was intended to apply in the criminal context. !d. at 664 ("Bail, fines,
and punishment traditionally have been associated with the criminal process, and by
subjecting the three to parallel limitations the text of the Amendment suggests an
intention to limit the power of those entrusted with the criminal-law function of
government. An examination of the history of the Amendment and the decisions of this
Court construing the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment confirms that it
was designed to protect those convicted of crimes. We adhere to this longstanding
limitation and hold that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to the paddling of children
as a means of maintaining discipline in public schools."). In Ingraham, the Supreme Court
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that "[t]he applicability of the Eighth Amendment always has turned on its
original meaning, as demonstrated by its historical derivation. " 55 But long
before that, the Supreme Court's 1910 decision in Weems v. United States 56
flatly rejected a purely historical interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. 5 7
In holding unconstitutional a corporal punishment involving more than
twelve years of hard labor in chains, 58 the Court in Weems emphasized:
"Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.
Therefore a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application
than the mischief which gave it birth. " 59 For more than one hundred years,
the Supreme Court has thus rejected a view of the Eighth Amendment that
relies solely on historical understandings.
This Article argues that the time has come to declare executions unconstitutional as "cruel and unusual punishments." It shows the bizarre
anomaly of present-day American executions, not only in terms of modern
Western thought and norms emphasizing equality and human rights, but in
light of existing Eighth Amendment principles. The Eighth Amendment, in
rulings dating back many decades, has already been interpreted to bar nonlethal corporal punishments-that is, bodily punishments short of death. 60
In fact, the federal courts have long characterized unprovoked and gratuitous inmate beatings and other forms of prisoner mistreatment and abuse
as "obvious" or "clear" Eighth Amendment violations. 61 The Supreme
Court itself recognizes the government's duty to protect prisoners from
harm and provide them with their basic needs: shelter, medical care, and

specifically left open the issue of whether public school students have a substantive due
process right to remain free from severe corporal punishments. !d. at 659 n.12.
55 !d. at 670 n.39.
56 217 u.s. 349 (1910).
57 Id. at 373.
58 Id. at 363-64.
59 Id. at 373.
60 See Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974) ("handcuffing inmates to the fence
and to cells for long periods of time" are "forms of corporal punishment" that "run afoul
of the Eighth Amendment"). Decades ago, the U.S. Supreme Court itself noted American
society's "general abandonment of corporal punishment as a means of punishing criminal
offenders." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 660 (1977).
61 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 734-35 & n.2, 737-38, 741 (2002) (attaching prisoner to
"hitching post," causing "pain and discomfort" resulting in dehydration, a sunburn and
muscle aches, was characterized as an "obvious" and "clear" Eighth Amendment
violation); Tucker v. Randall, 948 F.2d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Deliberate
nontreatment of broken ribs and a broken hand for 9'h months, resulting in permanent
deformities, presents a clear Eighth Amendment violation."); Merced v. Moylan, No.
9:05-CV-1426, 2007 WL 3171800 *10 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2007) ("Attacking a
handcuffed prisoner and causing injury, without provocation, constitutes a clear Eighth
Amendment violation of which a reasonable person should have known."); see also
Henderson v. DeRobertis, 940 F.2d 1055, 1066 (7th Cir. 1991) ("In sum, in 1982 it was
clearly established that prison inmates had a right under the eighth amendment of the
Constitution to adequate heat and shelter.").
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the like. 62 The contradiction of the law protecting prisoners from harm
while simultaneously allowing their execution-a kind of Dr. Jekyll-andMr. Hyde 63 jurisprudence-is the focal point of this Article's critique.
This Article argues for a principled interpretation of the U.S. Constitution's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Part II of the Article discusses the Eighth Amendment's origins, from the English Bill of Rights to the
Virginia Declaration of Rights to the state ratifying conventions that gave
life to James Madison's "cruel and unusual punishments" language. 64 It
also shows how the catchphrases "cruel and unusual" and "cruel or unusual"-used in English law and the founders' time to describe criminal assaults or to designate the severity of a homicide-became part of the nomenclature of American law. The cruel and unusual terms, history reveals,
also constituted a well-established benchmark to gauge the mistreatment of
slaves and mariners while simultaneously regulating the law of homicide
and manslaughter. Those two conjoined words-by virtue of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments-have long forbidden the "cruel and unusual" punishment of criminals throughout the United States. 65
Following Part II's historical account and its description of early
American cases construing the "cruel and unusual" language, Part III discusses the current state of America's death penalty and existing Eighth
Amendment case law. That section emphasizes the arbitrary and racially
discriminatory manner in which U.S. death sentences are imposed, as well
as the many thorny problems that continue to plague America's death penalty. Those thickets include the risk of executing the innocent, an errorridden system, and prolonged stays on death row. Among other things,
Part III highlights the racial bias and stark geographic disparities now so
E.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) ("That the Eighth Amendment
protects against future harm to inmates is not a novel proposition. The Amendment, as we
have said, requires that inmates be furnished with the basic human needs, one of which is
'reasonable safety."'); see also Martino v. Carey, 563 F. Supp. 984, 999 (D. Ore. 1983)
("Functioning plumbing, including toilets, sinks and showers, is a basic necessity of
civilized life. The provision of adequate means of hygiene, and the sanitary disposal of
bodily wastes so that the wastes do not contaminate the cells, are constitutionally
required. This is so because the facility's obligation to provide basic minima of shelter
and sanitation will otherwise not be satisfied."); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 523
(2d Cir. 1967) ("We are of the view that civilized standards of humane decency simply do
not permit a man for a substantial period of time to be denuded and exposed to the bitter
cold of winter in northern New York State and to be deprived of the basic elements of
hygiene such as soap and toilet paper.").
63 See ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON, THE STRANGE CASE OF DR. JEKYLL AND MR. HYDE
(1886). In Robert Louis Stevenson's novel, the kind and virtuous Dr. Jekyll-the
respectable physician-protector-is transformed into the monstrous and wicked Mr. Hyde.
State v. Yarborough, 39 Kan. 581, 18 P. 474 (Kan. 1888).
64 The Eighth Amendment's language was plainly derived from the English Bill of Rights
and the Virginia Declaration of Rights and was included, albeit in modified form, in the
constitutional amendments James Madison proposed in 1789. United States v. Moore, 486
F.2d 1139, 1235 n.160 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wright, C.J., dissenting).
65 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 203-08.
62
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closely associated with capital charges, death sentences and executions.
Statistics show that the vast majority of American executions take place in
just a few locales, mostly in the South, and that only a tiny percentage of
U.S. counties-many of them in Texas-account for the vast majority of
those executions. 66
Next, Part IV compares the reality of America's capital punishment
system as it exists today with the constitutional guarantees set forth in the
Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses. In particular, Part IV describes how death sentences and executions are cruel-and were, in fact, labeled as such long
ago, even by some of America's founders-and have, over time, become
unusual. Part IV further describes how, in early America, the "cruel" and
"unusual" labels were attached to particular criminal conduct or mistreatment, with judges or juries-through adjudication-making factual and
legal findings as to whether specific conduct qualified as "cruel and unusual."67 Finally, Part IV highlights how the Fourteenth Amendment, with its
emphasis on equality and non-random, non-arbitrary outcomes, revolutionized American law by restricting state power.
The Fourteenth Amendment, a Reconstruction Era provision ultimately read by the U.S. Supreme Court to selectively incorporate protections of
the Bill of Rights against the states, broadened the Eighth Amendment's
scope and reach by making the "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibition applicable to the states. 68 In the process, the Fourteenth Amendment
fundamentally transformed the U.S. Constitution, the relationship between
the federal government and the states, and the "cruel and unusual punishments" calculus. Not only does the Fourteenth Amendment, like the Fifth
Amendment before it, 69 specifically ensure "due process of law," but the
Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees "the equal protection of the
laws. " 70 The Eighth Amendment cannot be read in isolation, but must be
considered in light of its new companion, the Fourteenth Amendment, with
its focus on equality and equal treatment. 71 To fail to take into account

Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria's Vision, supra note 9, at 200 n.927 ("The rate of
executions varies widely by state, but also by counties within states.").
67 Early American judicial proceedings were handled much differently than they are
today, including with respect to the division of authority between judge and jury. See
Meghan J. Ryan, The Missing Jury: The Neglected Role ofJuries in Eighth Amendment
Punishments Clause Determinations, 64 FLA. L. REv. 549, 575 (2012) ("Early American
jurors were not only charged with fact-finding, as their English ancestors were, but they
were also informed that they had the power, and the right, to determine the law in the case
at hand.").
68 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 203-08.
69 U.S. CONST., amend. V (ratified Dec. 15, 1791).
70 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV (ratified July 9, 1868).
71 In analyzing their objectives, provisions of constitutions are routinely read together
with one another. Application of Lamb, 169 A.2d 822, 826 (N.J. Super. 1961) ("The
various provisions of our Constitution with respect to the three divisions of government
must be read, analyzed and interpreted together in determining the intended objectives of
66

3IO

The Anomaly of Executions
Fourteenth Amendment values when interpreting the Eighth Amendment
and resolving disputes over the Constitution's meaning would be like omitting discussion of the Civil War from an American history course.
After describing the Supreme Court's "evolving standards of decency"
test and summarizing existing precedents applying it, this Article-in Part
V-offers its critique of that approach. The lofty sounding "evolving
standards of decency" test-which now asks largely whether American
society has reached a "national consensus" as to a particular punishmenthas guided the Court's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause jurisprudence for more than a half century. That majoritarian test, however, has
proven problematic because, to date, it has failed to produce anything resembling a sensible body of Eighth Amendment case law. The "evolving
standards" test, in fact, gives short-shrift to the Constitution's text and has
led to an untenable state of affairs: one in which the death penalty is declared constitutional while less serious corporal punishments are found to
be unconstitutional. After recalling the abandonment of non-lethal corporal punishments in the American penal system, Part V specifically argues
that the Eighth Amendment should be read in a more intellectually consistent and straightforward manner.
The Article concludes that the Supreme Court, exercising its judicial
independence72 and reading the "cruel and unusual" language in a more
logical and principled fashion, should reevaluate its hopelessly irreconcilable Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. In particular, the Article argues that
the Court should declare U.S. executions unconstitutional because they are
"cruel and unusual punishments. " 73 Indeed, the Constitution's text-with

this fundamental and basic document."); Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas, 95
S.W.3d 253, 262 (Tex. 2002) ("Rules of constitutional interpretation dictate that all
clauses must be given effect."); Marsh v. Department of Civil Service, 370 N.W.2d 613,
617 (Mich. App. 1985) ("Provisions of the constitution should be read in context, not in
isolation, and they should be harmonized to give effect to all."); Johnson County Bd. of
Election Com'rs v. Holman, 655 S.W.2d 408, 409 (Ark. 1983) ("Since we must give
effect to all the language in the Constitution, we find no difficulty in reconciling the two
quoted provisions."); Olson v. City of West Fargo, 305 N.W.2d 821, 825 (N.D. 1981)
("[A] court must give effect and meaning to every provision of the Constitution and, if
possible, reconcile apparently inconsistent provisions. Further, this court has recognized
that all constitutional provisions have equal dignity.").
72 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is"); see also Chandler v.
Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit of the United States, 398 U.S. 74, 143 (1970) (Black, J.,
dissenting) ("The wise authors of our Constitution provided for judicial independence
because they were familiar with history; they knew that judges of the past-good,
patriotic judges-had occasionally lost not only their offices but had also sometimes lost
their freedom and their heads because of the actions and decrees of other judges. They
were determined that no such things should happen here.").
73 In the past, some Supreme Court Justices have themselves argued for this result.
Lindsey S. Vann, History Repeats Itself The Post-Furman Return to Arbitrariness in
Capital Punishment, 45 U. RICH. L. REv. 1255, 1260 (2011) ("Justices Brennan and
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its emphasis on cruelty and unusualness as well as due process and equal
protection-compels that result when the reality of American executions is
considered. Instead of looking to the concepts articulated in the Constitution as guiding lights, the Court has thus far fixated on its "evolving standards of decency" test, even though that test had produced absurd results. It
makes perfect sense that harsh corporal punishments are no longer allowed
within the U.S. penal system, but following that logic, it makes no sense
that capital punishment-a much more draconian sanction-should continue to be permitted.

II. "CRUEL AND UNUSUAL": A SHORT HISTORY
A. The Origins of the Phrase
The phrase "cruel and unusual punishments" first appeared in English
law.74 The English Declaration of Rights-later the English Bill of Rights of
1689-grew out of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 75 and provided in
part: "[E]xcessive Bail ought not to be required nor excessive Fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual Punishments inflicted. " 76 That clause-the
Eighth Amendment's oldest predecessor-is what inspired a number of
equivalent provisions in state bills of rights and constitutions.77 Indeed, that
language in the English Bill of Rights-copied verbatim by Virginia plantation owner George Mason for inclusion in Virginia's 1776 Declaration of
Rights 78-would become the linguistic source for the Eighth Amendment
itsel£.79 During the Revolutionary War, Great Britain and the United States
of America fought bitterly, but one thing is clear: both English subjects and
early Americans despised cruel and unusual punishments, though understandings of what those were seems to have varied substantially from person to person. 80
Marshall found the death penalty per se unconstitutional based in part on its arbitrary
imposition.").
74 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976).
75 People ex rel. Kemmler v. Durston, 55 Hun 64, 7 N.Y.S. 813, 814 (1889) (noting that
the "cruel and unusual punishments" language "originated in the well known 'bill of
rights' of England," with the English Bill of Rights described as "one of the first fruits of
the great revolution of 1688").
76 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 577 (2005); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,
966 (1991).
77 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 162-80.
78 VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § IX (June 12, 1776).
79 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890) ("[t]he provision in reference to cruel and
unusual punishments was taken from the well-known act of parliament of 1688, entitled
'An act for declaring the rights and liberties of the subject, and settling the succession of
the crown'"); Amy L. Riederer, Working 9 to 5: Embracing the Eighth Amendment
through an Integrated Model ofPrison Labor, 43 VAL. U. L. REv. 1425, 1429 (2009)
("the language of the Eighth Amendment was substantially copied from the language of
the English Act of Parliament in 1688").
80 Near the end of his life, Edmund Randolph, of Virginia, wrote that Virginia's
prohibition "against excessive bail and excessive fines, was borrowed from England with
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In both the English Bill of Rights and the Virginia Declaration of
Rights, the conjunctive and separated the cruel and unusual terms. English
and American lawmakers, however, often paid little attention to the conjunctive word that separated those words. For example, a 1689 pronouncement of more than ten Lords in Great Britain's Parliament, pertaining to the notorious case of convicted perjurer Titus Oates, uses "nor" instead of "and" in the key position, to wit: "[T]hat excessive Bail ought not
to be required, nor excessive Fines imposed, nor cruel nor unusual Punishments inflicted." 81 In fact, the phrases "cruel and unusual" and "cruel or
unusual" were often used interchangeably, 82 with early American state constitutions often employing "cruel or unusual" instead of the "cruel and
unusual" verbiage. 83
Sometimes, the word "unusual" was omitted entirely from constitutional documents, 84 making a given provision's sole emphasis-at least in
the eyes of some-on cruelty. 85 In the 1792 constitutions of Delaware and
Kentucky, for example, state lawmakers just prohibited "cruel" punish-

additional reprobation of cruel and unusual punishments." BESSLER, CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 376 n.40.
81 10 How. St. Tr. 1079, 1316 (K.B. 1685); 1 THE HISTORY AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
HOUSE OF LORDS, FROM THE RESTORATION IN 1660, TO THE PRESENT TIME 367 (1742).
That substitute language-as one scholar writes-"indicates that during the time the
Eighth Amendment was adopted the 'and' and the 'or' may have been used
interchangeably when describing cruel and/or unusual punishments." Samuel J.M.
Donnelly, Capital Punishment: A Critique of the Political and Philosophical Thought
Supporting the Justices' Positions, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 100 n.532 (1992); compare id.
at 100 ("The first Congress, which proposed the Eighth Amendment, may have rejected
both punishments which are 'cruel' and punishments which are 'unusual' rather than only
punishments which are at the same time 'cruel and unusual."').
82 E.g., JOHN P. DuvAL, ED., COMPILATION OF THE PuBLIC ACTS OF THE LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL OF THE TERRITORY OF FLORIDA, PASSED PRIOR TO 1840, at 223 (1839) (the
editorial summary of Florida's 1828 prohibition on "cruel or unusual punishment" of
slaves, set forth in the margin next to the statutory prohibition itself, read as follows:
"Cruel and unusual punishment of slaves").
83 Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights under State Constitutions
When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted
in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEx. L. REv. 7. 78 (2008) (discussing the
language variations in state constitutions); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
243-44 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (discussing early American provisions).
84 The English Declaration of Rights, in a recital, declared "that excessive bail hath been
required of persons committed in criminal cases, to elude the benefit of the laws made for
the liberty of the subject; and excessive fines have been imposed, and illegal and cruel
punishments inflicted." People ex rei. Kemmler v. Durston, 55 Hun 64, 7 N.Y.S. 813, 814
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1889). The use of"illegal and cruel" instead of"unusual and cruel" in that
recital only further confounded the debate over the Eighth Amendment's meaning.
85 Cf Campbell v. Wood, 511 U.S. 1119 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from cert.
denial) ("Not only have 46 of the 48 States that once regularly imposed hanging
abandoned the practice, but many state legislatures rejected the practice because it was
perceived as inhumane and barbaric, precisely the concern that lies at the core of the
Eighth Amendment.").
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ments, dropping the word "unusual" altogether. 86 In the founding era, one
finds unduly harsh or draconian punishments described with all sorts of
labels, including the following: "barbaric," "barbarous," "cruel," "disproportioned," "ignominious," "illegal," "immoderate," "infamous," "inhuman," "inhumane," "ludicrous," "odius," "sanguinary," "severe," "unchristian," "unheard-of," "unnatural" and "unusual." 87 Of that varied
terminology, though, only "cruel" and "unusual" made it into the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause.
The concepts of cruelty and unusualness, linked together like a chain
and related to one another in at least some fashion, 88 do, of course, have
separate meanings, as English dictionaries have long shown. While cruelty
has to do with causing pain or distress or tormenting someone, unusualness
has to do with uncommonness. 89 The close proximity of cruel and unusual
in the Eighth Amendment suggests, however, that the words were intended
by the Founding Fathers to be read together. 90 How modern-day judges

Stacy, supra note 17, at 504 ("Delaware and Kentucky enacted constitutions in 1792
during the year following the Bill of Rights' ratification. All of these constitutions
prohibited 'cruel punishments,' omitting entirely any reference to the term 'unusual.'
Numerous state constitutions enacted after the Founding period used this same
language.").
87 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 446 (listing references).
88 In ordinary parlance, a punishment that is "cruel" can also easily be found to be
"unusual" in the sense that one would not ordinarily expect a civilized society to impose a
cruel punishment. Conversely, a punishment that is "unusual" might naturally be
considered "cruel" in the sense that it might be deemed unconscionable or unfair to
arbitrarily impose an outlier punishment on one person (or a small group of people) when
others engaged in identical conduct are not receiving that particular punishment. After all,
there is something inherently unusual in selectively inflicting a cruel punishment, just as a
finding of cruelty can, in and of itself, be influential in determining that a punishment is
unusual. The "selective prosecution" doctrine is itself premised on the notion that a
prosecutor's decision may not be deliberately based upon unjustifiable standards "such as
race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608
(1985) (citations omitted).
89 In 1785, Samuel Johnson's dictionary defined "cruel" as "[b]loody; mischievous;
destructive; causing pain." The 1828 edition of Noah Webster's dictionary defined "cruel"
as "[i]nhuman; barbarous; savage; causing pain, grief or distress; exerted in tormenting,
vexing or afflicting." John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REv. 899, 911 (2011) (citations omitted).
Seventeenth-century English dictionaries, by contrast, defined "unusual" as "[n]ot usual;
uncommon; exceptional." Meghan J. Ryan, Does the Eighth Amendment Punishments
Clause Prohibit Only Punishments That Are Both Cruel and Unusual?, 87 WASH. U. L.
REv. 567, 602 (2010) (citations omitted).
90 In early English legal history, one can even find reference to "unusual Cruelties." See,
e.g., 1 THE HISTORY AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, FROM THE RESTORATION
IN 1660, TO THE PRESENT TIME 362 (1742) (this language appears in 1689, the same year
that the English Bill of Rights was put in place: "[T]hat which most nearly touch'd his
Majesty, was the French King's unchristian Prosecution of many of his Majesty's English
Protestant Subjects, for Matters of Religion, contrary to the Law of Nations, and express
86
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read the proscription against "cruel and unusual punishments" is, as it
must be, for them to decide on a case-by-case basis. 91 Cruel and unusual,
though related, are not identical, conjoined twins. Rather, those termsconnected by the and-can be thought of as fraternal twins conceived at
the same time but whose linguistic qualities and characteristics differ.
The Eighth Amendment, it is clear, was not drafted in a vacuum; it
came about as a product of the American Revolution. An examination of
centuries-old laws and legal treatises also plainly shows that the concept of
cruelty-the first part of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause-has
long been a familiar one to Anglo-American lawyers and jurists. In 1583,
Sir Robert Beale-a clerk of the Privy Council who invoked the Magna
Carta-condemned "the racking of grievous offenders, as being cruel, barbarous, contrary to law, and unto the liberty of English subjects." 92 In
1641, "The Body of Liberties"-a code of laws drafted by the Cambridgeeducated, Puritan preacher Nathaniel Ward, and later adopted by the General Court of Massachusetts-also used the term "cruel" 93 almost half a
century before the issuance of the English Bill of Rights. Clause 46 of that
Massachusetts legal code read: "For bodilie punishments we allow amongst
us none that are inhumane, barbarous or cruel." 94 The concept of cruelty
also appears in the writings of influential thinkers such as Coke,95 Grotius,96 Montesquieu/ 7 Beccaria/ 8 Vattel/ 9 Burlamaqui, 100 Bentham/ 01 Romilly/02 and others. 103

Treaties, forcing them to abjure their Religion by strange and unusual Cruelties ... ")
(italics in original).
91 Neither America's Founding Fathers nor the Fourteenth Amendment's framers are
around to interpret the words they adopted, leaving it to today's judges to make decisions
in cases and controversies as they arise.
92 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 171-72; Robert J. McWhirter, Baby,
Don't Be Cruel, 46 ARiz. ATT'Y 38, 44 (2010) (quoting LEONARD LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 232 (1999)).
93 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 173-74.
94 Id. at 174.
95 SIR EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND:
CONTAINING THE EXPOSITION OF MANY ANCIENT AND OTHER STATUTES, ch. 26, p. 42
(1797) (1642) ("Odium, signifieth hatred, and atia or acia in this writ signifieth malice,
because that malice is acida, that is, eager, sharpe and cruel!.") (italics in original); SIR
EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND:
CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES,
ch. 6, p. 44 (1669) (using the word "cruel!" in a chapter titled "Of Felony by Conjuration,
Witchcraft, Sorcery or Inchantrnent"); SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: CONCERNING THE JURISDICTION OF COURTS, ch. 1,
p. 33 (1671) (noting that the "Earl of Northumberland ... was by the Rebels cruelly and
causelessly slain").
96 HUGO GROTIDS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: INCLUDING THE LAW OF NATURE AND
OF NATIONS 54, 74, 330 (2010) (1625) (referencing "cruel treatment," "cruel acts," "cruel
wrath," and "an inducement to captors to refrain from the cruel rigor of putting prisoners
to death").
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The concept of unusualness-the second part of the "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibition-has likewise been with Anglo-American
law for centuries. The British House of Commons, in commenting on the

MONTESQUIEU, supra note 41, at 62, 84-85, 87, 91, 200, 206, 251, 258, 489, 670, 67374 (referencing "the most cruel provision of this law," "a cruel penalty," "cruel
punishments," "cruel penalties," "a crafty and cruel tyrant," "cruel laws," "cruel slavery,"
"cruel masters," and "cruel" monarchs and princes, and noting that "[i]n China robbers
who are cruel are cut to bits"). Montesquieu also called Roman laws "very severe" and
"full of very cruel provisions." BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 36.
98 CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 64, 69-70, 80, 89 (Richard Bellamy,
ed. & Richard Davis, trans., 1995) (1764) (referencing "cruel laws," "cruel" penal
servitude, "cruel tortures," "cruel example," and "cruel prerogatives"). Beccaria viewed
torture itself as "a cruelty" and opposed the death penalty "because of the example of
cruelty that it gives to men." BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 35.
99 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 20-21,25, 148, 178, 191-93, 197, 199,
215, 224, 226, 228, 236 (Thomas Adamo, ed., 2011) (1758) (referencing "a cruel tyrant,"
a "cruel and perfidious" enemy, a "cruel" fate, "cruel experience," "cruel treatment," "a
cruel decision," "cruel distress," "cruel necessity," "the dread of a cruel punishment,"
"cruel punishments," "cruel expedient," "cruel licentiousness," a prince's "cruel and
arbitrary disposition," "cruel" war, "cruel enemies," and "cruel conditions").
100 JEAN-JACQUES BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW, chs. II &
IV (Thomas Nugent, ed. 2006) (1747) (referring to "an unjust and cruel prince," "bloody
and cruel wars," and the oppression of a subject "in so cruel a manner").
101 There are more than a dozen references to the concept of"cruelty" in Bentham's book,
The Principles ofMorals and Legislation. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND LEGISLATION 58,102,114-19,122,137,151,180-81,311 (RobertM. Baird& Stuart
E. Rosenbaum, eds. 1988) (1789).
102 Samuel Romilly argued that the English mode of punishing treason-that the offender
be dragged to the gallows; be hanged by the neck; while alive, be cut down, with his
entrails taken out and burned; then beheaded and dismembered-"inflicts a most cruel
death." Romilly further argued against laws creating a "standard of cruelty." "I call upon
you to remember," Romilly said, "that cruel punishments have an inevitable tendency to
produce cruelty in the people." Basil Montagu, The Debate in the House of Commons
(Apr. 5, 1813), reprinted in 4 JAMES E. CRIMMINS, ED. THE DEATH PENALTY: DEBATES IN
BRITAIN AND THE U.S., 1725-1868 (2004).
103 InA Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, sergeant-at-law William Hawkins-in a
chapter entitled "OfMurder"-wrote in Section 41 of the applicable law: "It is to be
observed, that wherever a person, in cool blood, by way of revenge, unlawfully and
deliberately beats another in such a manner that he afterwards dies thereof, he is guilty of
murder, however unwilling he might have been to have gone so far." 1 WILLIAM
HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN; OR, A SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPAL
MATTERS RELATING TO THAT SUBJECT, DIGESTED UNDER PROPER HEADS 99 (John
Curwood, Esq., 8th ed. 1824). In Section 42, Hawkins then added: "Also it seems, that he
who, upon a sudden provocation, executes his revenge in such a cruel manner, as shews a
cruel and deliberate intent to do mischief, is guilty of murder, if death ensure; as where
the keeper of a park, finding a boy stealing wood, tied him to a horse's tail and beat him,
whereupon the horse ran away and killed him." Id.; see also 1 id. at 98 (noting that "so
base and cruel a revenge cannot have too severe a construction'); 1 id. at 789 ("A master
is not justified in beating his servant in a cruel or barbarous manner, or with an improper
instrument.").
97

3I6

The Anomaly of Executions
harsh, seventeenth-century punishment of Titus Oates, ordered to be pilloried every year for life, declared that Oates' punishment was "barbarous,"
an "ill Example to future Ages," and "unusual" in that "an Englishman
should be exposed upon a Pillory, so many times a Year, during his
Life." 104 Even before the U.S. Bill of Rights was adopted, the phrase "cruel
or unusual" appears in American trade legislation. 105 In early American
slave codes, slave owners and their overseers were legally permitted to
whip or chastise slaves, though not-at least in some places-with "unusual rigor." 106 The word "unusual" actually appears in America's founding
document, the Declaration of Independence, 107 and the notion of "unusual
punishments" was discussed at Virginia's ratification convention. 108

B. Blackstone's Commentaries
The concepts of cruelty and unusualness were certainly not novel ones
to America's Founding Fathers. In William Blackstone's Commentaries on
the Laws of England-a highly influential source for American colonial
lawyers 109-the term "cruel" appears multiple times. "The laws of the Ro104 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 175-76. In the modem era, members
of the U.S. Supreme Court have emphasized that whether a punishment is "unusual" is
tied to its frequency or acceptance and whether the punishment is uncommon. Thompson
v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823 (1988) ("whether an action is 'unusual' depends, in
common usage, upon the frequency of its occurrence or the magnitude of its acceptance");
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 976 (1991) ("the word 'unusual"' means "[s]uch as
is [not] in common use"); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ("these sentences are 'unusual' in the sense that the penalty of death is
infrequently imposed for murder, and that its imposition for rape is extraordinarily rare").
The term "unusual" has been described as a "common synonym" of"uncommon." Miller
v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2481 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
105 See An Act for Granting to the United States in Congress Assembled, Certain Imposts
and Duties Upon Foreign Goods Imported into this State, and for the Purpose of Paying
the Principal and Interest of the Debt Contracted in the Prosecution of the Late War with
Great Britain (Oct. 20, 1783).
106 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 314.
107 In one of its recitals, the Declaration of Independence declared that the "King of Great
Britain," George III, "has called together legislative bodies at places unusual,
uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their Public Records, for the sole
purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures." DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE (July 4, 1776).
108 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 299, 301.
109 James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the Scottish Judiciary, 124 HARv.
L. REv. 1613, 1614 n.l (2011) ("First published in England between 1765 and 1769, when
Blackstone held the Vinerian chair at Oxford, the Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland
enjoyed remarkable success in America."); Guy I. Seidman, The Origins of
Accountability: Everything I Know about the Sovereign's Immunity, I Learned from King
Henry III, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 393, 479 (2005) ("By 1776, American lawyers and many
of the Founding Fathers were well-versed in English law and practice through Blackstone.
The Commentaries, in short, were widely known in America and had an enormous
influence on American legal thought."); Welsh S. White, Fact-Finding and the Death
Penalty: The Scope of a Capital Defendant's Right to Jury Trial, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
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man kings, and the twelve tables of the decemviri," Blackstone wrote,
"were full of cruel punishments." 110 "It is, it must be owned," Blackstone
observed, "much easier to extirpate than to amend mankind; yet that magistrate must be esteemed both a weak and a cruel surgeon, who cuts off
every limb, which through ignorance or indolence he will not attempt to
cure." 111 Elsewhere, Blackstone refers to a "cruel law" 112 and "cruel
edicts," 113 mentions a "cruel process," 114 and writes of "most cruel and
disagreeable hardships" 115 and "the cool and cruel sarcasm of the sovereign."116 In America, apprenticeships and the study of Blackstone's Commentaries remained the primary means of legal education until the late
1800s, making early American lawyers especially familiar with Blackstone's treatise. 117
In his Commentaries, Blackstone actually used the phrase "cruel and
unusual" in two separate contexts. 118 First, Blackstone used those words to
define "murder by express malice." 119 In detailing the elements of murder,
Blackstone wrote that "the killing must be committed with malice aforethought, to make it the crime of murder." 120 "This," he explained, "is the

1, 4 n.24 (1989) ("Included among those who read and acknowledged the authority of
Blackstone's Commentaries were John Adams, Nathaniel Green, James Madison,
Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and Patrick Henry.") (citing Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William
Blackstone and the New American Republic: A Study ofIntellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 731, 743-45 (1976)). St. George Tucker's annotated American edition of
Blackstone's Commentaries, published in 1803, was also later a standard legal reference
for American lawyers. David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth
Century, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1359, 1370-72 (1998).
110 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A FACSIMILE OF
THE FIRST EDITION OF 1765-1769, at 17 (1769) (1979) (italics in original).
111 !d. at 18 (italics in original).
112 Id. at 138.
113 Id. at 151.
114 Id. at 323.
115 Id. at 219.
116 !d. at 399.
117 Jessica J. Sage, Authority of the Law? The Contribution of Secularized Legal
Education to the Moral Crisis of the Profession, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 707, 714 (2004);
see also Jason J. Kilborn, Who's In Charge Here? Putting Clients in Their Place, 37 GA.
L. REv. 1, 14 n.62 (2002) ("The influence of English law practice on the American bar
was inevitable, as the primary early sources of legal training for aspiring American
lawyers were apprenticeship, reading Coke or Blackstone in the office of an Englishtrained barrister, and study in one ofthe English Inns of Court."); Kopel, supra note 109,
at 1372 ("Almost every prospective lawyer began his studies by reading Tucker's
Blackstone, and some lawyers may never have read anything else. Thomas Jefferson
recommended Tucker's Blackstone as part of the course of study for aspiring law
students, since the Tucker book was the best source for overall mastery of American
law.").
118 Ryan, supra note 89, at 601 nn.l97 & 199 (citing Blackstone's use of"cruel and
unusual").
119 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 110, at 199.
120 !d. at 198 (italics in original).
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grand criterion, which now distinguishes murder from other killing: and
this malice prepense, malitia praecogitata, is not so properly spite or malevolence to the deceased in particular, as any evil design in general; the
dictate of a wicked, depraved, and malignant heart; un disposition a faire
un male chose and it may be either express, or implied in law." 121
"Express malice," Blackstone wrote, "is when one, with a sedate deliberate mind and formed design, doth kill another: which formed design is
evidenced by external circumstances discovering that inward intention; as
lying in wait, antecedent menaces, former grudges, and concerted schemes
to do him some bodily harm." 122 "Also," Blackstone added, "if even upon
a sudden provocation one beats another in a cruel and unusual manner, so
that he dies, though he did not intend his death, yet he is guilty of murder
by express malice; that is, by an express evil design, the genuine sense of

malitia. " 123
Following that legal pronouncement, Blackstone-in the very next
sentence-then listed these specific examples along with an explanation for
why it would be considered murder by express malice: "As when a parkkeeper tied a boy, that was stealing wood, to a horse's tail, and dragged
him along the park; when a master corrected his servant with an iron bar,
and a schoolmaster stamped on his scholar's belly, so that each of the sufferers died; these were justly held to be murders, because the correction
being excessive, and such as could not proceed but from a bad heart, it was
equivalent to a deliberate act of slaughter." 124 "Neither shall he be guilty of
a less crime, who kills another in consequence of such a wilful act, as shews
him to be an enemy to all mankind in general; as going deliberately with a
horse used to strike, or discharging a gun, among a multiple of people." 125
"So if a man resolves to kill the next man he meets, and does kill him, it is
murder although he knew him not; for this is universal malice," Blackstone
concluded. 126

121
122

Id. at 198-99 (italics in original).
!d. at 199. "This takes in," Blackstone explained, "the case of deliberate duelling,

where both parties meet avowedly with an intent to murder: thinking it their duty, as
gentlemen, and claiming it as their right, to wanton with their own lives and those of their
fellow creatures; without any warrant or authority from any power either divine or human,
but in direct contradiction to the laws both of God and man: and therefore the law has
justly fixed the crime and punishment of murder, on them, and on their seconds also." Id.
123 !d. (italics in original); compare id. at 200. In Pleas of the Crown, Sir Matthew Hale
had written in 1678: "In Cases ofMurder, there must be Malice; and if a Man assaults
another with a dangerous Weapon, tho' without Provocation, 'tis express Malice from the
nature of the Fact, which is Cruel." SIR MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF TIIE CROWN: OR, A
METHODICAL SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS RELATING TO THAT SUBJECT 19
(1716) (1678).
124 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 110, at 199-200 (citing 1 Hal. P. C. 454, 471-74).
125 !d. at 200.
126 !d. Blackstone ended his discussion of murder by express malice by further explaining:
"And, iftwo or more come together to do an unlawful act against the king's peace, of
which the probable consequence might be bloodshed; as to beat a man, to commit a riot,
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After referring to a beating in a "cruel and unusual manner" under
the rubric of murder by express malice, 127 Blackstone then wrote of cases of
murder by implied malice and also contrasted deadly beatings where only
"manslaughter" would be found. "[I]n many cases where no malice is expressed," Blackstone noted, "the law will imply it: as, where a man wilfully
poisons another, in such a deliberate act the law presumes malice, though
no particular emnity can be proved." 128 As Blackstone further explained:
"[I]f a man kills another suddenly, without any, or without a considerable,
provocation, the law implies malice; for no person, unless of an abandoned
heart, would be guilty of such an act, upon a slight or no apparent
cause." 129 "No affront, by words, or gestures only," he wrote, "is a sufficient provocation, so as to excuse or extenuate such acts of violence as
manifestly endanger the life of another." 130 "But if the person so provoked
had unfortunately killed the other, by beating him in such a manner as
shewed only an intent to chastise and not to kill him," Blackstone clarified,
"the law so far considers the provocation of contumelious behavior, as to
adjudge it only manslaughter, and not murder." 131
In his second reference, Blackstone later referred to the concept of
"cruel and unusual punishments" in discussing the English Bill of Rights. 132
That reference-in Chapter 29 of Book Four, a chapter titled "OF
juDGMENT, AND IT'S CONSEQUENCES"-was prefaced by Blackstone's discussion of criminal judgments and the possibility of an offender's "pardon"
or "praying the benefit of clergy" to "arrest" a judgment. 133 "If all these
resources fail," Blackstone wrote, "the court must pronounce that judgment, which the law hath annexed to the crime, and which hath been constantly mentioned, together with the crime itself, in some or other of the
former chapters." 134 As he explained: "Of these some are capital, which
extend to the life of the offender, and consist generally in being hanged by
the neck till dead; though in very atrocious crimes other circumstances of
terror, pain, or disgrace are superadded: as, in treasons of all kinds, being
drawn or dragged to the place of execution; in high treason affecting the

or to rob a park; and one of them kills a man; it is murder in them all, because of the
unlawful act, the malitia praecogitata, or evil intended beforehand." Id. (italics in
original).
127 Id. at 199.
128 I d. at 200.
129 Id.
13o Id.
131 I d. Blackstone thus contrasted deadly beatings carried out in a "cruel and unusual
manner"-which would constitute murder by express malice-with deadly beatings
carried out only with the intent to "chastise," with the latter beatings only constituting
manslaughter. Id. at 199-200.
132 Id. at 372.
133 I d. at 368-69.
134 I d. at 369-70.
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king's person or government, embowelling alive, beheading, and quartering; and in murder, a public dissection." 135
Though English law once allowed such horrific punishments, Blackstone was quick to note that the severity of these punishments was, in practice, often mitigated. "[T]he humanity of the English nation," Blackstone
qualified, "has authorized, by a tacit consent, an almost general mitigation
of such part of these judgments as favour of torture or cruelty: a sledge or
hurdle being usually allowed to such traitors as are condemned to be
drawn; and there being very few instances (and those accidental or by negligence) of any person's being emboweled or burned, till previously deprived of sensation by strangling." 136 "Some punishments," he wrote,
"consist in exile or punishment, by abjuration of the realm, or transportation to the American colonies: others in loss of liberty, by perpetual or
temporary imprisonment." 137 "Some, though rarely," he added, "occasion
a mutilation or dismembering, by cutting off the hand or ears: others fix a
lasting stigma on the offender, by slitting the nostrils, or branding in the
hand or face." 138 Blackstone also noted the availability of "discretionary
135 !d. at 370. "And," Blackstone added, "in case of any treason committed by a female,
the judgment is to be burned alive." !d.
136 !d. at 370. Another commentator on English law specifically equated torture with
cruelty, wrote that England did not use torture, and saw the "cruel and unusual
punishments" prohibition as a restriction on acts if torture. J. L. DE LOLME, THE
CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND; OR, AN ACCOUNT OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT 383-85
(Corrected ed., 1789) ("the use of Torture, that method of administering Justice in which
folly may be said to be added to cruelty"; "the use of Torture has, from the earliest times,
been utterly unknown in England" and "all attempts to introduce it, whatever might be the
power of those who made them, or the circumstances in which they renewed their
endeavors, have been strenuously opposed and defeated"; "From the same cause also
arose that remarkable forbearance of the English Laws, to use any cruel severity in the
punishments which experience shewed it was necessary for the preservation of Society to
establish: and the utmost vengeance of those laws, even against the most enormous
Offenders, never extends beyond the simple deprivation of life"). As that commentator
wrote: "[S]o anxious has the English Legislature been to establish mercy, even to
convicted offenders, as a fundamental principle of the Government of England, that they
made it an express article of that great public Compact which was framed at the important
era of the Revolution, that 'no cruel and unusual punishments should be used."' !d. at
385-86 (citing English Bill of Rights, art. X). The same language also appears in an earlier
edition of that treatise. J. L. DE LOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND, OR, AN ACCOUNT
OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT 340-41 (1777).
137 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 110, at 370.
138 !d. In one section, on the punishment of theft for those "who have no property
themselves," Blackstone wrote: "Sir Thomas More, and the marquis Beccaria, at the
distance of more than two centuries, have very sensibly proposed that kind of corporal
punishment, which approaches the nearest to a pecuniary satisfaction; viz. a temporary
imprisonment, with an obligation to labour, first for the party robbed, and afterwards for
the public, in works of the most slavish kind: in order to oblige the offender to repair, by
his industry and diligence, the depredations he has committed upon private property and
public order." !d. at 238. "But," Blackstone added, "notwithstanding all the remonstrances
of speculative politicians and moralists, the punishment of theft still continues, throughout
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fines" and punishments involving the infliction of "corporal pain" such as
"whipping, hard labour in the house of correction, the pillory, the stocks,
and the ducking-stool." 139 A ducking stool was a chair connected to a pulley system where slanderers and women, among others, "were restrained
and then repeatedly plunged into a convenient body of water." 140
Blackstone, the Oxford scholar, felt strongly that English lawthough harsh-was still enlightened compared to the laws of other countries.141 "Disgusting as this catalogue may seem," Blackstone wrote of punishments authorized by English law, "it will afford pleasure to an English

the greatest part of Europe, to be capital: and Puffendorf, together with Sir Matthew Hale,
are of opinion that this must always be referred to the prudence of the legislature; who are
to judge, say they, when crimes are become so enormous as to require such sanguinary
restrictions." Id.
139 !d. at 370. Judicial discretion-and the ability to inflict a wide array of corporal
punishments short of death-was a hallmark of the English legal system. See 3 THE
WORKS OF SIR WILLIAM TEMPLE, BART 56 (1757):
[I]t may seem probable, that the more natural and effectual way in our nation, to prevent
or suppress thefts and robberies, were to change the usual punishment by short and easy
deaths, into some others of painful and uneasy lives, which they will find much harder to
bear, and be more unwilling and afraid to suffer than the other. Therefore a liberty might
at least be left to the judges and the bench, according to the difference of persons, crimes,
and circumstances, to inflict either death, or some notorious mark, by slitting the nose, or
such brands upon the cheeks, which can never be effaced by time or art; and such persons
to be condemned either to slavery in our plantations abroad, or labour in work-houses at
home; and this either for their lives, or certain numbers of years, according to the degrees
of their crimes.
Accord 3 THE HISTORY OF THE WORKS OF THE LEARNED: OR, AN IMPARTIAL ACCOUNT OF
BOOKS LATELY PRINTED IN ALL PARTS OF EUROPE 636 (1701) ("That for the more
Effectual suppression of Thefts and Robberies, it would be proper to change the usual
Punishment by short and easie Deaths, into some others of painful and uneasie Lives,
which they will find much harder to bear, and be more unwilling and afraid to suffer than
the other.").
140 Matthew W. Meskell, The History of Prisons in the United States from 1777 to 1877,
51 STAN. L. REv. 839, 841-42 (1999). InA Treatise ofthe Pleas of the Crown,
Englishmen William Hawkins-under the heading "Cucking Stool"-wrote: "Sometimes
called Ducking Stool, the usual punishment for a common scold." 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A
TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN; OR, A SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS
RELATING TO THAT SUBJECT, DIGESTED UNDER PROPER HEADS 624 (Thomas Leached.,
6th ed. 1777) (italics in original); see also id. at 352 n.3 (in another section of his treatise,
Hawkins also made reference to a "usual" punishment, writing in that unrelated context:
"The usual mode of punishment at present is by pillory, fine, imprisonment, and surety for
the good behaviour."). While men were traditionally punished in the stocks in earlier
times, ducking-stools had been used extensively in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
to punish women. ALFRED CREIGH, HISTORY OF WASHINGTON COUNTY: FROM ITS FIRST
SETTLEMENT TO THE PRESENT TIME, ch. 1 (1870).
141 William Blackstone (1723-1780) was the Vinerian Professor of Civil Law who, in the
1760s, arranged for Oxford University Press to print his Commentaries. Lionel Bently &
Jane C. Ginsburg, "The Sole Right ... Shall Return to the Authors": Anglo-American
Authors' Reversion Rights from the Statute ofAnne to Contemporary U.S. Copyright, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1475, 1499 (2010).
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reader, and do honour to the English law, to compare it with that shocking
apparatus of death and torment, to be met with in the criminal codes of
almost every other nation in Europe." 142 "[I]t is moreover," Blackstone
explained, "one of the glories of our English law, that the nature, though
not always the quantity or degree, of punishment is ascertained for every
offence; and that it is not left in the breast of any judge, nor even of a jury,
to alter that judgment, which the law has beforehand ordained, for every
subject alike, without respect of persons." 143 "[W]here an established penalty is annexed to crimes," Blackstone offered, "the criminal may read their
certain consequence in that law, which ought to be the unvaried rule, as it
is the inflexible judgment, of his actions." 144
It was after this discussion that Blackstone cited the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause of the English Bill of Rights. "The discretionary
fines and discretionary length of imprisonment, which our courts are enabled to impose," Blackstone first explained, "may seem an exception to
this rule." 145 "But," he noted, "the general nature of the punishment, viz.
by fine or imprisonment, is in these cases fixed and determinate: though the
duration and quantity of each must frequently vary, from the aggravations
or otherwise of the offence, the quality and condition of the parties, and
from innumerable other circumstances." 146 As Blackstone wrote: "Our
statute law has not therefore often ascertained the quantity of fines, nor the
common law ever; it directing such an offence to be punishment by fine, in
general, without specifying the certain sum: which is fully sufficient, when
we consider, that however unlimited the power of the court may seem, it is
far from being wholly arbitrary; but it's discretion is regulated by law." 147
"For the bill of rights," Blackstone emphasized, "has particularly declared,
that excessive fines ought not to be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. " 148
By the time James Madison drafted the U.S. Bill of Rights, he would
have been quite familiar with William Blackstone's Commentaries. Madison never became a lawyer, but he did intermittently study law. 149 After
graduating from the College of New Jersey in 1771, he stayed on "employing his times in miscellaneous studies; but not without a reference to the
142

4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 110, at 370-71.
!d. at 371 (italics in original). Death sentences at that time, of course, were mandatory.
Scott W. Howe, Furman's Mythical Mandate, 40 U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 435, 472 (2007)
("mandatory death sentences were allowed at the time of the founding").
144 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 110, at 371.
145 !d.
146 !d. (italics in original).
147 !d. at 372.
148 !d. Blackstone wrote that the English Bill of Rights "had a retrospect to some
unprecedented proceedings in the court ofking's bench, in the reign of king James the
second." Id. He also stated that "the bill of rights was only declaratory, throughout, of the
old constitutional law ofthe land." Id.
149 Mary Sarah Bilder, James Madison, Law Student and Demi-Lawyer, 28 LAW & HrsT.
REv. 389, 390-93 (2010).
143
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profession of the Law." 150 Upon returning to Virginia, he studied law for
long stretches as he contemplated becoming a member of the Bar .151 The
law books Madison read is not clear, but in 1773 Madison wrote that he
intended "to read Law occasionally and have procured books for that purpose."152 Madison even asked William Bradford, his closest college friend,
to send him a list of the books Bradford planned to read to become a lawyer.153 In Pennsylvania, Bradford-a penal reformer-would personally
lead efforts to restrict that state's death penalty to first-degree murderers.
And Bradford was even willing to contemplate that evidence might show
one day that executions were unnecessary for those murderers, too. 154
Blackstone's Commentaries, which also communicated Cesare Beccaria's ideas to a much wider audience/ 55 were highly influential in the American colonies and early America. 156 Bradford-who later became the Attorney General of the United States and who greatly admired Beccaria's treatise157-specifically wrote of Blackstone's Commentaries, telling Madison
of that title: "I am most pleased with & find but little of that disagreeable
dryness I was taught to expect." 158 In 1783, Madison recommended that
Congress acquire a copy of Blackstone's Commentaries; in 1785, while
trying to gain passage of Jefferson's Virginia bill to proportion crimes and
punishments, a bill that would have severely curtailed capital punishment,
Madison took notes on Blackstone's treatise; and at the 1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, in a debate over an ex post facto provision, Madison recorded a reference to Blackstone's Commentaries made by
John Dickinson. 159

150

!d. at 393-94.
Id. at 394, 396-98, 402-03.
152 Id. at 394.
153 Id. at 394-95.
154 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 84-91.
155 See Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria's Vision, supra note 9 (describing Cesare Beccaria's
influence on American penal reform).
156 Kathryn Preyer, "Cesare Beccaria and the Founding Fathers," in BLACKSTONE IN
AMERICA: SELECTED ESSAYS OF KATHRYN PREYER 241 (Mary Sarah Bilder, Maeva
Marcus & R. Kent Newmyer eds., 2009)("Blackstone's references to Beccaria in his
Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland, published between 1765 and 1769 and widely
available in the colonies, may have communicated Beccaria's theories to a wider audience
than read the original.").
157 Letter from William Bradford, Jr. to Luigi Castiglioni (Aug. 10, 1786), reprinted in
LUIGI CASTIGLIONI'S VIAGGIO: TRAVELS IN THE UNITED STATES OF NORTH AMERICA 17851787, 313-14 (Antonio Pace ed., 1983) ("The name of Beccaria has become familiar in
Pennsylvania, his authority has become great, and his principles have spread among all
classes of persons and impressed themselves deeply in the hearts of our citizens.").
158 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 110, at 399.
159 Id. at 395, 399. Thomas Jefferson also recommended that aspiring lawyers read
Blackstone's Commentaries. !d. at 398; BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at
54.
151
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Blackstone's Commentaries-as with early American legal treatises
such as Zephaniah Swift's System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut160 and Tucker's Blackstone 161 -not only acknowledged the use of death

160 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 105-106
(1795) ("The power of justices of the peace, is not so expressly defined respecting
corporal punishments, as pecuniary penalty; they can however, inflict no corporal
punishment, but whipping, setting in the stocks, and imprisonment."); id. at 181 ("Action
of debt, will not lie upon a statute where the consequence of a conviction, is to subject the
party to a corporal punishment."); id. at 184 (noting "cases where corporal punishment is
to be inflicted"); id. at 185 ("where corporal punishment is to be inflicted, debt, assumpsit,
or action on statute will not lie"); id. at 232 ("A juror who has been convicted of ... any
other infamous corporal punishment, may be challenged."); id. at 239 (noting that a
person who "has stood ... in the pillory, or has been stigmatized or cropped" as a result of
a conviction associated with an "infamous judgment" shall be excluded from testifYing);
id. at 295 ("For a few of the most enormous crimes, the punishment was death, and for the
rest, corporal pains and pecuniary penalties were inflicted, according to the nature of the
offense."); id. at 296 (noting that "corporal and pecuniary punishments are inflicted" for
crimes not punishable by death or imprisonment in "New-Gate"); id. at 297 ("corporal
pains and pecuniary penalties may be proportioned in such a manner as to subserve the
interest of society: that corporal punishment is proper for those crimes which are
infamous and bad in their own nature"); id. at 318 ("If the offender is unable to pay the
forfeiture of twenty pounds, he shall be set in the pillory for one hour, in the county town
where the offense was committed or next adjoining to the place, and have both his ears
nailed."); id. at 320-211 (noting that the punishments for "Blasphemy by the Statute" are
"whipping not exceeding forty stripes, and setting in the pillory one hour" and that
"Blasphemy at common law" is a crime "punishable by fine and imprisonment, and other
infamous corporal punishment"); id. at 330 (noting the "corporal punishment not
exceeding ten stripes" was a punishment for fornication); id. at 347 (noting that libel is
punishable by "fine, imprisonment, and pillory at the discretion of the court"); id. at 352
(noting that cheating is "punishable by fine, imprisonment and pillory"); id. at 356 (noting
that conspiracy "is punished by fine, imprisonment, and pillory"); id. at 365 (noting that
the punishment of misdemeanors "must be fine, imprisonment and pillory, which are the
common law punishments"); id. at 392 (referring to cases "where corporal punishment
must be inflicted"); id. at 405 ("Whenever a statute creates a crime, it inflicts some
specific punishment. The punishments at common law are fine, imprisonment and
pillory.").
161 2 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARY: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE
(1803), ch. 14 ("Of Master and Servant") ("A master may by law correct his apprentice or
servant for negligence or other misbehavior, so it be done with moderation: though, if the
master's wife beats him, it is good cause of departure. But if any servant, workman, or
laborer assaults his master or dame, he shall suffer one year's imprisonment, and other
open corporal punishment, not extending to life or limb."); id. at Note H ("wherever the
benefit of clergy is allowed to a slave, the court, besides burning him in the hand (the
usual punishment inflicted on free persons) may inflict such further corporal punishment
as they may think fit"); id. ("A slave convicted of hog-stealing, shall, for the first offense,
receive thirty-nine lashes: any other person twenty-five ... The punishment for the second
and third offense, of this kind, is the same in the case of a free person, as of a slave,
namely, by the pillory and loss of ears, for the second offense ... "); id. ("we must not
forget, that many actions, which are either not punishable at all, when perpetrated by a
white person, or at most, by fine and imprisonment, only, are liable to severe corporal
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as a punishment, but also described in multiple instances how corporal
punishments were-or had been-used to punish crimes. 162 In Blackstone's
Commentaries, one finds specific references to "corporal punishment," 163
including the pillory/ 64 whipping/ 65 and ear cropping. 166 "[I]t is usual to

punishment, when done by a slave; nay, even to death itself, in some cases"); id.
("Resistance to a white person, in any case, was, formerly, and now, in any case, except a
wanton assault on the negroe or mulattoe, is punishable by whipping."); id. ("Slaves, by
these and other acts, are prohibited from going abroad without leave, in writing from their
masters, and if they do, they may be whipped ... "); id. ("By the act of 1723, c. 4, it was
enacted, that when any negroe or mulattoe shall be found, upon due proof made, or
pregnant circumstances, to have given false testimony, every such offender shall, without
further trial, have his ears successively nailed to the pillory for the space of an hour, and
then cut off, and moreover receive thirty-nine lashes on his bare back, or such other
punishment as the court shall think proper, not extending to life or limb. This act, with the
exception of the words pregnant circumstances, was re-enacted in 1792.").
162 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 110, at 12 (referencing infliction of"corporal punishments"
as punishment for offenders); id. at 123 ("for this species of contempt a man may not only
be fined and imprisoned, but suffer the pillory or other infamous corporal punishment");
id. at 125-26 (noting the use of"corporal punishment" to punish those "guilty of a high
misprison"); id. at 138 (noting that "corporal and pecuniary punishments, exile and
perpetual infamy, are more suited to the genius of the English law"); id. at 151 (noting
that the punishment for libel "is fine, and such corporal punishment as the court in their
discretion shall inflict"); id. at 173 (noting that "corporal punishment" is inflicted "as in
case of wilful perjury"); id. at 175 (noting that "corporal and pecuniary" punishments are
assigned for killing game "at unseasonable times of the year"); id. at 217 (noting that
"ignominious corporal penalties" may be imposed for "a breach of the king's peace"); id.
at 237 (noting that "corporal punishment" had "been found necessary" to punish theft
where the offender has no property, though stating that "how far this corporal punishment
ought to extend, is what has occasioned the doubt").
163 Id. at 59 (in a section on offenses "against God and religion" and "blasphemy," stating
that "[t]hese are offenses punishable at common law by fine and imprisonment, or other
infamous corporal punishment"); id. at 61-62 (in a section on offenders who are "religious
impostors," noting that such offenses "are punishable by the temporal courts with fme,
imprisonment, and infamous corporal punishment"); id. at 65 (stating that the "temporal
punishment for having bastard children" was not specified in the statute of Elizabeth but
"that a corporal punishment was intended"); id. at 70-71 (noting that "corporal
punishment" shall be inflicted upon offenders convicted of violating the rights of
ambassadors).
164 Id. at 61 ("persons pretending to use witchcraft, tell fortunes, or discover stolen goods
by skill in the occult sciences, is still deservedly punished with a year's imprisonment,
and standing four times in the pillory"); id. at 137 (in a section on the punishment of
perjury, noting that the punishment by statute was "to stand with both ears nailed to the
pillory"); id. at 158 ("any deceitful practice, in cozening another by artful means, whether
in matters of trade or otherwise, as by playing with false dice, or the like, is punishable
with fine, imprisonment, and pillory"); id. (anyone defrauding another of valuable chattels
"shall suffer such punishment by imprisonment, fine, pillory, transportation, whipping, or
other corporal pain, as the court shall direct"); id. at 158-59 (the third offense of
"ENGROSSING"-that is, "getting into one's possession, or buying up, of com or other
dead victuals, with intent to sell them again"-is a forfeiture of "all his goods" and to be
"set in the pillory, and imprisoned at the king's pleasure").
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award judgment of the pillory," Blackstone noted in one instance. 167 Similar references to corporal punishments are also found in early American
legal commentaries. 168 In the founding era, both corporal and capital punishments were thus woven into the fabric of English and American law.
And at that time, both kinds of punishments-at least in certain formswere considered usual or customary.

C. The Eighth Amendment and Its Equivalents
The "cruel and unusual punishments" phrase first found its way into
American law through the Virginia Declaration of Rights. 169 Drafted in
1776 by Virginia plantation owner George Mason, the applicable provision of that natural rights-oriented legal document read in full: "That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted." 170 Before the Revolutionary War, Mason himself had expressed the belief that Americans should be afforded the
same rights as Englishmen, 171 so it is hardly surprising that he looked to
English law when he did his own legal drafting. Mason later explicitly contended that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments was
intended to prohibit "torture" 172-a concept now explicitly defined by in-

165 Id. at 238 ("the inferior species of theft, or petit larceny, is only punished by whipping
at common law").
166 Id. at 159-60 (noting the use of the pillory and "loss of one ear" as punishments for
monopolists).
167 !d. at 217.
168 6 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAWS 667
(1824) (citing a "July, 1795, Lincoln County" case known as "Avery's case" in which
Avery was prosecuted for the crime of blasphemy and "sentenced to be set on the gallows
one hour, and to be whipped twenty stripes"); id. at 676 (noting that, "[i]n 1785, the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts passed a law" providing that "if any man or woman
shall commit adultery," the offender "shall be set on the gallows with a rope &c. one
hour" and "be publicly whipped, not exceeding thirty-nine stripes"); id. at 677 (noting that
"in 1642, the Colony legislature passed an act" making fornication a crime and permitting
"corporal punishment" and that a Massachusetts act of March 15, 1786, provided for a
fine for fornication but further provided that if the offender failed to pay his fine "he may
be whipped, not exceeding ten stripes"); id. at 719 (referencing "Mass. Act, July 4, 1786,
revised, in substance, March 15, 1805," and noting, "This act provides, (among many
other things,) that if any person 'shall forge or counterfeit any silver or gold money, or
coin, that is or shall be current in this Commonwealth,' he shall be fined, set in the pillory,
have an ear cut off, set on the gallows, be whipped, and sentenced to hard labour, not
above seven years.").
169 VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § IX (June 12, 1776).
170 !d.
171 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 177 ("[A]s early as 1766, Mason
himself had asserted that American colonists 'clainl Nothing but the Liberty & Privileges
of Englishmen, in the same degree, as if we had still continued among or Brethren in
Great Britain."').
172 Id. at 187-88. Mason expressed this view at Virginia's ratification convention when the
Constitution itself was being considered. Mason-who vehemently believed that a
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ternationallaw, 173 what the Founding Fathers called the "Law of Nations"
in the U.S. Constitution. 174
After the Virginia Declaration of Rights was approved on June 12,
1776, 175 other states soon followed suit. In August 1776, Maryland delegates approved their own declaration, with two clauses specifically addressing cruel punishments. 176 Clause 14 read: "That sanguinary laws ought to
be avoided, as far as is consistent with the safety of the State; and no law,
to inflict cruel and unusual pains and penalties, 177 ought to be made in any

national bill of rights was necessary-said of his handiwork, the Virginia Declaration of
Rights, that a "clause of the bill of rights provided that no cruel and unusual punishments
shall be inflicted; therefore, torture was included in the prohibition." Id.
173 The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment provides as follows:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or
incidental to lawful sanctions.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, art. 1, G.A. res. 39/45 [armex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N.
Doc. A/39/51 (1984), entered into force June 26, 1987]. The last line of that definition of
torture, of course, begs the question of whether the physical or mental "pain or suffering"
arising from, inherent in, and incidental to the death penalty is itself"lawful" under the
Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. If death sentences and
executions are found to be both cruel and unusual, they are-plain and simpleunconstitutional.
174 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (giving Congress the power "[t]o define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of
Nations").
175 ROGER L. KEMP, ED., DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: A COLLECTION OF
ESSENTIAL WORKS 52 (2010).
176 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 178.
177 The U.S. Constitution prohibited bills of attainder, legislative acts that in earlier times
inflicted the punishment of death-either directly or conditionally-without a judicial
trial. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9; Cunrmings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 323-24 (1866); see also
Nixon v. Administrator for General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 473 (1977) ("In England a
bill of attainder originally connoted a parliamentary Act sentencing a named individual or
identifiable members of a group to death."). If the punishment were to be less than death,
the act was termed "a bill of pains and penalties." Cummings, 71 U.S. at 323; see also
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 317 n.6 (1946) ("Originally a judgment of death
was necessary to attaint and the consequences of attainder were forfeiture and corruption
of blood. If the judgment was lesser punishment than death there was no attaint and the
bill was one of pains and penalties. Practically all the American precedents are bills of
pains and penalties.") (citations omitted); Nixon, 433 U.S. at 474 ("Generally addressed to
persons considered disloyal to the Crown or State, 'pains and penalties' historically
consisted of a wide array of punishments: commonly included were imprisonment,
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case, or at any time hereafter." 178 Clause 22 further provided: "That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or
unusual punishments inflicted, by the courts of law." 179 Likewise, in September 1776, Delaware adopted a declaration of rights providing "[t]hat
excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel or unusual punishments inflicted." 180 Similar provisions were also
soon put in place in North Carolina, 181 Massachusetts, 182 New Hampshire,183 and New York. 184
By the time of the 1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia,
there was already a division among the states between provisions prohibiting "cruel and unusual punishments" and those barring "cruel or unusual
punishments." 185 While Virginia and New York forbade "cruel and unusual" punishments, other states chose to prohibit "cruel or unusual" punishments. There was also a division among American states as to whether
such provisions were absolute prohibitions or something less. Some provisions used the mandatory language of "shall" and restricted the actions of
all branches of government, while others seemed more hortatory or less
restrictive, using "ought" or only restricting the actions of courts and magistrates.186 The way in which individual states adopted such protections and

banishment, and the punitive confiscation of property by the sovereign."). The Supreme
Court has ruled that "[w]ithin the meaning of the [U.S.] Constitution, bills of attainder
include bills of pains and penalties." Cummings, 71 U.S. at 323; see also Lovett, 328 U.S.
at 317 n.6 ("The Constitution in prohibiting bills of attainder undoubtedly included bills
of pains and penalties as the majority in the Cummings case held."); Nixon, 433 U.S. at
473-74 ("Article I, § 9, however, also proscribes enactments originally characterized as
bills of pains and penalties, that is, legislative Acts inflicting punishment other than
execution.").
178 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 178.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 N.C. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § X (1776) ("That excessive bail should not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted.").
182 MAss. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XXVI (1780) ("No magistrate or court of law
shall demand excessive bail or sureties, impose excessive fines, or inflict cruel or unusual
punishments.").
183 N.H. BILL OF RIGHTS, art. XXXIII (1784) ("No magistrate or court of law shall demand
excessive bail or sureties, impose excessive fines, or inflict cruel or unusual
punishments.").
184 N.Y. BILL OF RIGHTS (1787) ("That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
185 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966 (1991).
186 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 180, 184. The following excerpt from
a Massachusetts author's book-a guide for youth, looking at Massachusetts'
constitution-illustrates how restraints on legislatures were viewed separate from those on
magistrates and courts:
Q. What restraint does the constitution lay upon the Legislature, respecting the
declaration of crimes?
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in which lawmakers spoke of them, with seemingly little attention paid to
whether a disjunctive or conjunctive word was used between "cruel" and
"unusual," has led some scholars to label them "boilerplate" provisions. 187
There were, in fact, many different language variants employed in the
late eighteenth century to express disdain for cruel or out-of-the-ordinary
punishments. 188 Virginia's provision counseled that "cruel and unusual"
punishments "ought not" be inflicted, without any indication of whether
the clause applied only to certain branches of government. 189 In contrast,
Maryland's provision barring "cruel or unusual punishments"-but also
using the words "ought not"-only restricted "the courts of law." 190
A. That no subject ought, in any case, or in any time, to be declared guilty of treason
or felony by the Legislature.
Q. Under what restraint, also, are our magistrates and courts oflaw?
A. The constitution declares that they shall not demand excessive bail or sureties,
impose excessive fines, or inflict cruel or unusual punishment.
JOSEPH RICHARDSON, THE AMERICAN READER: A SELECTION OF LESSONS FOR READING
AND SPEAKING WHOLLY FROM AMERICAN AUTHORS 41 (1810).
187 See Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The
Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 839, 840 (1969) (arguing "cruel and unusual" was a
kind of"constitutional 'boilerplate"'); see also Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth
Amendment, supra note 11, at 129 ("For many in the founding generation, it had become
the verbiage of civility, and they were intent on employing it for whatever it was worth.
Like the Latin Mass, it was valued by those for whom it was cultural heritage, whether
understood or not.").
188 Some commentators and judges have suggested that, in light of the lack of historical
evidence surrounding its adoption, the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual" verbiage
should not necessarily be read conjunctively. See Ved P. Nanda, Recent Developments in
the United States and Internationally Regarding Capital Punishment-An Appraisal, 67
ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 523, 549 (1993) ("As to the Court's interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment, opponents of capital punishment have argued that the Court should read the
words 'cruel and unusual' disjunctively rather than conjunctively since there is no
authoritative record of what the first Congress meant in using the phrase.") (quoting
Samuel J.M. Donnelly, Capital Punishment: A Critique of the Political and Philosophical
Thought Supporting the Justices' Positions, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. I, 100-101 (1992)). One
law professor points out that the inherited "cruel and unusual punishments" language
"was copied into the Eighth Amendment without extensive discussion of whether the
'and' was conjunctive or disjunctive." Donnelly, supra, at 100 n.532. The Justices of the
Supreme Court have themselves reached very different conclusions on the import of the
words. Compare Furman, 408 U.S. at 242-47 (Douglas, J., concurring) and id. at 258-64
(Brennan, J., concurring) with id. at 316-22 (Marshall, J., concurring) and id. at 376-83
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Constitution's use of the word "and" has also been debated
in another context, that of the Necessary and Proper Clause. See Robert G. Natelson, The
Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 55 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 243,
265 ("At first glance, 'and' appears to be a conjunctive-a law must be 'necessary plus
proper.' Bus as Professor Scott Burnham has pointed out, 'and' can have a disjunctive
meaning as well. One might read the Necessary and Proper Clause as saying that a law
must be necessary or proper.") (citing SCOTT J. BURNHAM, DRAFTING AND ANALYZING
CONTRACTS 95 (3d ed. 2003)).
189 VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § IX (June 12, 1776) (emphasis added).
190 MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 2 (1776) (emphasis added).
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Whereas North Carolina's declaration proclaimed without reservation that
"cruel or unusual" punishments "should not" be required, 191 the Massachusetts and New Hampshire provisions-barring "cruel or unusual punishments"-limited their applicability to magistrates and courts of law. 192
The Massachusetts and New Hampshire clauses instead provided that
"[n]o magistrate or court of law shall ... inflict cruel or unusual punishments."193
Other states took their own approaches, with language variantswhether subtle or otherwise-emerging in the eighteenth century. New
York's Bill of Rights-approved on January 26, 1787-used more hortatory language, reading "[t]hat excessive bail ought not to be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." 194
For its part, Pennsylvania's 1776 constitution-which lasted until 1790,
when a new constitution took effect barring "cruel punishments" 195-chose
to bar sanguinary and disproportionate punishments. Pennsylvania's 1776
constitution specifically provided that "[t]he penal laws as heretofore used
shall be reformed by the legislature of this state, as soon as may be, and
punishments made in some cases less sanguinary, and in general more proportionate to the crimes." 196 In the founding era, the term "sanguinary"
was often used interchangeably with, or as a synonym for, "cruel." 197

191

N.C. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, §X (1776) (emphasis added).
MAss. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XXVI (1780) (emphasis added); N.H. BILL OF
RIGHTS, art. XXXIII (1784) (emphasis added).
193 !d.
192

194 N.Y. BILL OF RIGHTS (1787). There was even internal division in Maryland's 1776
Declaration of Rights as it prohibited both "cruel and unusual pains and penalties" while
simultaneously barring "cruel or unusual punishments." MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS §§
XIV, XXII (Aug. 14, 1776). The U.S. Constitution-which explicitly outlaws bills of
attainder-has consistently been read to bar bills of pains and penalties, too, even though
the Constitution itself makes no reference to "bills of pains and penalties." Selective Serv.
Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 852 (1984) ("At common
law, bills of attainder often imposed the death penalty; lesser punishments were imposed
by bills of pains and penalties. The Constitution proscribes these less penalties as well as
those imposing death.").
195 PA. CONST., art. IX, §XIII (1790).
196 PA. CONST., § 38 (1776) (emphasis added); id. at§ 38 (calling for prisons to be
constructed "to make sanguinary punishments less necessary"). South Carolina's 1778
constitution also indicated that penal laws were to be reformed so that punishments would
be "made in some cases less sanguinary, and in general more proportionate to the crime."
S.C. CONST., art. XL (1778).
197 See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 157 (C. C. Va. 1807) (the infamous English
judge George Jeffreys is described as "bloodthirsty," with Jeffreys further characterized as
"[t]hat sanguinary and cruel judge" who "treated every man who came to be tried before
him as a traitor"); Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 924, 946 (C.C. Pa. 1800) (a reference to
"[c]rue! measures" follows a sentence containing the phrase "sanguinary bosom"). The
word "murderous," according to Webster's New International Dicitionary, is itself
"characterized by, or causing murder or bloodshed; having the purpose or quality of
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The First Congress actually voted to approve both the "cruel and unusual" and "cruel or unusual" language variants within weeks of one another.198 The Northwest Ordinance, first adopted by the Continental Congress
on July 13, 1787, then re-approved by the First Congress on July 14, 1789,
contained the following provision: "All fines shall be moderate; and no
cruel or unusual punishments shall be inflicted." 199 The Northwest Ordinance, adopted to govern territory "northwest of the river Ohio," was
drafted by Massachusetts lawyer Nathan Dane and its "cruel or unusual"
provision was-not surprisingly-based in part on the language in Massachusetts' 1780 constitution. 200 That constitution-still in effect to this day,
making it America's oldest operating constitution-was largely the handiwork of John Adams, later the second President of the United States. 201
Adams passionately quoted Beccaria's treatise in 1770 in his defense of
British soldiers accused of murder following the Boston Massacre, and in
1786 he also copied the following Beccaria quotation into his diary: "Every
Act of Authority, of one Man over another for which there is not an absolute Necessity, is tyrannical." 202
The Eighth Amendment text itself, crafted by James Madison and introduced to the First Congress on June 8, 1789, borrowed the "cruel and
unusual punishments" language from the Virginia Declaration of Rights in
his home state. 203 Because executions were then the standard punishment
for various crimes, it is unsurprising that members of Congress adopted the
Eighth Amendment language with little debate. As death sentences were
then mandatory for certain crimes, the founders certainly had little reason
to engage in extended debate about whether executions were unusual. At
that time, they clearly weren't. Some early Americans, such as Dr. Benjamin Rush, plainly thought executions cruel, 204 but it was not realistic to
then argue that executions were unusual. The record reflects that Congress
approved the language of the Eighth Amendment in September 1789205 by
a "considerable majority," having previously adopted "without issue" the
"cruel or unusual punishments" provision of Northwest Ordinance just
weeks earlier. 206

murder; bloody; sanguinary, bloodthirsty, fell savage, cruel." Savannah News-Press, Inc.
v. J. R. Harley, Ill S.E.2 259, 263 (Ga. Ct. App. 1959).
198 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 118-19.
199 Id.; Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. II, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789).
200 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 118.
201 Robert F. Williams, The State Constitutions of the Founding Decade: Pennsylvania's
Radica/1776 Constitution and Its Influences on American Constitutionalism, 62 TEMP. L.
REv. 541, 569 (1989).
202 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 50.
203 !d. at 119.
204 !d. at 66-84.
205 The flrst ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution were submitted to the states by
Congress on September 25, 1789. 1 Stat. 97 (1789).
206 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 119. A more detailed history of the
adoption of the Northwest Ordinance and the debate surrounding the Eighth
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The "cruel and unusual" catchphrase was not limited to its use in the
Eighth Amendment. That language also came to be used extensively in legal proceedings relating to whether slaves or seamen had been mistreated,
indicating that the "cruel and unusual" terminology carried with it an element of adjudicatory fact-finding, whether for judge or jury. 207 Alabama,
Florida and Mississippi laws, to protect slave owners' interests, prohibited
the infliction of "cruel or unusual punishments" 208 while other laws prohibited "cruel treatment" or "cruel punishment" or barred chastisements
carried out with "unusual rigor." 209 In Mann v. Trabue, 210 for instance, the
Missouri Supreme Court wrote in 1827 that a slave's death was brought
about by "cruel and unusual treatment." 211 And in State v. Maner, 212 an
1834 case, the South Carolina Court of Appeals-in construing that state's
1740 prohibition of "cruel punishment"-wrote that the state's law
"makes any unusual and cruel treatment of a slave an indictable offense."213
Early American laws, in fact, frequently regulated the treatment of
slaves, with the concept of cruelty-and sometimes unusualness-present
in such laws. 214 For example, an early South Carolina law-known as "the
negro Act of 1740"-expressly forbade anyone from "willfilly" cutting out
a slave's tongue; putting out a slave's eye; castrating or "cruelly" scalding,
burning or depriving a slave "of any limb, or member"; or from inflicting
"any other cruel punishment, other than by whipping, or beating with a
horse-whip, cow-skin, switch, or small stick, or by putting irons on, or

Amendment's ratification can be found in my recent book, Cruel and Unusual: The
American Death Penalty and the Founders' Eighth Amendment. !d. at 118-19, 162-71.
207 Ryan, supra note 67, at 557 ("Historically, juries have been trusted to decide issues
like Eighth Amendment cruelty that we might today consider questions of law.").
208 "An Act respecting slaves," ch. 1, § 16 (passed Mar. 6, 1805), reprinted in HARRY
TOULMIN, ED., A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA: CONTAINING THE
STATUTES AND RESOLUTIONS IN FORCE AT THE END OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN
JANUARY, 1823, at 631 (1823); "An act, to reduce into one, the several acts, concerning
slaves, free negroes, and mulattoes," ch. 73, § 44 (passed June 18, 1822), reprinted in THE
REVISED CODE OF THE LAWS OF MISSISSIPPI 379 (1824); "An Act relating to Crimes and
Misdemeanors committed by Slaves, free Negroes, and Mulattoes,"§ 31 (approved Nov.
21, 1828), reprinted in JOHN P. DuvAL, ED., COMPILATION OF THE PuBLIC ACTS OF THE
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE TERRITORY OF FLORIDA, PASSED PRIOR TO 1840, at 223
(1839); ANDREW FEDE, PEOPLE WITHOUT RIGHTS: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE
FUNDAMENTALS OF THELAWOF SLAVERY IN THE U.S. SOUTH 111 (1992) (discussing
Alabama's law); see also id. at 112 ("There are several cases in which masters were
indicted for cruel and unusual punishment."); id. ("The only reported conviction for a
master for cruel punishment is reported in the 1843 Alabama case of Turnipseed v. State.
The master was fined the minimum sum-fifty dollars.").
209 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 217.
210 1 Mo. 709, 1827 WL 1987 (1827).
211 !d. at *1.
212 2 Hill453, 1834 WL 1528 (S.C. App. 1834).
213 !d. at *1.
214 THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619-1860, at 182-91 (1999).
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confining, or imprisoning such slave." 215 In enacting that law, South Carolina's legislature recited that "cruelty is not only highly unbecoming those
who profess themselves Christians, but is odious in the eyes of all men who
have any sense of virtue or humanity. " 216
Seamen, too, were expressly protected from "cruel and unusual punishment." Thus, a federal law, passed by Congress and approved on March
3, 1835, provided in pertinent part:
[I]f any master or other officer, of any American ship or vessel on the high
seas . . . shall, from malice, hatred, or revenge, and without justifiable
cause, beat, wound, or imprison any one or more of the crew of such ship
or vessel, or withhold from them suitable food or nourishment, or inflict
upon them any cruel and unusual punishment, every such person so offending shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by fine, not exceeding
one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding five years, or by
both, according to the nature and aggravation of the offence. 217

Five years later, Congress added another provision respecting mariners that spoke of "unusual or cruel treatment. " 218 One mid-nineteenthcentury American pleading guide, reflecting the sentiment of the time, dedicated an entire section to the topic that was titled: "For inflicting cruel and
unusual punishment on one of the crew of a vessel, &c. " 219
In Southern states, the "unusual" language was often seen as a way to
validate then-prevailing customs in relation to the treatment and punishment of slaves. In discussing Louisiana's prohibition on chastising slaves
with "unusual rigor," anti-slavery activist William Goodell-a journalist

BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 217.
GEORGE M. STROUD, SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY IN THE SEVERAL
STATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 39 (1827), reprinted in PAUL FINKELMAN, ED.,
SLAVERY, RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 1700-1872, at 195 (2007).
217 "An Act in amendment of the acts for the punishment of offenses against the United
States," Public Law No. 28, § 3, reprinted in GEORGE SHARSWOOD, ED., THE PUBLIC AND
GENERAL STATUTES PASSED BY THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (FROM
1828 TO 1836 INCLUSIVE) 2417 (1837) & 5 THE MILITARY AND NAVAL MAGAZINE OF THE
UNITED STATES, FROM MARCH, 1835, TO SEPTEMBER, 1835, at 316 (1835).
218 That law provided as follows:
In all cases where deserters are apprehended, the consul or commercial agent shall inquire
into the facts; and, if satisfied that the desertion was caused by unusual or cruel treatment,
the mariner shall be discharged, and receive, in addition to his wages to the time of the
discharge, three months' pay; and the officer discharging him shall enter upon the crewlist and shipping articles the cause of discharge, and the particulars in which the cruelty or
unusual treatment consisted, and subscribe his name thereto officially.
"An Act in addition to the several acts regulating the shipment and discharge of seamen,
and the duties of consuls," 26th Cong., Sess. 1, ch. XLVIII, § 17, reprinted in RICHARD
PETERS, ED., THE PUBLIC STATUTES AT LARGE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FROM
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT IN 1789, TO MARCH 3, 1845, at 396-97 (1846).
219 FRANCIS WHARTON, PRECEDENTS OF INDICTMENTS AND PLEAS, ADAPTED TO THE USE
BOTH OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THOSE OF ALL THE SEVERAL STATES 540
(1849) (italics in original).
215

216
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who wrote extensively about slavery220-saw "something in this singular
phraseology that requires study. " 221 "Such a law, instead of correcting prevailing usages," Goodell lamented, "receives its definition from them. " 222
As Goodell explained: "That which is 'usual' is authorized, whatever it
may be, short of maiming mutilation, and murder. And the more rigorous,
severe, and cruel may be the prevailing usages of a community, the more
rigorous, severe, and cruel they are expressly authorized to be. " 223 In other
words, even apart from their use by judges in criminal cases and in ordinary parlance by the public at-large, the cruel and unusual concepts-by
virtue of their placement in various laws-would have been familiar to
masters and slave overseers in the context of legal proceedings.
In England and the United States, the concepts of cruelty and unusualness have, in fact, long been associated with both the criminal law and
the institution of slavery. 224 "The individual is referred, as a standard of
lawful action," Goodell emphasized in his book, "to the common practices
of his neighbors around him. What is 'usual' among them is lawful for
him.'ms "'Unusual rigor,"' Goodell added, "must be defined in the light of

Biography ofWilliam Goodell, RG 30/29 -William Goodell Family Papers, Oberlin
College Archives, available at
http://www.oberlin.edu/archive!holdings/finding/RG30/SG29/biography.html.
221 WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: ITS
DISTINCTIVE FEATURES SHOWN BY ITS STATUTES, JUDICIAL DECISIONS, AND ILLUSTRATIVE
FACTS 161 (2d ed. 1853).
222 !d. at 161-62 (italics in original).
223 !d. at 162 (italics in original).
224 THE MIGHTY DESTROYER DISPLAYED, IN SOME ACCOUNT OF THE DREADFUL HA VOCK
MADE BY THE MISTAKEN USE AS WELL AS ABUSE OF DISTILLED SPIRITUOUS LIQUORS 26
(1774) ("Sir I Dalrymple in his memoirs says that the Parliament in the declaration of
right asserted, that pitying and respecting human nature, no cruel and unusual punishment
should be inflicted. How Britons can so readily admit of a change in their disposition and
sentiments, as to practice in America what they abhor and detested in Britain, can be
accounted for on no other principle, but as being the natural effect of slave-keeping,
which as the celebrated Montesquieu observes, 'insensibly accustoms those who are in the
practice of it, to want all moral virtues, to become haughty, hasty hard hearted, passionate,
voluptuous and cruel."') (italics in original); Trials of Major Bonnet and others, 5 George
1 (Nov. 10, 1718) ("May it please your honours, and you gentlemen of the Jury; the
prisoner who now stands arraigned at the bar, has been guilty of many piracies, committed
many robberies, ruined many families, and been the occasion of many most cruel and
inhuman murders .... "), reprinted in XV T. B. HOWELL, COMP., A COMPLETE COLLECTION
OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND
MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783, at 1291 (1816).
225 WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: ITS
DISTINCTIVE FEATURES SHOWN BY ITS STATUTES, JUDICIAL DECISIONS, AND ILLUSTRATIVE
FACTS 162 (2d ed. 1853) (italics in original). Writing at a time before the Fourteenth
Amendment's ratification, William Goodell elaborated further in this vein:
If it is "usuar' to "chastise" a slave by inflicting on him a hundred lashes, it is lawful to do
so. If it is "usuar' to add five hundred lashes more, it is equally lawful! In short, the
current usages of the fraternity of slaveholders (with the exceptions specified) are
proclaimed, by the Civil Code of Louisiana, to constitute the law. This approximates
220
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what is usual." 226 "We may infer," he said, considering what was usually
done in places like Louisiana and South Carolina, "that 'cruel punishment'
by 'whipping or beating with a horsewhip, cowskin, switch, or small stick,
or by putting irons on, or confining or imprisoning,' was not 'unusual' and
consequently not forbidden by the new Civil Code. " 227 Not only were executions used in places such as Virginia to quell slave rebellions, but the use
of the lash to punish slaves was extraordinarily common, too. 228
Some legal commentators, noting their close proximity in codes, even
saw the "cruel" and "unusual" terms as synonymous. In 1827, Pennsylva-

closely to the abrogation oflaw, so far as slaveholders are concerned, or the abdication of
supremacy by the civil government in their favor. The condition of this great nation of
twenty millions of people, controlled by a little more than one hundred thousand
slaveholders, seem but an expansion of this idea.
Id. (italics in original).
226 Id. (italics in original).
227 /d. at 162-63. In discussing North Carolina's 1798 law that exempted from the state's
murder statute situations in which the slave was resisting "his lawful owner or master" or
in which any slave died through the use of"moderate correction," Goodell also argued:
"In the light of this, we may understand also the prohibition of 'unusual punishment.' It
does not always reach the case of those who die under the lash, for even this may be
'moderate correction,' and consequently not 'unusual."' !d. at 180-82 (italics in original).
Elsewhere, Goodell emphasized as follows:
If any further light is wanted on that feature of the Slave Code that insultingly proffers
to the slave its protection from "unusuar' punishments, the inquirer might see what
punishments are "usuar' by looking over the advertisements and paragraphs of a dozen
leading Southern journals, from as many different States, for twelve months. Cut out,
arranged, and pasted in a scrap-book, with an index, they would furnish him with a
copious and authentic commentary on the slave laws ....
He will find there numerous advertisements of runaway slaves, and of jailers' notices
of apprehension and commitments of them, in which the descriptions specifY scars from
whipping, from iron collars, from gun-shots, from brandings, &c., &c .... All this, as the
reader now knows, is authorized by law-not prohibited as "unusual."
Then comes another class, which, if not expressly authorized, are found by their
frequency to be outside of the prohibited pale of"unusual." ...
One case, on page 15 of Mr. Weld's book, is doubtless a specimen of tens, if not
hundreds of thousands; assuredly it does not come under the condemnation of being
"unusual." The "owner" of a female slave, who was a Methodist, proposed a criminal
intercourse with her: she refused. He sent her to the "overseer" to be flogged. Again he
made advances-again she refused, and again she was flogged! Afterwards she yielded to
his adulterous wishes! And now, the attentive reader of the preceding pages will have
learned that all this was strictly within the protection of the law!
!d. at 218-20 (italics in original); see also CLAYTON E. JEWETT& JOHN 0. ALLEN,
SLAVERY IN THE SOUTH: A STATE-BY-STATE HISTORY 245 (2004) ("Though slaves in
theory were protected from cruel and unusual punishment, practice reveals uncountable
instances of physical abuse through whipping. Most owners did not view this method of
punishment as cruel or unusual.").
228 DOUGLAS R. EGERTON, GABRIEL'S REBELLION: THE VIRGINIA SLAVE CONSPIRACIES OF
1800 AND 1802, at 111-12, 187 (1993); KENNETH S. GREENBERG, ED., NAT TURNER: A
SLAVEREBELLIONINHISTORY AND MEMORY 3, 71, 73, 146, 195 (2003).

336

The Anomaly of Executions
nia lawyer George M. Stroud,229 in commenting on Mississippi's law prohibiting the "cruel or unusual punishment" of slaves, wrote: '"Cruel' and
'unusual,' connected as they are by the disjunctive 'or,' mean precisely the
same thing, and will be so construed by the court. And what horrible barbarities may be exposed under the name of usual punishments, the reader
will be enabled to judge by recurring to the laws of South Carolina and
Louisiana, contained on the preceding pages. " 230 Stroud also emphasized
that, as a practical matter, such anti-cruelty laws "cannot be enforced"
because of "the exclusion of the testimony" of "those who are not white"
during "the trial of a white person. " 231
An 1817 graduate of Princeton College, George Stroud served in the Pennsylvania
legislature in 1824, published his book on the laws of slavery in 1827, and later became a
judge in Philadelphia. 8 WAYNE CUTLER, ED., CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES K. POLK 7
(1993).
230 GEORGE M. STROUD, SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY IN THE SEVERAL
STATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 42 (1827), reprinted in PAUL FINKELMAN, ED.,
SLAVERY, RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 1700-1872, at 198 (2007). In
commenting on that same law, Charles Elliott-an opponent of slavery-said much the
same thing in 1850, writing: "Besides, cruel or unusual mean precisely the same thing,
and will be so construed by the court." 1 CHARLES ELLIOTT, SINFULNESS OF AMERICAN
SLAVERY 194 (1850) (italics in original). As Elliot, paraphrasing Stroud's earlier work,
wrote: "And what horrible cruelties may be inflicted under the name of usual
punishments," that writer lamented, "may be gathered from the laws of South Carolina
and Louisiana." Id. at 194-95 (italics in original).
In construing Mississippi's "cruel or unusual punishment" prohibition, William
Goodell emphasized that a slave was treated as "a 'chattel'-a 'thing'-not a person."
WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: ITS
DISTINCTIVE FEATURES SHOWN BY ITS STATUTES, JUDICIAL DECISIONS, AND ILLUSTRATIVE
FACTS 165 (2d ed. 1853). "And it is only an 'unusual' punishment that is forbidden!"
Goodell recorded, adding: "The masters and overseers have only to repeat their excessive
punishments so frequently that they become 'usual,' and the statute does not apply to
them! In this view it holds out an inducement to render the most cruel inflictions usual."
Id. (italics in original). "It is incredible," Goodell concluded, "that owners and overseers
should be much restrained by the provisions of this act." !d.
231 GEORGE M. STROUD, SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY IN THE SEVERAL
STATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 36 (1827), reprinted in PAUL FINKELMAN, ED.,
SLAVERY, RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 1700-1872, at 192 (2007)). This
comment was made under the following heading: "Prop. III. THE MASTER MAY, AT HIS
DISCRETION, INFLICT ANY SPECIES OF PUNISHMENT UPON THE PERSON OF HIS SLAVE." !d. at
35. In that section, Stroud added that at least "so far as regards the pages of the statute
book:' were concerned "the life at least of the slave, is safe from the authorized violence
of the master." !d. at 36 (italics in original). Stroud then added: "There was a time in
many, if not in all the slave-holding districts of our country, when the murder of a slave
was followed by a pecuniary fine only. In one state, a change of the law in this respect has
been very recent. At the present date, I am happy to say, the wilful, malicious and
deliberate murder of a slave, by whomsoever perpetrated, is declared to be punishable
with death in every state." Id. As Stroud concluded that section of his book:
Upon a fair review of what has been written on the subject of this proposition, the result is
found to be-That the master's power to inflict corporal punishments to any extent, short
of life and limb, is fully sanctioned by law, in all the slave-holding states-that the
229
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D. "Cruel" and "Unusual" Homicides and Beatings
The "cruel and unusual" and "cruel or unusual" terminology has often likewise been used to describe beatings or assess the severity-or
blameworthiness-of a killing. 232 For example, in State v. Norris, 233 the
defendant Norris quarreled with a man and was beaten up, but then left
the scene, got a deadly weapon, and returned to kill his antagonist, Nathaniel Daves. 234 Just a few days later, Norris was charged and tried for the

master, in at least two states, is expressly protected in using the horsewhip and cowskin, as
instruments for beating his slave-that he may, with entire impunity, in the same states,
load his slave with irons, or subject him to perpetual imprisonment whenever he may so
choose-that for cruelly scalding, wilfully cutting out the tongue, putting out an eye, and
for any other dismemberment, if proved, a fine of one hundred pounds currency only is
incurred in South Carolina-that though in all the states the wilful, deliberate and
malicious murder of the slave is now directed to be punished with death, yet, as in the
case of a white offender, none except whites can give evidence, a conviction can seldom,
if ever, take place.
!d. at 43-44 (italics in original).
232 State v. Norris, 2 N.C. 429, 1796 WL 327 (N.C. Super. L. & Eq. 1796); see also In re
Kottman, 2 Hill (SC) 363, 1834 WL 1576 * 1 ("[T]o shew that the Court ought not to
interpose in favor of the father, affidavits were read, that the father had beaten this son in
a cruel and unusual manner without any just cause."); People v. Rector, 19 Wend. 569
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Judicature 1838) ("Where there is no intent to kill, the offense may be
either murder or manslaughter; the graduation of the crime depending on the manner in
which it was committed and the other attending circumstances. When the act is done in
committing, or attempting to commit a misdemeanor below the grade of felony, and the
deceased is killed by misadventure; and when the killing is in a heat of passion, but in a
cruel or unusual manner, or by a dangerous weapon, the crime may be only manslaughter:
(2 R. S. 661, § 6, 10, 12;) but when perpetrated by an act imminently dangerous to others,
and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life, it will be murder. (!d. p. 657, §
5.)."); "Court of Oyer and Terminer," NEW-YORKDAILYTRIBUNE (New-York, N.Y.),
Sept. 24, 1850, at 3 (noting that Robert Moffat was "found guilty of manslaughter in the
second degree" in causing the death of his wife where "the Court and Jury considered it
taking life in a cruel and unusual manner, but not intending to take life"); see also Jacob
v. State, 22 Tenn. 493, 1842 WL 1984 *2 (Tenn. 1842) (using the "cruel and unusual
manner" phrase as regards a beating); Commonwealth v. Green, 17 Mass. 515, 551, 1822
WL 1507 *22 (Mass. 1822) ("The man, with whose murder the prisoner is charged, was
found beaten and mangled in a cruel manner."); Eckart v. Wilson, 1823 WL 2203 *4 (Pa.
1823) (referring to "cruel, deliberate murder"); "An Outrage at Fort McHenry," THE
JEFFERSONIAN (Stroudsburg, Pa.), July 19, 1855, at 2 (referring to "the most cruel and
unusual chastisement" of a soldier).
233 2 N.C. 429, 1796 WL 327 (N.C. Super. L. & Eq. 1796).
234 !d. at *5. The quarrel started on a Saturday night in a piazza after Norris and another
man went to the house of a Mrs. Ramsay, where Daves and others were gathered. Though
what happened and what led up to the fight was disputed, it was clear that Norris and
Daves exchanged words, Daves called Norris "a damned liar," and Norris-in tum-call
Daves "a damned liar" for accusing Norris of trying "to breed a riot." In the ensuing
fistacuffs, Daves gave Norris "three or four blows, upon which Norris ran off towards his
own house." After Norris ran to his house, which was several yards away, he returned and
stabbed Daves in the belly, a three- or four inch wound that proved lethal. /d. at *3-5.
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victim's murder. 235 The solicitor general-in the context of discussing the
difference between murder and manslaughter236 just five years after the
U.S. Bill of Rights was ratified-told a North Carolina court in 1796 that
the beating that led to the death was done in a "cruel or unusual manner. "237
The solicitor general's use of the "cruel or unusual" terminology sheds
light on how that phrase was commonly understood in the late eighteenth
century. "The grand distinction between murder and manslaughter is," he
emphasized, "that murder is accompanied with the circumstances of malice
aforethought. '0238 "The true legal idea of malice, as applied to the case of
killing," he said, is where "the fact of killing is attended with such circumstances" as show "the slayer to have a cruel and diabolical temper and disposition, above what is ordinarily found amongst mankind. " 239 The solici-

/d. at *1-2.
The solicitor general was of the view that the homicide at issue was "either murder or
manslaughter." !d. at *5.
237 /d.
238 /d. A similar statement is found in State v. Weaver, 3 N.C. 54, 1798 WL 102 (N.C.
Super. L. & Eq., 1797). The North Carolina judge, using cruel and punishments in the
same context, instructed in that case:
Murder is where the homicide with malice aforethought, which means not what is
commonly understood, but a doing the act under such circumstances as shews the heart to
be exceedingly malignant and cruel, above what is ordinarily found amongst mankind; &
the wickedness of heart is collected either from the express words and conduct of the
party, or from the manner in which the deed is done-in the first instance, by threatening
expressions, former grounds, or schemes to do him mischief, as by lying in wait for him
and the like; in the latter instance, by the excessiveness of punishment or dangerous
weapon, or means made use of to punish; as if for a slight offense which deserved only
moderate correction, any man should take up his servant and beat him so excessively as to
... cause his death; if in such a case for such an offense, he should beat out his brains with
an axe, shoot him with a gun, or kill him with a sword; from all these circumstances, it is
allowed that the heart is exceedingly depraved and cruel, and that the killing has not
proceeded from the frailty of human nature, and therefore the offense is deemed murder.
!d. at *1; compare State v. Boon, Tay. 246, 1801 WL 701 *5 (N.C. Conf. 1801)
(Johnston, J.) ("The murder of a slave appears to me a crime of the most atrocious and
barbarous nature; much more so than killing a person who is free, and on an equal footing.
It is an evidence of a most depraved and cruel disposition to murder one so much in your
power that he is incapable of making resistance, even in his own defense ... ")
239 Norris, 1796 WL 327 at *5; see also id. ("It is the cruelty of the action, and the
malignity of heart the action discovers, to which the law attributes the crime of murder.");
id. ("This cruelty and malignity of heart is discoverable from the action itself, and the
causes that lead to it."); id. ("The law deems it proper he should answer for all the
consequences of his cruelty, to their utmost extent; and that one who has behaved himself
with so much obduracy and perverseness, should no longer be regarded as entitled to that
compassion which the frailties of human nature may justly claim. He has acted not from
the frailty of his nature, but from the unfeeling ferocity of a savage heart; and this
circumstance causes the law to impute to him the crime of murder.").
235

236
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tor general thus argued that a murder-as opposed to a manslaughterhad been committed. 240
The solicitor general's argument-reported in some detail-thus
shows the prototypical context in which the "cruel or unusual" language
was used. In his argument, North Carolina's solicitor general repeatedly
referred to the legal distinction between murder and manslaughter.
"Whenever this excess of cruelty appears, this disposition of the mind to
enormous revenge," he argued, "the crime of homicide amounts to murder."241 "Disputes, and fighting in consequence of them, happen every day
in the streets and elsewhere," he emphasized, asking the following question: "will the law say, when one is worsted he may quit the affray, go
home, provide himself with a knife, return and plunge it into the body of
his adversary, and that he shall be guilty of no more than manslaughter?"242 "Would other men in general in his situation have taken up the
cruel, purpose of seeking so deadly a revenge?" the solicitor general
asked. 243 His reply: "I think they would not; and it seems to me the act can
appear no otherwise that as the effect of a cruel disposition, not of human
weakness deserving of our compassion; and if it be the effect of cruelty it
amounts to murder. " 244
In other words, the solicitor general viewed the defendant's cruelty as
indicative of the defendant's relative blameworthiness. After noting that
Norris had gone eighty or a hundred yards before returning to stab his ad-

240 !d. As the solicitor general argued:
If the cause that lead to it be such a conduct on the part of the person slain, as would in
ordinary tempers have produced only a slight resentment, not rising so high as to aim at
the life of the offender, but only to a punishment proportionable to the offense, and yet the
person offended has attacked and beaten the other, in such a manner or with such a
weapon as shews an intent to kill, and not only to chastise; and in beating he has killed the
other, the law will deem it murder: because the beating in a cruel or unusual manner, or
with such a weapon, are circumstances at ending the fact which shew the heart of the
slayer to have been more than ordinarily cruel and regardless of another's woe.
!d. (italics added) (citing Foster, p. 259).
241 /d. "[I]t is murder," he said, where "a heart" is "excessively cruel and turned to inhuman revenge." !d. "What can be more cruel, more indicative of a malignant heart, than
this deed of the prisoner?" !d.
242 Id. at *5.
243 !d.
244 !d. One of the presiding judges agreed with this view, saying:
I cannot think it an excuse to reduce the offense to manslaughter, where two persons
quarrel and fight, and one goes some distance, gets a knife, returns and kills the other with
it-such disputes happen every day. If we say it is not murder to kill shortly after, under
such circumstances as this man was killed, much blood will be spilt in a very short timeit will be establishing a dreadful precedent. Norris ran off from the first combat and went
home, he got into his house, his castle of refuge and defense, where no one would have
offered to molest him-why did he not remain there? Why take his knife and return back
eighty or an hundred yards to an enraged man? Did not this show a murderous intent, and
that his heart was bent upon cruelty?
!d. at *7 (Williams, J.).
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versary, the solicitor general again characterized the killing as a murder. 245
"The heart that could so long entertain the hideous fiend," he argued,
"must have been familiarized to its lessons-the cruelty of the act demonstrates it murder; and here is that cruelty in its most heightened colours. " 246
"Any circumstance of deliberation accompanying the fact of killing, though
the falling out is sudden and the killing a short time after," he contended,
"will cause the slayer to fall under the imputation of murder. " 247 By contrast, defense counsel made an effective appeal to the jury,248 seeking an
acquittal of the murder charge by citing Rowley's Case as a precedent. In
that case, two boys fought, one bloodying the nose of the other, before one
of the boys ran three quarters of a mile to his father, who came back and
killed the other boy with a staff-a crime "adjudged manslaughter only,
owing to the heat of the passions at the time the blow was given. " 249
In other words, the "cruel and unusual" terminology became, among
other things, a means to distinguish between types of homicides. 250 To this

245 The report of the solicitor general's arguments reads as follows:
If two persons suddenly fall out and fight, and in the contest one kills the other, that is
manslaughter: the blood is heated, the passions boil, rage dictates his conduct, and whilst
the blows are passing, there is no leisure for reflection, nor time for reason to assume its
empire. Keeling 56. That is not like the case before us: here the combatants were
separated, and the fatal blow not given till three or four minutes afterwards; not until the
slayer had gone eighty or an hundred yards, and returned after arming himself with a
deadly weapon.
!d. at *5.
246 !d.
247 /d.

Norris was ultimately acquitted of the murder charge. !d. at *8. An editorial note in the
case reporter gives a flavor for public sentiment at the time. It reads:
The cause of reporting this case with so much minuteness, is that the public opinion ran
very high against the prisoner before and after his trial, and he was pronounced guilty of
murder by many who were present at his trial. The jury who acquitted him, were highly
censured. Perhaps the learned may be of opinion, when they meet with this case, that the
jury gave a proper verdict. It is possible that may become the general opinion. If so,
probably some of those who are to be hereafter concerned in trials of this sort, may be led
to reflect on the rapidity with which a wrong opinion sometimes spreads its influence over
the public mind, and to be cautioned, that a popular sentiment, however honest and well
meaning it may be, may sometimes become current for want of sufficient consideration or
information, and as frequently so respecting matters of judicial deliberation as any others.
!d.
249 !d. at *6 (citing Rowley's case, Cro. J. 296).
250 6 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAWS 645
(1824) ("Malice may be express or implied; express, as if one form a deliberate design to
kill a man, and kills him; this is malice express, and murder, and is evidenced in many
ways, as in duels, lying in wait, &c.; so it is express malice and murder, if A, even on a
sudden provocation, beats B in a cruel and unusual manner, so that he dies, though he did
not intend death; for here is an express evil design; as where the park keeper found a boy
stealing wood, and tied him to a horse's tail, and he was killed; held, it was murder by
express malice. So where a master corrected a servant with an iron bar, and killed him;
248
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day, the "cruel and unusual" catchphrase-or variants thereof-remain on
the books in many jurisdictions. Indeed, the "cruel and unusual" and "cruel or unusual" terminology is still found in federal statutes,251 state constitutions/52 and state laws. 253 For instance, the Uniform Code of Military
Justice-in a provision associating the phrase "cruel or unusual" with nonlethal corporal penalties-provides: "Punishment by flogging, or by branding, marking, or tattooing on the body, or any other cruel or unusual punishment, may not be adjudged by any court-martial or inflicted upon any
person subject to this chapter." 254 In short, particular acts-be they homicides, manslaughters, or bodily punishments of a non-lethal nature-have
long been associated with the "cruel" and "unusual" language.
In state statutes, the "cruel" and "unusual" terminology is even still
found in laws on the subject of homicide, 255 manslaughter, 256 and punish-

held, this was murder, because such excessive correction could but be attended probably
by death or bloodshed, and could proceed but from a wicked heart.") (citations omitted).
251 See 22 U.S. C. § 6912(a)(6) (a commission set up to monitor human rights in the
People's Republic of China is charged with monitoring "the right to be free from torture
and other forms of cruel or unusual punishment"); 25 U.S. C. § 1302(a)(7)(A) ("No Indian
tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall ... inflict cruel and unusual
punishments"); see also 42 U.S. C. § 2000dd(a) ("No individual in the custody or under
the physical control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical
location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment."); 42
U.S.C. § 2000dd(d) ("In this section, the term 'cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment' means the cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited
by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States
... "); U.S. Ct. of App. 9th Cir. Rule 34-3 ("Civil appeals in the following categories will
receive hearing or submission priority: ... (4) Appeals alleging deprivation of medical care
to the incarcerated or other cruel or unusual punishment ... "). "Cruel and unusual
punishments" are also specifically prohibited in Guam and the Virgin Islands. 48 U.S.C. §
1421b(h); 48 u.s.c. § 1561.
252 See Mary R. Falk & Eve Cary, Death-DefYing Feats: State Constitutional Challenges
to New York's Death Penalty, 4 J.L. PoL'Y 161, 177-78 (1995). Some state-law provisions
explicitly prohibit "corporal" punishments, too. S.C. CONST., art. I, § 15 ("Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor shall excessive fines be imposed, nor shall cruel, nor corporal,
nor unusual punishment be inflicted ... "); compare D.C. CODE, art. I, § 11 (the
"Constitution of the State of New Columbia" reads in part: "The State shall not require
excessive fines, nor impose cruel, corporal, or unusual punishment, or sentence of
death.").
253 ALA. CODE § 16-l-24.1(g) ("Except in the case of excessive force or cruel and unusual
punishment, no certified or noncertified employee of the State Board of Education or any
local board of education shall be civilly liable for any action carried out in conformity
with state law and system or school rules regarding the control, discipline, suspension,
and expulsion of students.").
254 10 U.S.C. § 855 (emphasis added).
255 CAL. PENAL CODE § 195 ("Homicide is excusable in the following cases ... 2. When
committed by accident and misfortune, in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a sudden combat, when no undue advantage is taken, nor any
dangerous weapon used, and when the killing is not done in a cruel or unusual manner.");
Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-17 ("The killing of any human being by the act, procurement, or
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ment. 257 For example, in some places, the killing of a human being by "accident or misfortune" is considered "excusable" so long as the killing was
not done in a "cruel or unusual manner." 258 The "cruel" and "unusual"
omission of another shall be excusable: ... (c) When committed upon any sudden combat,
without undue advantage being taken, and without any dangerous weapon being used, and
not done in a cruel or unusual manner.").
256 Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-35 ("The killing of a human being, without malice, in the
heat of passion, but in a cruel or unusual manner, or by the use of a dangerous weapon,
without authority oflaw, and not in necessary self-defense, shall be manslaughter."); 21
OKLA. STAT. ANN.§ 711 ("Homicide is manslaughter in the first degree in the following
cases: ... 2. When perpetrated without a design to effect death, and in a heat of passion,
but in a cruel and unusual manner, or by means of a dangerous weapon; unless it is
committed under such circumstances as constitute excusable or justifiable homicide.");
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-15 ("Homicide is manslaughter in the first degree if
perpetrated: ... (2) Without any design to effect death, including an unborn child, and in a
heat of passion, but in a cruel and unusual manner ... "); Ward v. State, 935 So.2d 1047,
1055 (Miss. App. 2005) ("The elements of manslaughter are laid out in Mississippi Code
Annotated section 97-3-35, and include (1) the killing of a human being, (2) without
malice, (3) in the heat of passion, (4) but in a cruel or unusual manner, or by the use of a
dangerous weapon, (5) without authority oflaw, (6) and not in necessary self-defense.");
compare Martin v. State, 818 So.2d 380, 382 (Miss. App. 2002) ("We conclude that the
use of a knife to stab the victim to death, if found to have been done in the heat of passion
without malice and not in necessary self-defense, would be sufficient evidence to convict
of manslaughter through the use of a deadly weapon without the necessity of a specific
finding that the stabbing was undertaken in a cruel or unusual manner.").
257 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.43 ("When no punishment is provided by statute, the court
shall sentence the convicted person to a term of imprisonment that, in view of the degree
and aggravation of the offense, is not cruel, unusual, or repugnant to the person's
constitutional rights."); 21 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 443a ("[A]ll prisoners who escape from
either of the aforesaid prisons either while confined therein, or while at large as a trusty,
when apprehended and returned to the prison, shall be punishable by the prison authorities
in such manner as may be prescribed by the rules and regulations of the prison provided
that such punishment shall not be cruel or unusual."): ORE. REv. STAT. § 138.040(2) ("If
the appellate court determines the disposition imposed exceeds the maximum allowable
by law or is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual, the appellate court shall direct the court
from which the appeal is taken to impose the disposition that should be imposed.").
258 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.03 ("Homicide is excusable when committed by accident and
misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means with usual ordinary caution, and
without any unlawful intent, or by accident and misfortune in the heat of passion, upon
any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a sudden combat, without any dangerous
weapon being used and not done in a cruel or unusual manner."); IDAHO CODE§ 18-4012
("Homicide is excusable in the following cases ... 2. When committed by accident and
misfortune, in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a
sudden combat when no undue advantage is taken nor any dangerous weapon used, and
when the killing is not done in a cruel or unusual manner."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-5
("Homicide is excusable in the following cases: ... B. when committed by accident or
misfortune in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a
sudden combat, if no undue advantage is taken, nor any dangerous weapon used and the
killing is not done in a cruel or unusual manner."); 21 OKLA. STAT. ANN.§ 731
("Homicide is excusable in the following cases ... 2. When committed by accident and
misfortune in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a
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words are also currently employed to protect animals, 259 students,260 juvenile inmates, 261 prisoners,262 and the residents of treatment facilities 263 and
nursing homes. 264 In California, such language also appears in laws forbidding any "cruel, corporal or unusual punishment" in a jail or prison set-

sudden combat provided that no undue advantage is taken, nor any dangerous weapon
used, and that the killing is not done in a cruel or unusual manner."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 22-16-31 ("Homicide is excusable if committed by accident and misfortune in the heat
of passion, upon sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a sudden combat. However,
to be excusable, no undue advantage may be taken nor any dangerous weapon used and
the killing may not be done in a cruel or unusual manner."); 14 V.I. CODE ANN. § 926
("Homicide is excusable ... when committed by accident and misfortune, in the heat of
passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a sudden combat, when no
undue advantage is taken, nor any dangerous weapon used, and when the killing is not
done in a cruel or unusual manner.").
259 TEx. PENAL CODE§ 49.02(a) ("A person commits an offense if the person intentionally
or knowingly: ... (4) transports or confines a livestock animal in a cruel and unusual
manner ... ").
26 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.11 (2) ("Except in the case of excessive force or cruel and
unusual punishment, a teacher or other member of the instructional staff, a principal or the
principal's designated representative, or a school bus driver shall not be civilly or
criminally liable for any action carried out in conformity with the State Board of
Education and district school board rules regarding the control, discipline, suspension, and
expulsion of students ... "); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 1012.75.11(1) ("Except in the case of
excessive force or cruel and unusual punishment, a teacher or other member of the
instructional staff, a principal or the principal's designated representative, or a bus driver
shall not be civilly or criminally liable for any action carried out in conformity with State
Board of Education and district school board rules regarding the control, discipline,
suspension, and expulsion of students ... "); Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-11-57 ("Except in the
case of excessive force or cruel and unusual punishment, a teacher, assistant teacher,
principal, or an assistant principal acting within the course and scope of his employment
shall not be liable for any action carried out in conformity with state or federal law or
rules or regulations of the State Board of Education or the local school board regarding
the control, discipline, suspension and expulsion of students.").
261 ORE. REv. STAT. § 421.105(1) ("The superintendent may enforce obedience to the rules
for the government of the inmates in the institution under the supervision of the
superintendent by appropriate punishment but neither the superintendent nor any other
prison official or employee may strike or inflict physical violence except in self-defense,
or inflict any cruel or unusual punishment.").
262 TEx. CODE CRIM. PRo., art. 16.21 ("Every sheriff shall keep safely a person committed
to his custody. He shall use no cruel or unusual means to secure this end, but shall adopt
all necessary measures to prevent the escape of a prisoner.").
263 16 DEL. CODE ANN.§ 2220(18) ("Every patient shall be free from verbal, physical or
mental abuse, cruel and unusual punishment, involuntary seclusion, withholding of monetary allowance, withholding of food and deprivation of sleep."); 16 DEL. CODE ANN. §
5182( 17) ("Every patient shall be free from verbal, physical or mental abuse, cruel and
unusual punishment, involuntary seclusion, withholding of monetary allowance, withholding offood and deprivation of sleep.").
264 16 DEL. CODE ANN.§ 1121(24) ("Every patient and resident shall be free from verbal,
physical or mental abuse, cruel and unusual punishment, involuntary seclusion, withholding of monetary allowance, withholding of food and deprivation of sleep.").
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ting. 265 In each of those contexts, the fact-finder is expected to determine
what so qualifies, just as judges are tasked on a daily basis with making
bail determinations, their discretionary judgments constrained only, if
found to be "excessive," by the Bail Clause. 266

E. Early American Cases
i. An Overview: 1791 to 1830
In the pre-1830 period, the Eighth Amendment and comparable statelaw provisions were considered only a minimal amount by American judges. In 1799, Virginia's excessive fines clause was held to forbid the imposition of a joint fine on people jointly indicted for assaulting a magistrate. 267
In 1801, a North Carolina judge agreed with counsel that the common-law
punishment of pressing to death-also known as peine forte et dure 268 -

265 CAL. PENAL CODE § 673 ("It shall be unlawful to use in the reformatories, institutions,
jails, state hospitals or any other state, county, or city institution any cruel, corporal or
unusual punishment or to inflict any treatment or allow any lack of care whatever which
would injure or impair the health of the prisoner, inmate, or person confined; and
punishment by the use of the strait jacket, gag, thumbscrew, shower bath or the tricing up
of a prisoner, inmate or person confined is hereby prohibited."); CAL. PENAL CODE § 2652
("It shall be unlawful to use in the prisons, any cruel, corporal or unusual punishment or
to inflict any treatment or allow any lack of care whatever which would injure or impair
the health of the prisoner, inmate or person confined; and punishment by the use of the
strait-jacket, gag, thumb-screw, shower-bath or the tricing up of prisoners, inmates or
persons confined is hereby prohibited.").
266 Cf Evans v. Foster, 1 N.H. 374, 1819 WL 470 *3 (1819) (in interpreting New
Hampshire's "cruel or unusual punishments" clause, the New Hampshire court ruled that
"the determination of 'what bail shall be called excessive must be left to the courts on
considering the circumstances of the case'") (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 110, at
297). As the Superior Court of Judicature of New Hampshire held in 1819 in interpreting
its state constitutional provision:
The constitution forbids all "courts of law" as well as single "magistrates" to require
"excessive bail." If the members of a higher court therefore, violate this prohibition, they
are equally liable with a justice of the peace: and an indictment or an impeachment would
seem to be sufficient remedies. Any suffering to individuals, that may be apprehended
from the great number and limited knowledge of single magistrates, can always be soon
obviated; as the person, committed for a failure to procure bail, which appears excessive,
possesses the right to be brought before a judge of this court by a Habeas Corpus, and to
have the sum reduced, if under all the circumstances it is thought too large.
Id. at *4.
267 Jones v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. 555, 1799 WL 260 *1 (Va. 1799).
268 This form of torture, used on those who refused to plead to a crime, involved crushing
the body with heavy loads of stones or iron. Douglas M. Coulson, Distorted Records in
"Benito Cereno •• and the Slave Rebellion Tradition, 22 YALE J.L. & HUM. 1, 24 (2010);
see also Frederick C. Millett, Will the United States Follow England (and the Rest of the
World) in Abandoning Capital Punishment?, 6 PIERCE L. REv. 547, 587 n.295 (2008)
("The effect of pressing on an uncooperative accused was, and was intended to be, fatal.
As early as 1426, pressing was used in England, though it never seems to have enjoyed
wide popularity with the courts. Its sole recorded use in this country seems to have been
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could not be inflicted because North Carolina's bill of rights prohibited
cruel and unusual punishments. 269 And in 1810, in a challenge to a Virginia
law requiring attorneys to take an anti-dueling oath before being admitted
to the bar, an attorney in the case cited Virginia's cruel and unusual punishments clause. "If not against the WORD, is it not against the SPIRIT,
which declares, 'that cruel and unusual punishments ought not to be inflicted?"' the attorney argued in challenging the state law.27°
Other pre-1830 cases found a bail determination not "excessive" under New Hampshire's "cruel or unusual punishments" clause;271 upheld the
constitutionality of anti-gaming laws;272 and found that disenfranchisement
imposed for dueling under a New York anti-dueling statute "is not an unusual punishment" in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 273 In one case, In
re Turner,2 74 a Maine court-in a decision issued in 1825-rejected a claim
that it was a cruel and unusual punishment to chain a black seaman to the
deck of a vessel. 275 In that case, Isaac Turner had filed a petition for habeas
corpus stating that he was a cook on board the brig Effort, then at the
wharf in the port of Portland, Maine, and that he had been confined on
board, with his leg chained, for several days and nights successively. 276
Corporal punishments-though their overuse had been questioned by
the likes of Montesquieu277-were frequently authorized278 and used in co-

during the notorious Salem witchcraft trials, in 1692, when one Giles Cory was pressed to
death for refusal to plead to the charge of witchcraft.").
269 State v. Gainer, 3 N.C. 140, 1801 WL 710 (N.C. Super. L. & Eq., 1801).
270 In re Leigh, 1 Munf. 468, 1810 WL 547 (Va. 1810).
271 Evans v. Foster, 1 N.H. 374, 1819 WL 470 *2 (N.H. 1819).
272 Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 6 Rand. 694, 1828 WL 860 (Va. 1828) (a Virginia act making those convicted of gaming subject to stripes was held not to constitute a cruel and
unusual punishment under state law); State v. Smith, 10 Tenn. 272, 1829 WL 501 *5
(Tenn. Err. & App. 1829) (state law declaring those convicted of gaming disqualified
from holding office was not unconstitutional).
273 Barker v. People, 20 Johns. 457 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1823); see also Barker v. People, 3
Cow. 686 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824) ("Without inquiring whether disqualification to hold
office, is a punishment either cruel or unusual, I consider this provision of the national
constitution, inapplicable to offenses against a state.").
274 1 Ware 83, 24 F. Cas. 340 (D.C. Me. 1825).
275 !d. at 340-42.
276 Id. In rejecting the seaman's claim, the court ruled:
The chaining of a man to the deck of a vessel does indeed carry with it a harsh sound, and
suggests to the imagination images of cruelty and suffering. But it does not appear that the
mode of confinement was such as to give much bodily pain, for though some complaint of
the kind is suggested now, none was made at the time, nor is there the smallest indication
of a cruel and vindictive disposition on the part of the master.
!d. at 342.
277 1 CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 100 (3d ed. 1762) ("A
good legislator takes a just medium; he ordains neither always pecuniary, nor always
corporal punishments."); compare id. at 203 ("But as those who have no property are
generally the readiest to attack the property of others, it has been found necessary, instead
of a pecuniary, to substitute a corporal punishment.").
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lonial America. 279 "Through the colonies," write historian Caroline Cox,
"corporal punishment not only reinforced the authority of the state but
also aided in defining social status," as the slaves and the poor were generally the ones punished corporally. 280 "When not resorting to capital sentences," Cox explains, "colonial courts used fines, various forms of public
humiliation," and corporal punishments such as whipping, often adhering
to biblical injunctions. 281 "Slaves, at the bottom of the social ladder, experienced only corporal punishment," she writes. 282
Indeed, corporal punishments, especially the lash, were regularly used
by the military on enlisted soldiers, with George Washington and other
commanders ordering such punishments. 283 "For officers," however, Cox
notes, "there was no corporal punishment," with "a private or public reprimand from a superior officer" being the norm and "dismissal from the
service being the harshest punishment." 284 In the pre-Fourteenth Amendment era, punishments were thus not meted out equally to offenders. Those
with a higher social status might be sparred humiliating corporal punishments; slaves, privates and seaman were not so fortunate.
During and after the Revolutionary War, corporal punishments of
varying types were consequently regularly handed out in criminal and
courts-martial cases. 285 "During the post Revolutionary period," writes
historian Myra Glenn, "a series of regulations and statutes legitimized the
practice of corporal punishment in the new republic. " 286 "The United

278

State v. Fleming, 1848 WL 2457 * 1 (S.C. App. Law 1848) ("manslaughter at the
common law was punished by branding in the hand and imprisonment"); State v. Raines,
3 McCord 533, 1826 WL 710 *6 (S.C. App. 1826) (noting that the common-law
punishment of manslaughter is "branding in the hand and imprisonment").
279 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97-98 (2003) (noting the some colonial punishments were
meant to inflict public disgrace and that "whipping, pillory, and branding inflicted
physical pain"; "[a] murderer might be branded with an 'M,' and a thief with a 'T. "').
28

°

CAROLINE Cox, A PROPER SENSE OF HONOR: SERVICE AND SACRIFICE IN GEORGE
WASHINGTON'S ARMY 154 (2004).

/d. at 151. As Cox writes: "Deuteronomy 25:3 laid out the limit for whipping: 'Forty
stripes he may give him, and not exceed ... Most colonies followed that example and only
occasionally exceeded it, as in Pennsylvania, for example, where fifty lashes were
sometimes given for third offenses." !d. at 151-52; compare id. at 152 (noting that in New
York and the Carolinas, "lash punishments for whites regularly rose above 39 lashes,
ranging as high as 150 in New York and to several hundred during the vigilante Regulator
movements in the Carolina backcountry").
282 /d. at 154.
283 /d. at 157, 187, 203-04, 451.
284 /d. at 134.
285 Fults v. State, 1854 WL 2165 *1 (Tenn. 1854) (noting that "the judgment of the court
in manslaughter" before "the Code of 1829" was "branding in the hand"); Van Buren v.
State, 1852 WL 2044 *1 (Miss. Err. App. 1852) (noting that a slave was indicted for
burglary, tried and convicted, and sentenced to be branded in the hand and to receive
twenty-five lashes each day for four successive days).
281

286

MYRA C. GLENN, CAMPAIGNS AGAINST CORPORAL PuNISHMENT: PRISONERS, SAILORS,
WOMEN, AND CHILDREN IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 9 (1984).
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States Congress, for example," she explains, "authorized flogging aboard
American men-of-war," with the first of these regulations drawn up by
John Adams in 1775 when he served on the Naval Committee of the Continental Congress. 287 The "Rules for the Regulation of the Navy" permitted
naval commanders to inflict up to twelve lashes on any enlisted man. 288 In
1797, the Congress would endorse those "Rules," and two years later
Congress, in its "Articles for the Government of the Navy," authorized
flogging for specific offenses such as swearing or drunkenness. 289 "An Act
for the better government of the navy of the Untied States," which governed naval operations from 1800 to 1850, also extended to a naval court
martial the use of the lash as punishment. 290 Congress did not abolish naval
flogging until September 28, 1850. 291
In early America, legislatures experimented with doing away with
corporal punishment of offenders. In 1786, for instance, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania established a system of solitary confinement at hard
labor and criminals who formerly might have been punished capitally or
corporally were instead incarcerated.292 "In 1796," writes Myra Glenn,
"New York State followed Pennsylvania's lead" by authorizing Newgate
State Prison and by prohibiting the whipping of convicts. 293 "These successes in prison reform, however, were shortlived," Glenn notes. 294 "During the first two decades of the nineteenth century," she explains, "there
was a discernible trend toward the corporal punishment of criminals. " 295
For instance, after opening in 1805, the Massachusetts State Prison at
Charlestown inflicted harsh corporal punishments, especially flogging. 296
Likewise, a mutiny in Newgate Prison prompted New York legislators in
1819 to repeal their earlier prohibition on prison whippings. 297 Thus, in the
Founding Fathers' time, corporal punishment-then a relatively common,
or usual, sanction-was a flash point of controversy. The use of corporal
punishments ebbed and flowed, though in many places such punishments
remained a gritty reality of early American life. 298

Id.
Id.
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 !d.
292 !d.
293 !d.
294 !d.
295 Id.
296 Id.
297 Id.
287
288

298

at 9-10.
at 9 n.*.
at 10.

at 11.
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ii. Early Jurists on Cruelty and Race
The most interesting cases-at least in terms of understanding how
early American jurists understood the prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments"-dealt with non-lethal corporal punishments and the
issue of race. In james v. Commonwealth/ 99 an 1825 case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court specifically addressed the corporal punishment known
as "ducking." In that case, a woman, Nancy James, had been convicted of
being a common scold and, on October 29, 1824, was sentenced "to be
placed in a certain engine of correction, called a cucking or ducking-stool,
on Wednesday, the third day of November, then next ensuing, between the
hours of ten and twelve o'clock in the morning, and being so placed therein, to be plunged three times into the water." 300 James' counsel argued the
sentence was "illegal," alleging that it violated both the U.S. Constitution
and Pennsylvania's constitution. 301
Finding the Eighth Amendment inapplicable to state cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court first found that state courts "are left at liberty to
regulate their own criminal codes as they may deem proper, without reference to the laws or constitution of the United States." 302 At the same time,
Pennsylvania's highest court emphasized that Nancy James' sentence "has
created much ferment and excitement in the public mind; it is considered as
a cruel, unusual, unnatural and ludicrous judgment." 303 "[B]ut whatever
prejudices may exist against it," the court noted, "still, if it be the law of
the land, the court must pronounce judgment for it. " 304 "But," the court
clarified, "as it is revolting to humanity, and is of that description that only
could have been invented in an age of barbarism, we ought to be well persuaded, either that it is the appropriate judgment of the common law, or is

299

1825 WL 1899 (Pa. 1825).
!d. at * 1. As noted earlier, a ducking or "cucking" stool was a chair connected to a
pulley system whereby offenders were plunged into the water. Meskell, supra note 140, at
841-42. John Adams made notes pertaining to the crime of scolding in 1766---in particular, as regards its frequency-in the case of"Dus. Rex vs. Mary Gardiner, for a common
Scold, Quarreller and Disturber of the Peace" in the Suffolk Court of General Sessions.
Diary of John Adams, "Suffolk Sessions July 1766," available at
http://www.masshist.org/publications/apde/portia.php?id=DJAOld426 ("Hawkins-a
common Scold is punishable by putting into the Ducking Stool. Prosecutions rare, 'tho the
offense frequent.").
301 James, 1825 WL 1899 at* 1. Pennsylvania's 1790 constitution omitted any reference
to "unusual," providing "[t]hat excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel punishments inflicted." PA. CONST. art. IX, §XIII (1790).
302 !d. at *2. Elsewhere in the James case report, it was noted: "Common scolding has
been recognized as an indictable offense in two of our sister states, New York and
Massachusetts; and though it was in both held to be punishable only by fine and
imprisonment, that might be under peculiar provisions of their laws or constitutions,
which would not affect a decision in Pennsylvania." Id. at *4 (italics in original).
303 Id. at *5.
304 !d.
300
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inflicted by some positive law; and that that common law or statutory provision has been adopted here, and is now in force." 305
Associate Justice Thomas Duncan306-who delivered the court's ruling-noted at the outset how much time he had spent researching the punishment of ducking: "I have employed some time, not very pleasantly, certainly not very profitably, in tracing the punishment ad ludibrium, to its
source, and have followed this stream until it has sunk in oblivion, in the
general improvement of society, and the reformation of criminal punishment, and been dried up by time, that great innovator. " 307 In his lengthy
opinion, Duncan emphasized the oddity of the scolding offense. "It must
strike all, as a peculiar feature of this offence," he said, "that it is of the
feminine gender, that it degraded woman to a mere thing, to a nuisance,
and does not consider her as a person. " 308 "But this is not to be wondered
at," he added, "when we reflect on the general degraded state of woman,
when this punishment was introduced; she was, in some respects, the servant or slave of the husband; so that he might correct her with a stick as
thick as his own thumb." 309
Before passing on James' sentence, Justice Duncan-very much concerned, it seems, with human dignity-also gave an extensive history of the
punishment being considered. After focusing on the varied and wideranging instrumentalities that had been used to inflict the punishment, 310

Id.
See 17 THOMAS SERGEANT & WILLIAM RAWLE, EDS., REPORTS OF CASES ADTIIDGED IN
THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 459 (3d ed. 1874) (describing Thomas Duncan's
legal career).
307 James, 1825 WL 1899 at *5 (italics in original).
308 !d. at *6 (italics in original).
309 Id. "There is a tradition," Justice Duncan offered in his opinion, "that at the publication
ofBracton's learned work, in which the dimension of this instrument of correction was
first stated, the women of the town in which he lived, seized him and ducked him in a
horse-pond." Id. Bracton, a thirteenth-century English jurist, wrote a long treatise, De
legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae (On the Laws and Customs of England) that attempted
to describe the whole of English law. Bracton: De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae,
HARvARD LAw SCHOOL LIBRARY, http://hlsl5 .law.harvard.edu/bracton! (last visited Nov.
19, 2011). In it, Bracton spoke of the "ducking-stool." !d. (Thome ed., Vol. 2, pp. 290,
299, 340).
310 As Justice Duncan noted:
The punishment of the ducking or cucking-stool, is from the cuckoo, qui odiosejurgat et
rixatur, as Lord COKE has it, in 3 Inst. 219; or, as Jacob has it, in his dictionary, the
gogen-stool, and by some thought to be corrupted from the choke-stool; and the
instrunlent is called in Stat. 51 Hen. III., a trebucket, a pitfall, and in law, as Lord COKE
says, signifies a stool that falls into a pit of water; whereas, the last instrument that was
seen in England, as Morgan, an editor of Jacob's Dictionary mentions, consisted of a beam
or rafter, moving on a fulcrum, and extending to the centre of a large pond, on which end
the stool used to be placed; while, on the other hand, Daines Barrington, a learned
antiquarian, in his Observations on the Statutes 40, says, it is a machine anciently used in
the siege of towns, and the etymology is from the Celtic, tre, that is, ville, and our own
bucket, and signifies a town-bucket.
3os

306
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Duncan-on behalf of the court, and in light of the many different kinds of
ducking or cucking stools-noted: "Thus, in our very outset, we are involved in doubt, and who shall decide, where there is such a difference
among the learned? The officer would not know what to do, whether to fix
Nancy James on a stool, or in a bucket, whether she is to be run into the
river on wheels, or to be soused into a pond, from a beam or rafter." 311
Justice Duncan then proceeded to recount how the punishment of ducking
was so antiquated in England that examples of the instruments used to inflict it could not be readily located. 312 Duncan referenced the repeal of
"two bloody statutes ... by the voice of humanity," saying "that it seems
most probable, that hanging of women as witches and gypsies, and ducking
them as scolds, ceased about the same time, viz: the time of the restoration,
and before the charter to William Penn." 313 "Indeed," he concluded, "it
appears, that at the same period, the race of witches and scolds became
extinct, when the law ceased to hang the witches and duck the scolds." 314
In his opinion, Justice Duncan next explained that "[t]he instances are
numerous of statutes being repealed in fact-a kind of silent legislation. " 315
Duncan explained: "As to the abrogation of statutes by 'non user,' there
may rest some doubt; for myself, I own, my opinion is, that 'non user' may
be such as to render them obsolete, when their objects vanish or their reason ceases." 316 "The common law (and this is but a customary punishment), what is it, but common usage?" Duncan offered. "The long disue-

James, 1825 WL 1899 at *6.
311 /d. at *7.
312

Justice Duncan, in discussing England's experience with the punishment, put it this
way:
From the country from which, it is suggested, we have borrowed it, we could obtain no
information, nor expect a model, for not a vestige of it is there to be found; unless,
perhaps, alongside of the rack (the Duke of Exeter's daughter), which is still shown as a
curiosity, by a yeoman of the King's guard, as an instrument of punishment, which, like
the trebucket, was once used in England (Barrington 366); for no poor woman, in that
country, has suffered under the edge of a law so barbarous, for the last century; like
unscoured armor, it is hung up by the wall; like the law of witchcraft, it has remained
unused; for no one has suffered under that law, either at the stake or on the gibbet, since
the reign of Charles II.; although the law stood unrepealed on the statute book, until 9
Geo. II., as our own law against the same offense, until several years after the revolution;
or, like the act against the gypsies, which punished those with death, without the benefit
of clergy, who remained one month within the realm; and Lord HALE, in his Pleas of the
Crown 671, says, "I have not known these statutes put much in execution, only about
twenty years since, at the assizes at Bury, about thirteen were condemned and executed
for this offense. On this judgment, BLACKSTONE, 4th vol. 166, remarks, "but to the
honor of our national humanity, there are no instances more modem."
James, 1825 WL 1899 at *7.
313 !d.
314 !d.
315 Id. at *8.
316 !d. (italics in original).
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tude of any law," he said, "amounts to its repeal." 317 A "villeinous judgment, by long disuse," he concluded of one species of punishment, "has
become obsolete, it not having been pronounced for ages." 318 "The barbarous writ of attaint, which has as strong a foundation as any principle in
common law," he added, "has been long banished." 319
Justice Duncan-writing less than thirty-five years after the ratification of the Bill of Rights-thus concluded that punishments, even those still
on the statute books, could become improper through disuse. "That such
crimes and punishments existed at the common law," he acknowledged of
the prior punishments he referenced, "every treatise to the present day
states; but this does not prove," he clarified, "that they now exist." 320
"They are nothing more," he emphasized, "than the memorials of times
that are past, as the usages of our uncivilized ancestors; and in nothing is
the gradual change of the common law more apparent, and in nothing does
it accommodate itself more to the change of manners and effect of education, than in the silent and gradual disuse of barbarous criminal punishments."321
In ruling on the illegality of the corporal punishment put before the
court, fact-finding is evident in the discussion. After citing a treatise from

317

Id. Duncan's opinion was as follows:
Mr. Woodeson, in his second lecture (vol. 1st, 63) of civil, positive and instituted laws,
observes, "that the last consideration is the period of their existence;" they may be
repealed either expressly or by implication founded on disuse: he cites this passage from
the Digest, "rectissime illud receptum est--ut magis non solus sujfragio legislatorum, sed
etiam tacito consensu omnium, per desuetudinem abrogatur. It certainly requires very
strong grounds to presume a law obsolete, yet as the whole community includes as well
the legislative power as its subjects, total disuse of any civil institution for ages past, may
afford just and rational objections against disrespected and superannuated ordinances.
Judge WILSON (2d Wilson's Works 38, 39), observes, "that it is the characteristic of a
system of common law, that it may be accommodated to the circumstances, the exigencies
and the conveniences of the people by whom it is appointed. Now, as these circumstances,
exigencies and conveniences silently change, a proportionate change in time and in degree
must take place in the accommodated system. Time silently and gradually introduces; it
silently and gradually withdraws its customary laws."
James, 1825 WL 1899 at *8 (italics in original).
318 Id.
319 Id. The concept of"attainder" under English law was "the stain or corruption of blood
which arises from being condemned" for a crime, while a "bill of attainder" was a bill
brought into Parliament "for attainting persons condemned for high treason." 1 JoHN
BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 102 (1839) (1993). Bills of attainder-once frequently used by
legislators to sentence people to death in the absence of judicial proceedings-were
outlawed by the U.S. Constitution. MARTIN J. WADE& WILLIAM F. RUSSELL, THE SHORT
CONSTITUTION 153 (3d rev. ed. 1921 ). At common law, a person convicted of treason or a
felony would be considered "attainted." 2 DAVID ROBERTSON, TRIAL OF AARON BURR FOR
TREASON 92 (1875).
320 James, 1825 WL 1899 at *8.
321 !d.
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1581 that distinguished between capital and non-capital corporal punishments, Justice Duncan emphasized that corporal punishments were diminishing and that he could find no evidence of the punishment of ducking for
scolding being lawfully inflicted for many decades. 322 Duncan referenced
both English authorities 323 and the well-known Pennsylvania lawyer James
Wilson-a Founding Father and an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme
Court from 1789 to 1798-in support of his position that the ducking of
scolds was an impermissible and antiquated punishment. 324 Duncan noted

322

The opinion in James stated as follows:
Lambarde, who first published his Treatise on the Office of Justice of the Peace, in 1581,
lib. i. ch. 12, states that corporal punishments are either capital, or not capital; that capital
are inflicted "sundrie ways; as by hanging, burning, boiling, pressing: not capital, are of
divers sorts, as cutting off the hand or ear, burning or branding the hand, face, shoulders,
whipping, imprisonment, stocking, sitting in the pillory, or on the cucking-stool." Of this
kind of punishment our old laws had more sorts than we now have; as pulling out the
tongue for false rumors, cutting off the nose, and for adultery, taking away the privy parts.
So they had more sorts of punishments, when Lambarde wrote, than we now have.
Blessed be GOD! I feel a conviction (and I have examined every book upon which I could
lay my hands), that there is no judicial record, certainly no report, of this punishment
being inflicted for more than one hundred years. The case in 2 Strange 849, The King v.
Taylor, was quashed generally; it was not against her as communis vexatrix, but as
calumniatrix et communis perturbatrix; and in The King v. Margaret Cooper, id. 1246,
the judgment was not rendered as for a common scold; and the last of them was as long
ago as 19 Geo. II., nearly eighty years ago.
James, 1825 WL 1899 at *8.
323 James, 1825 WL 1899 at *9:
In the Queen v. Foxby, 6 Mod. 11, in the second of Anne, the judgment was likewise
arrested for mistake in the indictment. The note of the reporter is, the punishment of a
scold is ducking, but the counsel for the prisoner said, "he knew no law for ducking of
scolds." Lord HOLT did not give any opinion as to the judgment; he only mentioned that
it was indictable in the Leet, "and that it was better ducking in a Trinity than a
Michaelmas term;" better in warm than in cold weather. But it was too much even for the
gravity of the grave and learned Chief Justice of the King's Bench, to treat the subject
with any solemnity. In page 178, she was brought up again (for the sheriff had let her go
at large), and the court let her run again until the next term. HOLT could not conceal his
contempt for this farce of ducking; he sneered at the trebucket, declaring that ducking
would only harden the criminal; and, if she were once ducked, she would scold all the
days of her life. I think, that the trebucket then made its final exit, or afterwards was only
heard of in the courts of justice, as John Doe and Richard Roe, pledges of prosecution; a
mere nominal thing.
324 James, 1825 WL 1899 at *9:
Judge WILSON, certainly a learned and eminent person, to whom the state committed the
revision of her laws, in his third volume, page 311, treats the trebucket with the same
contempt with which Lord HOLT had done before him. After giving the judgment against
a common scold, in a public lecture, he sneeringly says-"so she shall be plunged into the
water, by way of punishment and prevention;" and thus scornfully winds up the
trebucket-"our modem men of gallantry would not surely decline the honor of her
company; I therefore humbly propose, that in future, the cucking-stool shall be made to
hold double." And those only who knew that great man, can form an idea what that look
of scorn was. This cucking-stool was a species of the tumbrellum; Lord COKE laments
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that scolds were once "indictable in the sheriff's tourn," 325 but ultimately
concluded that ducking was no longer an authorized punishment for such
offenders. "There is no ground, whatever may be the antiquated theory of
the law," Duncan explained, "that it now exists, in fact and in practice, as
a legal punishment." 326
Justice Duncan-in delivering his opinion-noted that all the members of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court might not agree on everything, but
they were unanimous as to the question before the court. As Duncan explained: "I do not know that all the members of the court agree with me in
the conclusion, as to the abrogation of this punishment in England, by disuse; but in the inquiry most important, there is no difference of opinion.
We all agree in this, that this customary ancient punishment for ducking
scolds, was never adopted, and therefore, is not the common law of Pennsylvania. " 327 After emphasizing that "the ducking-stool, cucking-stool, or
choking-stool," as well as "the pillory, the collisstrigium, or neck-stretch,
are punishments ejusdem generis, of the same family," Duncan cited authorities for the proposition that putting someone "in the pillory" was intended to "disgrace" the offender. 328 "[I]t is very certain," Duncan explained, "that the legislature never considered the ducking-stool a legal

that there was no good Latin word for the dung-cart, and says, that the pillory and the
trebucket were of the dung-cart family.
325 James, 1825 WL 1899 at * 10. Duncan noted that a "cucking-stool" had been defined
as "an engine, invented for the punishment of scolding and unquiet women." Id. He then
proceeded to explain the rationale in earlier years for this instrument of punishment:
Very possibly, as both men and women were, in those days, rude and disorderly, the
women were put in the trebucket and the men in the pillory, for disturbing or making a
noise in this great court; and Lord COKE, 3 Inst. 219, says, "furea, pillore et tumbrel
appendant al view de frank-pledge, and every one who hath a leet or market, ought to
have a pillory and trebucket to punish offenders; for want whereof, the lord may be fined,
or his liberty seized."
James, 1825 WL 1899 at *10.
326 James, 1825 WL 1899 at *10. In support of this proposition, Duncan gave the
following recitation of authorities:
Barrington says, it was a punishment formerly used in this country, for female offenders,
and not confined to the offense of scolding; and Jacob says, the punishment is disused.
Mr. Morgan, one of his editors, informs us, that he saw the remains of one, on a private
estate, in Warwickshire; and Mr. Tomlins, in his last edition of this work, mentions there
had been one, which had lately been removed, at Banbury, in Oxfordshire, but that was
not a machine for legal punishment, but was used to make sport for the mob, in ducking
common women; for this usage, this propensity to ducking women, was pretty inveterate.
Old women were generally ducked by the common people, by way of primary or
experimental trial, before they were delivered over to the civil magistrate to be hanged as
witches; many of the accused died under the experiment. This does not depend on a work
of fiction (many of which, in the present day, present the real manners and habits of the
times in which they lay the scenes), but on authentic history.
Id.
327 Id.
328

Id. (italics in original).
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punishment, which could be inflicted by the sentence of the law, or when
they abolished the pillory and whipping-post, &c., they would have included it. " 329
In 1790, the Pennsylvania legislature had adopted "An Act to reform
the Penal Laws of this state." 330 Among other things, that law substituted
prison sentences and hard labor for "whipping" and other previously authorized punishments, listed in the act as "burning in the hand," "cutting
off the ears," "nailing the ear or ears to the pillory," and "placing in and
upon the pillory." 331 "The object of the framers of the act of 1790," Justice
Duncan opined, "was the abolition of all infamous, disgraceful, public
punishments-all cruel and unnatural punishments-for all the classes of
minor offences and misdemeanors, to which they had been before applied."
"This was the object of the author of our humane penal code," Duncan
said, adding, "I need not mention the name of Mr. Bradford, to whom the
civilized world is so much indebted. " 332 In 1793, William Bradford-a
close friend of James Madison from their days together at the College of
New Jersey-penned a lengthy and influential essay, An Enquiry How Far
the Punishment of Death Is Necessary in Pennsylvania, advocating the cur!d.
Act of Apr. 5, 1790, reprinted in 3 LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
440-54 (1803).
331 !d., § 4. Prior to 1790, ear cropping, public whipping, and the pillory were explicitly
authorized by Pennsylvania law. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 21, 1772 (any person or persons
breaking and entering a house at night "shall stand in the pillory during the space of one
hour, have his, her or their ears cut off, and nailed to the pillory, be publicly whipped with
thirty-nine lashes on the bare back, well laid on"), reprinted in 2 LAws OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 55-56 (1803); Act of Feb. 26, 1773 (counterfeiters
"shall be sentenced to the pillory, and have both his or her ears cut off, and nailed to the
pillory, and be publicly whipped on his or her bare back, with thirty-one lashes, well laid
on"), reprinted in 2 LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 82-83 ( 1803 ); Act
of Mar. 10, 1780 (any person or persons guilty of stealing a horse "for the first offense,
shall stand in the pillory for one hour, and shall be publicly whipped on his, her or their
backs with thirty-nine lashes, well laid on, and at the same time shall have his, her or their
ears cut off, and nailed to the pillory; and for the second offense shall be whipped and
pillored in like manner, and be branded on the forehead, in a plain and visible manner,
with the letters H. T."), reprinted in 2 LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
255-56 (1803); Act of Mar. 16, 1785 (counterfeiters "shall be sentenced to the pillory, and
to have both his or her ears cut off, and nailed to the pillory"), reprinted in 3 LAws OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 24-25 (1803).
332 Justice Duncan noted:
[T]he wisdom, humanity, and policy of our Pennsylvania plan, has crossed the Atlantic.
England, attached as she is to her own system, has adopted ours; and very lately, by stat.
56 Geo. III., has abolished pillory in all cases but perjury and subornation of perjury.
Long before, to the honor of her humanity, in the case of punishments inflicted for
clergyable offenses, she had extended the benefit of clergy to women, provided that the
whipping should be in private, and in the presence of the female sex alone, 19 Geo. II., ch.
26; and I believe the punishment of whipping, as to females, has been altogether
abolished.
James, 1825 WL 1899 at *10.
329
330
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tailment of death sentences. 333
In addition to crediting the much-heralded work of William Bradford,
Justice Duncan's opinion also mentioned the efforts of Jared Ingersoll, another prominent local figure. 334 "The late Judge INGERSOLL," Duncan
noted, "a name respected and honored, when attorney-general, in his report to the legislature, in 1813, stated that by several acts of assembly,
'cruel and unnatural punishments, which tended only to harden and confirm the criminal, had been abolished for all inferior offences."' 335 "It is
apparent," Duncan emphasized, referring to Bradford and Ingersoll, "that
those two distinguished men were of opinion that all infamous corporal
punishments, and disgraceful public spectacles, ad ludibrium, were abolished; and that the legislature so considered it when they passed the several
acts reforming the penal laws, I think, we have the most conclusive evidence."336
In his analysis, Justice Duncan spent a lot of time recounting the history of laws punishing scolding, whether by fine, gagging, or confinement
at hard labor. 337 After referencing laws passed in 1682 and 1683 that punished scolding, Duncan emphasized that those laws "continued in force
until 1700, when another act against scolding passed, inflicting the same
penalty of imprisonment, five days at hard labor, or to be gagged and stand
at some convenient place, at the discretion of the magistrate. " 338 "The act
of 1700 was repealed by the Queen in council, but I have not been able to
find the repeal of the acts of 1682 and 1683," Duncan added. 339 "Whatever be the fact," he ruled, "the conclusion is the same-that the commonlaw punishment of ducking was not received nor embodied by usage so as

BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 85.
Jared Ingersoll served as Pennsylvania's attorney general from 1790 to 1799 and also
from 1811 to 1817. In 1821, Ingersoll became the presiding judge of the District Court for
the City and County of Philadelphia, but died a year later. Robert J. Lukens, Jared
Ingersoll's Rejection ofAppointment as One of the "Midnight Judges" of 1801:
Foolhardy or Farsighted?, 70 TEMP. L. REv. 189, 203-205 (1997).
335 James, 1825 WL 1899 at *11.
336 !d. Noting the Quaker heritage of Pennsylvania, Justice Duncan added:
The sanguinary code of England could be no favorite with William Penn and his followers, who fled from persecution. Cruel punishments were not likely to be introduced by
a society who denied the right to touch the life of man, even for the most atrocious crime.
For had they brought with them the whole body of the British criminal law, then we
should have had the appeal of death, and the impious spectacle of a trial by battle in a
Quaker colony; and it is worthy of remembrance, that the charter of William Penn empowered him with the advice and assent of the freemen, to make laws for their own government, and until this was done, the laws of England, in respect to real and personal
property, and as to felonies were to continue the same. Thus, as to misdemeanors, the
common-law punishments were not brought over by the first settlers.
!d.
337 Id.
338 Id.
339 !d.
333

334
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to become a part of the common law of Pennsylvania." 340 As Duncan emphasized: "It was rejected, as not accommodated to the circumstances of
the country, and against all the notions of punishment entertained by this
primitive and humane community; and, though they adopted the commonlaw doctrines as to inferior offences, yet they did not follow their punishment."341
In making his ruling, Justice Duncan spoke of the common law and its
evolving nature. "I do not find the rule on this subject," he noted, "more
satisfactorily laid down than by the Chief Justice." 342 "Every country, he
observed," Duncan wrote of the Chief Justice's prior decision in The
Guardians of the Poor of Philadelphia v. Greene, 343 "had its common
law-ours is composed partly of the common law of England, and partly
of our own usages." 344 As Duncan emphasized: "Our ancestors, when they
emigrated, took with them such of the English principles as were convenient for the situation in which they were about to place themselves. By degrees, as circumstances demanded, we adopted the English usages, or substituted others better suited to our wants; until, before the revolution, we
had formed a system of our own, founded, in general, on the English constitution, but not without considerable variation; and in nothing was the
variation greater, than in the trial and punishment of crimes." 345
In considering the practice of ducking scolds, Duncan wrote that "all
our legislation has been opposed to this punishment; judicial decisions
there are none." 346 "I cannot give to the two precedents from the quarter
sessions of Philadelphia," he said, "the weight of decisions." 347 As Duncan
reasoned in rejecting reliance on those precedents: "The two instances in
the quarter sessions, which are principally relied upon to sustain the judgment, are too slight a foundation on which to rest a sentence, so hostile to
all the policy and humanity of our penal code, and so much opposed to the

340 Id.
341 !d. "It is not true," Duncan held, "that our ancestors brought with them all the
common-law offenses; for instance, that of champerty and maintenance, this court
decided in Stoever v. Whitman's Lessee, 6 Binn. 416, did not exist here." !d. at *12.
342 !d. at *12.
343 5 Binn. 554, 558 (Pa. 1813).
344 James, 1825 WL 1899 at* 12.
345 !d.; see also id. (italics in original):
Judge CHASE, in the United States v. Worrall, 2 Dall. 384, on the same subject, thus
expresses himself: "When the American colonies were first settled by our ancestors, it
was held, as well among the settlers, as by the judges and lawyers of England, that they
brought hither, as their birthright and inheritance, so much of the common law as was
applicable to their local situation and change of circumstances; but each colony judged for
itself what part of the common law was applicable to its new condition, and by various
modes--by legislative acts, by judicial decisions, or by constant usage--adopted some
parts and rejected others."
346 James, 1825 WL 1899 at* 12.
347 !d.
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sense of the community." 348 "Common-law rights," Duncan emphasized,
"are to be found in the opinions of lawyers, delivered by axioms; or in judicial decisions, well considered and established; or to be collected from the
universal usage through the country." 349
Justice Duncan thus took a practical, non-rigid approach to the question before him, looking at the facts as any good judge is supposed to do.
"What is the evidence here?" Duncan asked, before proceeding to recount
the only instances he could locate of women being ordered ducked for the
offense of scolding. 350 In one notorious case from the 1781-1782 time period, Duncan wrote, a sentence of ducking was only "most reluctantly" given before being "humanely" suspended. 351 In that case, the court"doubtful of the sentence to be given"-instead ordered the woman, by
agreement and with her consent, to simply leave the neighborhood in
which she had committed her offense. 352 The decisionmakers in that case,
Justice Duncan editorialized, "were glad, as well as the neighborhood, to
get rid of her." 353 "Mr. Bradford was then attorney-general," Duncan added, saying that "most probably, all was transacted under his advice; we can
thus readily account for this unusual judgment." 354
!d. As Judge Duncan wrote of the work of the court of quarter sessions and the absence
of ducking being inflicted as punishment:
The court of quarter sessions was, when this judgment was given, composed entirely of
men who (however high their standing in society, and however intelligent) were unversed
in law. Since 1782, until the last case in the mayor's court, forty years ran round, and there
has been no instance of this punishment. There has been one of an acquittal; that case,
therefore, proves nothing.
!d.
349 !d.
350 !d. Judge Duncan described what he found as follows:
In 1769, eighty years after the settlement of the colony, in The King v. Mary Conway, the
indictment was against her as a common scold; she pleaded guilty; the sentence was, that
she should be publicly ducked at the end of Market street wharf, in the Delaware; all this
passed without debate, and we may presume, without the assistance of counsel for the
woman. In 1779, ten years after, there was a trial and conviction (The State v. Ann
Maize), and the same sentence. In 1781, there was an indictment for the same offense,
against Mary Swann; verdict guilty; continued for advisement; continued from March
1781, to June 1782, when there is this most extraordinary entry: "defendant having
demeaned herself peaceably, kept under further advisement; and in the next term, on
motion of Mr. Bankson, the defendant was recognized, that she will, within one month,
leave the neighborhood and pay the costs."
!d.
351 !d.
352 !d.
353 !d.
354 !d. William Bradford was Pennsylvania's attorney general from 1780 to 1791, when he
was appointed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In 1794 Bradford become the
Attorney General of the United States, serving in that position until his death in 1795.
William Bradford (1755-1795), UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA UNIVERSITY ARCHIVES,
http://www.archives.upenn.edu/people/1700s/bradford_wm.html (last visited Nov. 15,
2011).
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While he discussed the common law in detail, Justice Duncan was not
willing to blindly follow ideas laid down decades earlier. "I must confess,"
he said of the punishment of ducking, "I am not so idolatrous a worshipper, as to tie myself to the tail of this dung-cart of the common law." 355 "I
am far from professing the same reverence for all the degrading and ludicrous punishments of the early days of the common law," he wrote, adding
of ducking: "I am far from thinking, that this is an unbroken pillar of the
common law, or that to remove this rubbish, would impair a structure,
which no man can admire more than I do." 356 "In coming to the conclusion, that the ducking-stool is not the punishment of scolds," Duncan
wrote, "I do not take into consideration the humane provisions of the constitutions of the United States and of this state, as to cruel and unusual
punishments, further than they show the sense of the whole community. "357
In alluding to, but not relying on, the Eighth Amendment's language,
Justice Duncan instead focused on the barbarous and undignified nature of
the punishment of ducking. As Duncan reasoned: "If the reformation of the
culprit, and prevention of the crime, be the just foundation and object of
all punishments, nothing could be further removed from these salutary
ends, than the infliction in question. " 358 "It destroys all personal respect,"
he explained, emphasizing that "the women thus punished would scold on
for life, and the exhibition would be far from being beneficial to the spectators."359 "What a spectacle would it exhibit!" he emphasized, worrying
about "a congregation of the idle" and the disorderly and the lack of any
persuasive penological justification. 360 "[T]he day would produce more
scolding," he said, "in this polite city, than would otherwise take place in a
year. ,361
By ruling that the ducking-stool was an instrument of the past, not the
present, Justice Duncan reversed the judgment of the court of quarter sessions. 362 In so doing, Duncan recognized that the change in the law
wrought over time was beneficial to society as a whole. "The city is rescued
from this ignominious and odious show, and the state from the opprobrium of the continuance of so barbarous an institution," Duncan wrote, noting that his ruling was in line with those of other states. 363 "The courts of
our sister states of New York and Massachusetts, governed by the same
common law as we are," he emphasized, "have declared that this strange

James, 1825 WL 1899 at* 13.
!d.
357 !d.
358 !d.
359 !d.
360 !d.
361 !d.
362 !d. at* 14.
363 !d. at* 13.
355

356
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and ludicrous punishment no longer exists with them." 364 "[T]he common
law punishment of ducking not being received here," Duncan concluded of
Pennsylvania law, "I join in the hope of a learned antiquarian and jurist of
our own country, 'that we shall hereafter hear nothing of the duckingstool, or other remains of the customs of barbarous ages."' 365
The James case dealt with a non-lethal corporal punishment, with the
decision grounded in the humanitarian principle of human dignity. But two
other cases from the pre-1830 period dealt with a thornier, much more
common problem in antebellum America: the intersection of race and the
prohibition on cruel punishments. In Ely v. Thompson, 366 a "free person of
color" brought "an action of trespass, assault, battery and imprisonment"
against a justice of the peace and a constable. 367 At issue was the legality of
a Kentucky law that subjected "any negro or mulatto, or Indian" to "thirty
lashes on his or her bare back, well laid on" for lifting "his or her hand in
opposition to any person not being a negro, mulatto or Indian. " 368 After
the plaintiff, Rhody Ely, filed his lawsuit, the justice of the peace "pleaded
his office" and the fact that "the plaintiff had lifted his hand in opposition
to a white man. " 369 The justice of the peace thus argued that the sentence
he pronounced-that Ely be lashed thirty times on his bare back-was justified under state law. 370 The constable likewise pled and interposed "his
office" and "the execution of the warrant," saying that he was entitled to
inflict stripes pursuant to the sentence of the justice of the peace. 371 The
lower court in the Kentucky case agreed, prompting Ely to argue on appeal
that the state law "is contrary to the constitution of this state, and therefore void. " 372
On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, Ely specifically invoked the state constitution's prohibition against "cruel punishments."
That prompted his adversaries-who conceded the cruelty of the law-to

Id.
!d. at *14 (citing Duponceau on Jurisdiction 96). In a "NOTE" that followed the
opinion itself, it was added that an act of Henry VIII had once been passed for the
punishment of a cook who had poisoned a bishop's family members. !d. As the note
stated: "[B]y an ex post facto law, this was made treason, and he was ordered to be thrown
into boiling water; the idea of which punishment, as Barrington suggests, was because he
was a cook." Id. (citation omitted; italics in original). "Such were the barbarous
institutions of the age," the note concluded, adding: "This punishment accorded with the
savage cruelty of the monarch, and was recommended by its quaintness; to boil a cook,
was quite a royal joke; as the Duke of Clarence was drowned in a butt of Malmsey, a
favor granted him by the King; a whimsical choice, says Hume, which implied that he had
an extraordinary passion for that liquor." !d. (italics in original).
366 3 A.K. Marsh. 70, 1820 WL 1161 *2-3 (Ky. App. 1820).
367 !d. at *2.
368 Id.
369 Id.
370 Id.
371 Id.
372 !d.
364
365
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take a three-pronged approach. First, they argued that the law allowing
non-whites to be lashed "is consistent with, and does not contravene any
of, the provisions of the constitution, and that the legislature might adopt
this punishment, notwithstanding its cruelty, with regard to white persons."373 Second, the justice of the peace and the constable alternatively
contended that even if the state law was found to violate the state's constitution, "yet free persons of color are no parties to our political compact,
and of course are not entitled to its privileges or shielded by its provisions,
and that they are subject to any regulation which the legislature may adopt,
although such regulations are contrary to the constitution in their
terms." 374 Finally, the justice of the peace and the constable asserted that as
"a judicial officer" and "a ministerial officer" who were "bound to execute
process without enquiring into its validity, neither can be responsible." 375
In Ely, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held in 1820 that the state
law in dispute was unconstitutional under Kentucky's prohibition against
"cruel punishments." 376 In particular, the Kentucky law was found to be
unconstitutional "in so far as it subjects the free person of color to corporal
punishment for raising his hand in opposition to a white person, if it be
done in self defense; and in so far as it infringes the privileges secured by
the 10th section of the 10th article." 377 The appellate court-in reaching
that decision-emphasized that a "remarkable feature" of the law was that
"[t]he oath of the party complaining is conclusive, and the justice must
inflict the punishment, although the proof may be untrue, and he disbelieves it." 378 Noting "the extensive nature of the act" and that the law prevented actions not only taken "in an angry or threatening manner but also
those "done in self defense, or in warding off injury, or in repelling attempts on the virtue of the female of color, by an intended ravisher," the
court in Ely found itself forced to confront-in its own words-"the disagreeable necessity of deciding upon" the law's constitutionality "so far as it
operates on free persons of color." 379
The court in Ely noted "the severity of the act" and lamented "its
want of those mild features which characterize the rest of our code." 380
And the court seemed reluctant-as courts so often are-to invalidate the
!d. In other words, they argued that a state law designed to protect whites could not
contravene the state's prohibition against "cruel punishments".
374 !d.
375 !d.
373

376

Kentucky's first, second and third constitutions all expressly prohibited "cruel
punishments." BENNETT H. YOUNG, HISTORY AND TEXTS OF THE THREE CONSTITUTIONS OF
KENTUCKY 31, 53, 88 (1890).
377 Ely, 1820 WL 1161 at *2-3. Article X, section 10 of Kentucky's second constitution,
adopted in 1799, gave the accused in criminal prosecutions "a right to be heard by himself
and counsel" and "to meet the witnesses face to face," among other rights. Ky. Const., art.
X,§ 10.
378 Ely, 1820 WL 1161 at *4.
379 !d.
380 !d.
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operation of the law. As the court's opinion stated: "[H]owever severe,
cruel and rigorous its features, if it does not contravene the constitution, it
must be executed, till the legislative power of the government shall see
cause to change it." 381 Yet, the court found itself unwilling to ignore the
state constitution's long-standing prohibition on "cruel punishments." 382
As the court noted: "It would, however, be difficult to exempt this section
[of the code] from the imputation of cruelty, within the meaning of the
15th section of the 10th article of the constitution, so far as the act subjects
a free person of color to thirty lashes for lifting his hand in oppression to a
white person who was attempting wantonly to violate his or her person,
contrary to the peace and good order of society." 383 The court concluded:
"If a justice of the peace, or any other tribunal, should, under this act, inflict the stripes against a free person of color, who lifted his hand to save
him or herself from death or severe bodily harm, all men must pronounce
the punishment cruel indeed. " 384
As to the argument "that free persons of color are not parties to the
political compact," the court in Ely thought that argument had been taken
too far. 385 "This we can not admit, to the extent contended for," the court
began, noting that free persons of color "are certainly, in some measure,
parties." 386 The court-aware of the political environment in which it operated-walked a thin line. "Although they have not every benefit or privilege which the constitution secures," the court ruled, "yet they have many
secured by it." 387 The court, in its very next sentence, then clarified, however: "We need not take the trouble of inquiring how far they are, or are
not, parties. For, suppose the premises are admitted, the conclusion would
not follow, that the legislature had a right to do with them as it chose, and
that their acts on that subject could never be brought to a constitutional
test." 388 "Although they are not parties to the compact," the court held of
free persons of color, "yet they are entitled to repose under its shadow, and
thus secure themselves from the heated vengeance of the organs of government."389

/d.
!d. Article XII, section 15 of the Kentucky Constitution of 1792 provided: "That
excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishments
inflicted." Kentucky's second constitution, adopted in 1799, contained an identical
provision in Article X, section 15.
383 Ely, 1820 WL 1161 at *4.
384 !d.
385 !d. at *5.
386 !d.
387 /d.
388 /d.
389 !d. The court in Ely then compared the rights of free persons of color to those of aliens,
ruling as follows: "Aliens, who sojourn here, and belong to another, and claim nothing of
our government, but the right of passage, could not be taken up and hung by a justice of
the peace, without a hearing, without an opportunity of proving themselves innocent, and
without a jury, even if the legislature, by a solemn act, should direct it to be done." !d.
381

382
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By contrast, in Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 390 the General Court of
Virginia held in 1824 that Virginia's cruel and unusual punishments clause
had no relevance whatsoever to a free person of color. 391 In that case, the
petitioner-"a free man of color"-was indicted for grand larceny of bank
notes valued at one hundred and fifty dollars. 392 The petitioner was convicted of the crime, and the jury determined that thirty-nine stripes should
be inflicted upon him. 393 Thereafter, the Superior Court-following the
provisions of a new Virginia law-ordered that the petitioner "receive thirty-nine stripes on his bare back on the 26th of June next, and that after
that day, he be sold as a slave, and transported and banished beyond the
limits of the United States, in the manner prescribed by Law." 394
After the verdict, the petitioner in Aldridge then moved to have the
judgment arrested, arguing to the Superior Court-which rejected all of his
arguments-that the 1823 state law under which he was punished was unconstitutional as a cruel and unusual punishment. 395 That Virginia law
provided that in cases of grand larceny committed by "free negroes" or
"mulattoes," the free person of color could be sold as a slave and transported and banished beyond the limits of the United States. 396 The law allowing such persons to be sold as slaves, the petitioner had argued, "is contrary to the Bill of Rights of Virginia, and therefore, unconstitutional and
void." 397 Writing for the General Court of Virginia, Judge William Dade398

"The tenth section of the constitution, which we have quoted," the court held, "restricts
the powers of the legislature and every department of government." !d. As the court
emphasized: "The powers which they are therein forbidden to exercise, they do not
possess, and can not exercise over any man or class of men, be they aliens, free persons of
color, or citizens." !d. "Although free persons of color are not parties to our social
compact," the court concluded, "yet they have many privileges secured thereby, and have
a right to its protection." !d.
390 2 Va. Cas. 447, 1824 WL 1072 *3 (Va. Gen. 1824).
391 Id. at *2-4.
392 !d. at *1.
393 !d.
394 !d.
395 !d.
396 !d.
397 !d.
398 See Andrew T. Fede, Gender in the Law ofSlavery in the Antebellum United States, 18
CARDozo L. REv. 411, 420-21 (1996) (discussing another ruling of Judge William Dade,
who held in Commonwealth v. Turner, 5 Rand. 678, 1827 WL 1087 (Va. Gen. 1827), that
only the legislature-and not the common law--could declare a master's cruelty to a
slave to be a criminal battery). In Turner, a master had been indicted for "wilfully and
maliciously, violently, cruelly, immoderately, and excessively" beating, scourging and
whipping his own slave "with certain rods, whips and sticks." Turner, 1827 WL 1087 at
*1. "It is said to be the boast of the common law," Judge Dade ruled for the court, "that it
continually conforms itself to the ever-changing condition of society." !d. at *2. But after
comparing the beating of a slave with the beating of a horse and tracing the origins of
slavery itself, Dade called common-law prosecutions of masters for cruelty "a new idea"
and a "contested" subject, noting that "great changes are not to be made by the Courts."
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announced for the judges "that there is nothing in the Constitution or Bill
of Rights, repugnant to the power which the Legislature has exercised in
the punishment of this crime." 399
In analyzing Virginia's bill of rights, the General Court of Virginia began with the following observation: "Notwithstanding the general terms
used in the Bill of Rights, it is undeniable that it never was contemplated,
or considered, to extend to the whole population of the State." 400 As Judge
Dade ruled on the court's behalf: "Can it be doubted, that it not only was
not intended to apply to our slave population, but that the free blacks and
mulattoes were also not comprehended in it?" 401 "The leading and most
prominent feature" of Virginia's bill of rights, Dade acknowledged, "is the
equality of civil rights and liberty." 402 "And yet," he pointed out, "nobody

!d. at *2-5. "It is greatly to be deplored fuat an offense so odious and revolting as fuis," he
said, "should exist to fue reproach of humanity." "This Court," he wrote, however, "has
little hesitation in saying that fue power of correction does not belong to it." !d. at *5
(italics in original). Slaves in Virginia were not only then marginalized and powerless, but
they were quite literally without constitutional rights and subject to an incredibly harsh
state-law punishment regime. See, e.g., Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Anne F. Jacobs, The
"Law Only as an Enemy": The Legitimization ofRacial Powerlessness through the
Colonial and Antebellum Criminal Laws of Virginia, 70 N.C. L. REv. 969, 977 (1992)
("Slaves could receive the deafu penalty for at least sixty-eight offenses, whereas for
whites the same conduct eifuer was at most punishable by imprisonment or was not a
crime at all.").
Only one judge, William Brockenbrough, dissented in Turner, opining that slaves
should be protected under the common law from "all unnecessary, cruel, and inhuman
punishments." Turner, 1827 WL 1087 at *6 (Brockenbrough, J., dissenting). "I admit," he
wrote, "that whilst a statute existed which exempted a master from punishment for killing
his slave, by reason of a blow given during his correction, or for the manslaughter of a
slave, any beating, however cruel and severe, could not be fue subject of a prosecution."
Id. "But," Brockenbrough added, "fuis ferocious and sanguinary system oflegislation was
abolished by the act of November, 1788." !d. (citing 12 Hen. Stat. at Large, 681 ). "By that
repeal," he explained, "the common law was expressly revived: by fuat repeal, fue law
again extended its a:gis over the slave to protect him from all inhuman torture, though that
torture should be inflicted by the hand of a master." !d. As Brockenbrough argued:
I had not supposed that I was stretching the principles of the common law to an
unreasonable and unprecedented extent. I had supposed that if, in England, the mere
attempt, though ineffectual, to commit a felony, or the solicitation to commit one, be a
misdemesnor, (3 Bac. Ab. 549;) if an Indictment will be allowed in Massachusetts for
poisoning a cow, (1 Mass. T. Rep. 59;) or in Pennsylvania for killing a horse, (1 Dall.
335.) an Indictment might be sustained in Virginia for maliciously and inhumanly beating
a slave almost to death. In other words, I had supposed, that whilst the common law
protected all persons in the just exercise of any authority or power conferred on them by
the law; yet, for the abuse of that authority, or an excess in the exercise of it, they were
liable to be prosecuted as delinquents.
Turner, 1827 WL 1087 at *6 (italics in original).
399 Aldridge, 1824 WL 1072 at *3.
4oo Id.
401 Id.
402 !d.
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has ever questioned the power of the Legislature, to deny to free blacks and
mulattoes, one of the first privileges of a citizen; that of voting at elections,
although they might in every particular, except color, be in precisely the
same condition as those qualified to vote. " 403
In focusing on Virginia's cruel and unusual punishments prohibition
in particular, the General Court of Virginia ruled that "we have no notion
that it has any bearing on this case." As the court held: "That provision
was never designed to control the Legislative right to determine ad libitum
upon the adequacy of punishment, but is merely applicable to the modes of
punishment. " 404 As Judge Dade, emphasizing that "the best heads and
hearts of the land of our ancestors" had "long and loudly declaimed
against the wanton cruelty" of many punishments imposed "in other countries," ruled for a unanimous court: "[T]his section in the Bill of Rights,
was framed effectually to exclude these, so that no future Legislature, in a
moment perhaps of great and general excitement, should be tempted to
disgrace our Code by the introduction of any of those odious modes of
punishment. " 405 Ultimately, the General Court of Virginia overruled the
petitioner's request for a writ of error. 406
The two southern cases intersecting with race were both decided before the Civil War and the adoption of the Reconstruction Amendmentsamendments that would fundamentally reshape American law. The Thirteenth Amendment, adopted in 1865, abolished slavery, providing: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. " 407 The Fourteenth
Amendment, adopted in 1868, later conferred citizenship rights by providing in Section 1: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside." 408 That section also provided: "No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. " 409 The Fifteenth Amendment, conferring the right of citizens to vote regardless "of

!d. As Dade emphasized: "The numerous restrictions imposed on this class of people
in our Statute Book, many of which are inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the
Constitution, both of this State and of the Untied States, as respects the free whites,
demonstrate, that, here, those instruments have not been considered to extend equally to
both classes of our population." !d.
404 !d. (italics in original).
405 !d. at *3-4.
406 Id. at *7.
407 U.S. Const., amend. XIII.
408 U.S. Const., amend. XIV.
409 !d.
403
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race, color, or previous condition of servitude," 410 would-like the other
Reconstruction Amendments-change the course of American history and
U.S. law.
iii. The Supreme Court's Pre-1900 Cases

Wilkerson v. Utah 411 was the first case in which the U.S. Supreme
Court wrestled with the Eighth Amendment's meaning. In that 1878 case,
an Eighth Amendment challenge was lodged against a Utah law by a person sentenced to be shot by a firing squad for pre-meditated murder. At the
time, the Utah law-codified in 1876-provided that any person convicted
of first-degree murder "shall suffer death. " 412 Following the jury's guilty
verdict, the presiding judge-in accordance with Utah's mandatory sentencing scheme-had sentenced the prisoner as follows: "That 'you be taken from hence to some place in this Territory, where you shall be safely
kept until Friday, the fourteenth day of December next; that between the
hours of ten o'clock in the forenoon and three o'clock in the afternoon of
the last-named day you be taken from your place of confinement to some
place within this district, and that you there be publicly shot until you are
dead. "' 413
In deciding that the prisoner's death sentence was not unconstitutional, the Supreme Court in Wilkerson first pointed out that hanging and
shooting were then common methods of execution. 414 "Cruel and unusual

U.S. Const., amend. XV (ratified Feb. 3, 1870).
99 U.S. 130 (1878).
412 !d. at 129. Utah's 1876law did provide that, upon recommendation of the jury, a
person guilty of first-degree murder might be imprisoned at hard labor in the penitentiary
for life at the discretion of the court. !d. at 132, 136. Utah's prior law, in force from 1852
to 187 6, provided that "when any person shall be convicted of any crime the punishment
of which is death, ... he shall suffer death by being shot, hung, or beheaded, as the court
my direct," or as the convicted person may choose. !d. at 132 (quoting Comp. Laws Utah,
1876, 564).
413 !d. at 130-31. In that era, public executions were still common in some parts of the
country. See JOHN D. BESSLER, DEATH IN THE DARK: MIDNIGHT EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA
41-56 (1997). The last public execution took place in the United States in Kentucky in
1936. !d. at 31-33.
414 Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 133 ("the usages of the army to the present day are that sentences
of the kind may in certain cases be executed by shooting, and in others by hanging"); id.
at 134 ("[T]he custom of war, says a learned writer upon the subject, has, in the absence
of statutory law, determined that capital punishment be inflicted by shooting or hanging;
and the same author adds to the effect that mutiny, meaning mutiny not resulting in loss of
life, desertion, or other military crime, if a capital offense, is commonly punished by
shooting; that a spy is always hanged, and that mutiny, if accompanied by loss of life, is
punished in the same manner,-that is, by hanging.") (citation omitted); id. ("Military laws,
says another learned author, do not say how a criminal offending against such laws shall
be put to death, but leave it entirely to the custom of war; and his statement is that
shooting or hanging is the method determined by such custom. Like the preceding author,
he also proceeds to state that a spy is generally hanged, and that mutiny unaccompanied
with loss oflife is punished by the same means; and he also concurs with Benet, that
410
411
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punishments are forbidden by the Constitution," it noted, but then held
that "the authorities referred to are quite sufficient to show that the punishment of shooting as a mode of executing the death penalty for the crime
of murder in the first degree is not included in that category, within the
meaning of the eighth amendment." 415 As the Court explained: "Soldiers
convicted of desertion or other capital military offences are in the great
majority of cases sentenced to be shot, and the ceremony for such occasions is given in great ful[l]ness by the writers upon the subject of courtsmartial."416 The Court further cited William Blackstone's treatise, Commentaries on the Laws of England, for the proposition that capital offenders are often "hanged by the neck till dead." 417
The Court in Wilkerson, though approving the prisoner's sentence to
be shot, stated in dicta that the Eighth Amendment would prohibit certain
cruel, painful or disgraceful punishments. "Difficulty," the Court wrote,
"would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall
not be inflicted; but it is safe to affirm that punishments of torture, such as
those mentioned by the commentator referred to, and all others in the same
line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that [a]mendment to the Constitution."418 Blackstone-the referenced commentator-had, in the Supreme Court's words, admitted "that in very atrocious crimes other circumstances of terror, pain, or disgrace were sometimes superadded." 419 As
the Court in Wilkerson elaborated: "Cases mentioned by the author are,
where the prisoner was drawn or dragged to the place of execution, in treason; or where he was embowelled alive, beheaded, and quartered, in high
treason. " 420 "Mention," the Court added, continuing its discussion of
Blackstone's Commentaries, "is also made of public dissection in murder,
and burning alive in treason committed by a female. " 421 The Court in

desertion, disobedience of orders, or other capital crimes are usually punished by
shooting, adding, that the mode in all cases, that is, either shooting or hanging, may be
declared in the sentence.") (citation omitted).
415 !d. at 134-35.
416 !d. at 135 (italics added). The italicized language seems to focus on the usualness or
unusualness of the punishment in question.
417 Id. (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 110, at 377).
418 !d. at 135-35 (citations omitted).
419 Id. at 135.
420 !d.
421 !d. After recounting these cruel practices, the Court in Wilkerson editorialized: "History confirms the truth of these atrocities, but the commentator states that the humanity of
the nation by tacit consent allowed the mitigation of such parts of those judgments as
savored of torture or cruelty, and he states that they were seldom strictly carried into effect." !d. In the context of its decision ofhow the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
barred "punishments of torture," the Court further noted that another commentator, Chitty,
had discussed "instances" in which "the ignominious or more painful parts of the punishment of high treason have been remitted ... " !d.
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Wilkerson thus looked backed and to the then-current frequency of the
punishment's use as it made its ruling.
In re Kemmler, 422 the Supreme Court's next case to grapple with the
Eighth Amendment's meaning, dealt with a completely novel method of
execution, one not tried before and certainly not around in Blackstone's
day. That case involved the fate of a man, William Kemmler, sentenced to
be electrocuted in New York for first-degree murder. 423 In 1886, a New
York commission-led by New York City lawyer Elbridge Gerry-was
created to investigate and report on "the most humane and practical method known to modern science of carrying into effect the sentence of death in
capital cases. " 424 As a result of its work, the New York legislature passed
the Electrical Execution Act of 1888-a law that took effect on January 1,
1889, with William Kemmler becoming the first person to die in New
York's electric chair. 425 But Kemmler would not be executed before a legal
challenge was heard-a legal challenge that made it all the way to the U.S.
Supreme Court.
Before his execution, Kemmler had challenged his sentence as "a cruel
and unusual punishment" under both New Yark's constitution and the
U.S. Constitution. 426 That allegation was contested, 427 so the trial judge
decided to have a hearing on the issue and "[a] voluminous mass of evidence was then taken as to the effect of electricity as an agent of death, and
upon that evidence it was argued that the punishment in that form was
cruel and unusual." 428 As the lower court judge described it: "[I]t is in these
circumstances that I am asked to discharge the prisoner from his present
detention; it being contended in his behalf that the legislative enactment
under consideration provides punishment both cruel and unusual, the infliction whereof may well result in subjecting its unfortunate victim to the
most extreme and protracted vigor and subtility of cruelty and torture. " 429
In response, the authorities contended that New Yark's new law was
"a step forward and in keeping with the scientific progress of the age" and
that "the application of electricity as proposed will result in the immediate

422

136 U.S. 436 (1890).
!d. at 438-39.
424 BESSLER, supra note 413, at 47.
425 Id. at 48-49. William Kemmler was convicted of first-degree murder in the court of
oyer and terminer in Buffalo, New York. In re Kemmler, 7 N.Y.S. 145, 146 (1889).
426 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 439, 441.
427 !d. at 440-41.
428 !d. at 442. The appointment of a referee was agreed upon for the taking of testimony,
and the referee, Tracy C. Becker, Esq., was accordingly named. Becker later made a
report, transmitting the "large amount of testimony taken by him." In re Kemmler, 7
N.Y.S. at 146-47; see also People ex ref. Kemmler v. Durston, 74 Sickels 569, 24 N.E. 6
(N.Y. 1890) ("[C]ounsel for the respective parties agreed that a referee be appointed for
the purpose of taking the testimony in pursuance of the offer. In this way a mass of
testimony was given upon both sides, certified by the referee to the county judge, and
embraced in the extended record before us.").
429 In re Kemmler, 7 N.Y.S. at 148.
423
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and painless death of the culprit, so that the unsightly and horrifying spectacles which now not infrequently attend executions by hanging will effectually be prevented." 430 Ultimately, the county judge-who saw the question as "one largely of fact" 431-sided with the State of New York, holding
that William Kemmler had not overcome the presumption of constitutionality afforded to the New York law. 432 The county court ruled that certain
methods of executions, including hanging, "death by gunshot," and electrocution, were constitutional. 433 He also found that the Eighth Amend!d.
!d. at 149. As the lower court judge put it: "[I]t was because the burden of satisfying
the judicial mind of the cruel and unusual, and therefore unconstitutional, character of the
law in question was upon the defendant and to afford him opportunity to present the facts
as he claimed them to be, that, as the better course, the reference was ordered ... " !d. The
judge emphasized that because "scientific questions were involved ... an intelligent
decision of the question would seem to require that there be furnished to those called upon
to decide all the light that scientists, experts, and others having large experience in
electrical matters should be able to give ... " !d.
432 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 442.
433 The lower court judge ruled as follows:
Although the phrase "cruel and unusual punishments" has a history of 200 years, it is not
an easy task to define it. It was said in Wilkerson v. Utall, 99 U.S. 130, that "difficulty
would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision."
Courts have rarely been called upon to construe it. Nor is it now at all needful, in the view
which I entertain of the present case, and of my duty in regard to it, to attempt any
accurate and comprehensive definition. Beyond doubt, many of the methods used for the
infliction of the death penalty in other times and countries would to-day and in our land be
held illegal. As among these may be mentioned crucifixion, boiling in water, oil, or lead,
blowing from cannon's mouth, burning, breaking on the wheel, dismemberment, burying
alive. But not death itself is a cruel and unusual punishment, nor is death by gunshot or by
hanging, though there seems to be an element of cruelty inseparable from any taking of
human life as punishment for crime; but it is clearly not against this that the constitutional
prohibition is directed. It was held by the supreme court of the United States in the
Wilkerson Case above cited, that a sentence to death by shooting was not illegal in Utah.
Death was the penalty for murder at the common law, and of its infliction, Blackstone
said: "If upon judgment to be hanged by the neck till he is dead the criminal be not
thoroughly killed, but revives, the sheriff must hang him again; for the former hanging
was no execution of the sentence. And if a false tenderness were to be indulged in such
cases, a multitude of collusions might ensue. Nay, even while abjurations were in force,
such a criminal, so reviving, was not allowed to take sanctuary, and abjure the realm, but
his fleeing to sanctuary was held an escape in the officer." 4 Comm. 406. "Any
punishment declared by statute for an offense which was punishable in the same way at
the common law could not be regarded as cruel or unusual in the constitutional sense."
Cooley, Const. Lim. 329. The common-law rule applied in this state when the
constitutional provision under consideration was adopted, and long before and after, until
the act of 1888 took effect; and no question was made as to the legality of death by
hanging. That statute but changed the means whereby to produce death. And can it be said
that in this case it has been plainly and beyond doubt established that electricity as a
death-dealing agent is likely to prove less quick and sure in operation than the rope? I
believe not.
!d. at 149-50.
430

431
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ment was of no concern in the case because it was "addressed solely to the
national government" and "has no reference to punishments inflicted in
state courts for crimes against the state. " 434
The New York appellate courts affirmed that order. 435 While it was
determined that the state constitution's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments" imposed a restriction on the legislature436 and that certain methods of execution would be barred by it, 437 New York's appellate
judges-also seeing the issue as one of fact, 438 though to be determined by

434 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 442; In re Kemmler, 7 N.Y.S. at 148. In the lower court,
the judge emphasized that "[t]he constitution of the United States and that of the state of
New York, in language almost identical, provide against cruel and inhuman punishment
..."!d. "[O]ur own state fundamental law," the lower court judge added, "is so benignant
that not even he who cruelly murders can be cruelly punished." !d.
435 People ex ref. Kemmler v. Durston, 55 Hun 64, 7 N.Y.S. 813, 815 (1889) ("[T]hough
the mode of death prescribed is conceded to be unusual, there is no common knowledge
or consent that it is cruel; on the contrary, there is a belief, more or less common, that
death by an electric current, under favorable circumstances, is instantaneous and without
pain."); People ex ref. Kemmler v. Durston, 74 Sickels 569, 577, 24 N.E. 6, 8 (N.Y.
1890):
We entertain no doubt in regard to the power of the legislature to change the manner of
inflicting the penalty of death. The general power of the legislature over crimes, and its
power to define and punish the crime of murder, is not and cannot be disputed. The
amendments prescribed no new punishment for this offense. The punishment now, as
before, is death. The only change made is in the mode of carrying out the sentence. The
infliction of the death penalty in any manner must necessarily be accompanied with, what
might be considered in this age, some degree of cruelty, and it is resorted to only because
it is considered necessary for the protection of society.
436 People ex ref. Kemmler v. Durston, 55 Hun 64, 7 N.Y.S. 813, 815 (1889) ("it would
seem that the provision in the state constitution against cruel and unusual punishments, if
it were to have any practical operation,-if it was anything more than a mere glittering
generality, calculated to please the popular fancy, and gratifY the popular taste for a
'declaration ofrights,'-must have been intended as a restriction upon the legislative
authority").
437 People ex ref. Kemmler v. Durston, 55 Hun 64, 7 N.Y.S. 813, 815 (1889):
We have no doubt that if the legislature of this state should undertake to prescribe, for any
offense against its laws, the punishment of burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel,
disembowelling, or hanging in chains, to perish by exhaustion, it would be the duty of the
courts to pronounce upon such attempt the condemnation of the constitution. In the case
supposed, no doubt could exist, because the statute would be, on its face, repugnant to the
provision of the constitution against cruel and unusual punishments. It is common
knowledge that the punishments mentioned are unusual, and, by the common consent of
mankind, they are cruel punishments, because they involve torture and a lingering death.
438 People ex ref. Kemmler v. Durston, 55 Hun 64, 7 N.Y.S. 813, 815-16 (1889) ("It was
therefore a question of fact whether an electric current, of sufficient intensity, and
skillfully applied, will produce death without unnecessary suffering."); People ex ref.
Kemmler v. Durston, 74 Sickels 569, 577, 24 N.E. 6, 8 (N.Y. 1890) ("we think that its
presence in the constitution of this state confers power upon the courts to declare void
legislative acts prescribing punishments for crime in fact cruel and unusual").
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New York's legislature439-concluded that death by electrocution was not
among them. 440 As the New York Court of Appeals ruled in 1890:
"Whether the use of electricity, as an agency for producing death, constituted a more humane method of executing the judgment of the court in
capital cases, was a question for the determination of the legislature." 441 As
that court emphasized: "It was a question peculiarly within its province,
and the means at its command for ascertaining whether such a mode of
producing death involved cruelty, within the meaning of the constitutional
prohibition, were certainly as satisfactory and reliable as any that are consistent with the limited functions of an appellate court." 442
The New York Court of Appeals, after examining the testimony taken
in the case, concluded that it "can find but little in it to warrant the belief
that this new mode of execution is cruel, within the meaning of the constitution, though it is certainly unusual. " 443 The appellate court thus rejected

439 Both of New York's appellate courts deferred to the legislative fact-finding that led to
the adoption of electrocution as the new means of execution, seeing the court's own role
as extremely limited. People ex ref. Kemmler v. Durston, 55 Hun 64, 7 N.Y.S. 813, 816
(1889) ("There is nothing in the constitution of our government, or in the nature of things,
which gives any color to the proposition that, upon a mere question of fact involved in
legislation, the judgment of the court is superior to that of the legislature itself; nor is there
any authority for the proposition that, in respect to such question, relating either to the
manner or the matter oflegislation the decision of the legislature can be reviewed by the
court."); id. at 817 ("It is not merely upon principles of comity between co-ordinate
branches of the government of the state, but because of the separate province and responsibility of the legislature from that of the courts, that we hold that the latter are not permitted to inquire whether the former was ignorant of the facts necessary to determine the
meaning and effect of the laws which it has enacted; and, in respect to the particular statute in question, that the presumption that the legislature had ascertained the facts necessary to determine that death by the mode prescribed was not a cruel punishment is conclusive upon the court."); see also id. at 816-17:
In the case of In re Railroad Co., supra, it was said that the courts cannot take proofs
aliunde for the purpose of ascertaining whether a statute, valid and regular on its face, is
unconstitutional; that they cannot go behind the statute itself; that they cannot assume to
know that facts necessary to the constitutionality of the legislative act did not exist, but,
on the contrary, may assume that the legislature found that those facts did exist. So, too, in
respect to the manner of the passage of a bill, whether the constitutional quorum was
present, and a vote of a constitutional majority was given in its favor, the statute must be
its own evidence, and cannot be rebutted. The question is not one of fact, but oflaw, to be
determined by the record.
440 People ex ref. Kemmler v. Durston, 74 Sickels 569, 579, 24 N.E. 6, 8 (N.Y. 1890)
("The amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure, changing the mode of inflicting the
death penalty, does not, upon its face nor in its general purpose and intent, violate any
provision of the constitution.").
441 People ex ref. Kemmler v. Durston, 74 Sickels 569, 579, 24 N.E. 6, 8 (N.Y. 1890).
"The determination of the legislature of this question," the New York Court of Appeals
ruled, "is conclusive upon this court." Id.
442 Id.
443 People ex ref. Kemmler v. Durston, 74 Sickels 569, 579, 24 N.E. 6, 9 (N.Y. 1890)
(quoted inln re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 443).
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the notion that electrocution-admittedly a novel means of execution-was
cruel. "On the contrary," that court noted, "we agree with the court below
that it removes every reasonable doubt that the application of electricity to
the vital parts of the human body, under such conditions and in the manner contemplated by the statute, must result in instantaneous, and consequently in painless, death." 444 "It would be a strange result, indeed," that
court emphasized, speaking of the efforts of the New York legislature, "if it
could now be held that its efforts to devise a more humane method of carrying out the sentence of death in capital cases have culminated in the enactment of a law in conflict with the provisions of the constitution prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments. " 445
In affirming the constitutionality of electrocution as a mode of execution, the U.S. Supreme Court in In re Kemmler emphasized that the New
York legislature had appointed a commission to inquire into "the most
humane and practical method known to modern science of carrying into
effect the sentence of death in capital cases. " 446 The Supreme Court further
noted that New York's governor had said this in an annual message in calling for the law change: "The present mode of executing criminals by hanging has come down to us from the dark ages, and it may well be questioned
whether the science of the present day cannot provide a means for taking
the life of such as are condemned to die in a less barbarous manner. I
commend this suggestion to the consideration of the legislature. " 447
In its 1890 decision in In re Kemmler, the U.S. Supreme Court wrestled with the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to the dispute.
The Court summarized the condemned inmate's argument as follows: "It is
not contended, as it could not be, that the eighth amendment was intended
to apply to the states, but it is urged that the provision of the fourteenth
amendment, which forbids a state to make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, is a
prohibition on the state from the imposition of cruel and unusual punishments, and that such punishments are also prohibited by inclusion in the
term 'due process of law."' 448 Of course, the U.S. Supreme Court-many
decades later-determined that the Fourteenth Amendment did make the
!d. The New York Court of Appeals also ruled that "[t]he testimony of expert or other
witnesses is not admissible to show that in carrying out a law enacted by the legislature
some provision of the constitution may possibly be violated." People ex ref. Kemmler v.
Durston, 74 Sickels 569, 578, 24 N.E. 6, 8 (N.Y. 1890). "If the act upon its face is not in
conflict with the constitution," the court ruled, "then extraneous proof cannot be used to
condemn it." !d.; see also People ex ref. Kemmler v. Durston, 74 Sickels 569, 579, 24
N.E. 6, 8-9 (N.Y. 1890) ("The testimony taken by the referee, while not available to
impeach the validity of the legislation, may, we think, be regarded as a valuable collection
of facts and opinions touching the use of electricity as a means of producing death, and
for that reason as part of the argument for the relator, but nothing more.").
445 People ex ref. Kemmler v. Durston, 74 Sickels 569, 579, 24 N.E. 6, 8 (N.Y. 1890).
446 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 444.
447 !d.
448 !d. at 446.
444
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Eighth Amendment applicable to the states-a fact that must be kept in
mind as one analyzes the In re Kemmler ruling. 449
In In re Kemmler, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that New York's bar
on "cruel and unusual punishments" 450 "was intended particularly to operate upon the legislature of the state, to whose control the punishment of
crime was almost wholly confided." 451 In dicta, however, the Supreme
Court did opine that the Eighth Amendment's language barred "burning at
the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel, or the like. " 452 "[I]f the punishment prescribed for an offense against the laws of the state were manifestly cruel and unusual," the Court concluded, "it would be the duty of
the courts to adjudge such penalties to be within the constitutional prohibition."453 "And we think this is equally true" of the Eighth Amendment "in
its application to [C]ongress," the Court emphasized. 454 The Court-while
seeing the Eighth Amendment as only constraining the federal government
in the late nineteenth century-thus focused on particularly painful methods of executions when it thought about the Eighth Amendment.
While approving electrocution as a means of execution, the Supreme
Court in In re Kemmler specifically rejected the prisoner's Fourteenth
Amendment argument, 455 offered only limited guidance in determining
what punishments are "cruel," and utterly deferred to the state court
judgment. 456 "The decision of the state courts sustaining the validity of the
act under the state constitution is not re-examinable here," the Court determined, saying that "nor was that decision against any title, right, privilege, or immunity specially set up or claimed by the petitioner under the
constitution of the United States. " 457 The Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court held, acknowledging the 1868 amendment was intended to forbid

Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 445.
451 !d. at 446.
452 Id.
453 !d.
454 !d. at 446-47.
455 In speaking ofNew York's new law, the Court wrote:
The enactment of this statute was, in itself, within the legitimate sphere of the legislative
power of the state, and in the observance of those general rules prescribed by our systems
of jurisprudence; and the legislature of the state ofNew York determined that it did not
inflict cruel and unusual punishment, and its courts have sustained that determination. We
cannot perceive that the state has thereby abridged the privileges or immunities of the
petitioner, or deprived him of due process of law.
!d. at 449.
456 "In order to reverse the judgment of the highest court of the state of New York," the
Court emphasized, "we should be compelled to hold that it had committed an error so
gross as to amount in law to a denial by the state of due process of law to one accused of
crime, or of some right secured to him by the constitution of the United States." Id. at 449.
"We have no hesitation in saying that this we cannot do upon the record before us," the
Court concluded. Id.
457 !d. at 447.
449
450
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any "arbitrary deprivation" of life, 458 "did not radically change the whole
theory of the relations of the state and federal governments to each other,
and of both governments to the people. " 459
Still, the Court in In re Kemmler did grapple with the concept of cruelty, though it spoke of cruelty in its "constitutional" sense. "As to the cruelty of punishments, the Court ruled: "Punishments are cruel when they
involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not
cruel within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies
there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life. " 460 The Court, at a time when the Fourteenth
Amendment was still not being read to apply the provisions of the U.S. Bill
of Rights to the states, nonetheless gave an indication of the Fourteenth
Amendment's purpose. The Court said that the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibited the "arbitrary" deprivation of life while disclaiming the Fourteenth Amendment's relevance to the dispute.
And more cases, in a similar vein, were to come. In 1891, the Supreme
Court also rejected an Eighth Amendment challenge to the imposition of
solitary confinement. In McElvaine v. Brush,461 the prisoner, Charles
McElvaine, was convicted in New York of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. 462 The prisoner then sought a writ of habeas corpus from
the Court, challenging the portion of New York's penal code requiring the

!d. at 448. In particular, the Court wrote:
Undoubtedly the amendment forbids any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty, or property,
and secures equal protection to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their
rights; and, in the administration of criminal justice, requires that no different or higher
punishment shall be imposed upon one than is imposed upon all for like offenses. But it
was not designed to interfere with the power of the state to protect the lives, liberties, and
property of its citizens, and to promote their health, peace, morals, education, and good
order.
Id. at 448-49.
459 !d. at 448. The Court, relying in part on its highly questionable ruling in SlaughterHouse Cases, put it this way:
The same person may be at the same time a citizen of the United States and a citizen of a
state. Protection to life, liberty, and property rests, primarily, with the states, and the
amendment furnishes an additional guaranty against any encroachment by the states upon
those fundamental rights which belong to citizenship, and which the state governments
were created to secure. The privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as
distinguished from the privileges and immunities of citizens of the states, are indeed
protected by it; but those are privileges and immunities arising out of the nature and
essential character of the national government, and granted or secured by the constitution
of the United States.
!d. at 448 (citing United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) & Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872)).
460 Id. at 447. As to the New York state court finding that electrocution "might be said to
be 'unusual,"' the Supreme Court did not delve into the propriety of that finding, the
Court's finding of no cruelty making it unnecessary to reach that issue. Id.
461 142 u.s. 155 (1891).
462 !d. at 156-57.
458
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warden at Sing Sing to keep inmates in solitary confinement prior to their
execution. 463 In rejecting the contention that solitary confinement constituted a "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, the Court first emphasized that "[t]he first 10 articles of
amendment were not intended to limit the powers of the states in respect of
their own people, but to operate on the federal government only." 464
In McElvaine, the Supreme Court summarized the prisoner's Fourteenth Amendment contention as follows: "[T]he argument is that, so far
as those amendments secure the fundamental rights of the individual, they
make them his privileges and immunities as a citizen of the United States,
which cannot now, under the fourteenth amendment, be abridged by a
state; that the prohibition of cruel and unsusual [sic] punishments is one of
these; and that that prohibition is also included in that 'due process of law'
without which no state can deprive any person of life, liberty, or property."465 Finding no violation, the Supreme Court again deferred to the state's
judgment. 466 Again, the Court-in that late nineteenth-century case-gave
short-shrift to important Fourteenth Amendment principles, finding that
they did not apply at all.
The last nineteenth-century Supreme Court case to discuss the Eighth
Amendment was O'Neil v. State of Vermont. 467 In that case, a New Yorker, John O'Neil, was convicted of 307 separate offenses against the Vermont liquor laws and ordered to pay a fine of $6,638.72. If the fine was
not paid by a certain date, the court ordered that O'Neil be imprisoned at
hard labor for 19,914 days. 468 After that ruling, O'Neil challenged Vermont's law as imposing a "cruel and unusual punishment" under both
Vermont's constitution and the U.S. Constitution. 469 Before the case
reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the Vermont Supreme Court rejected
O'Neil's claims. 470 The U.S. Supreme Court, for its part, deferred again,

!d. at 157-58.
!d. at 158. The Court found its decision in In re Kenunler "decisive" of the issue
before it, noting that, in that ruling, "we were unable to perceive that the state had thereby
abridged the privileges or inununities of petitioner, or deprived him of due process of
law." !d. at 159.
465 !d. at 158.
466 !d. at 160. "The general rule of decision," the Court held, "is that this court will follow
the adjudication of the highest court of a state in the construction of its own statutes, and
there is nothing in this case to take it out of that rule." Id. at 160. The Supreme Court
reached a similar result in Trezza v. Brush, 142 U.S. 160 (1891), another case in which a
first-degree murderer in New York was sentenced to death and ordered to be held at Sing
Sing in solitary confinement. !d. at 160-61.
467 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
468 Id at 327 330
469
at331:
.
470 The Vermont Supreme Court ruled as follows:
'The constitutional inhibition of cruel and unusual punishments, or excessive fines or bail,
has no application. The punishment imposed by statute for the offense with which the
respondent, O'Neil, is charged, cannot be said to be excessive or oppressive. If he has
463

464

Id
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holding that "so far as it is a question arising under the constitution of
Vermont, it is not within our province." 471 "[A]s a federal question," the
Court continued, "it has always been ruled that the eighth amendment to
the constitution of the United States does not apply to the states. " 472 As a
result, the nation's highest court dismissed the case for "want of jurisdiction."473
The O'Neil case, however, brought the Fourteenth Amendment-and
its relationship to the Eighth Amendment-into starker relief than ever before. In a dissent, Justice Stephen Field-one of Abraham Lincoln's appointments-wrote that he was "compelled to disagree with my associates
in their disposition of this case. " 474 A pioneer of the concept of substantive
due process, Justice Field wrote that "[t]he punishment imposed was one
exceeding in severity ... anything which I have been able to find in the
records of our courts for the present century." 475 "Had he been found
guilty of burglary or highway robbery," Field wrote of O'Neil, "he would
have received less punishment than for the offenses of which he was convicted."476 "It was," he emphasized, "six times as great as any court in
Vermont could have imposed for manslaughter, forgery, or perjury." 477 "It
was," Field concluded, "one which, in its severity, considering the offenses
of which he was convicted, may justly be termed both 'unusual and cruel. "'478
Before making that assessment, Justice Field noted that the cruel and
unusual designation "is usually applied to punishments which inflict torture, such as the rack, the thumb-screw, the iron boot, the stretching of
limbs, and the like, which are attended with acute pain and suffering. " 479
subjected himself to a severe penalty, it is simply because he has committed a great many
such offenses. It would scarcely be competent for a person to assail the constitutionality
of the statute prescribing a punishment for burglary on the ground that he had committed
so many burglaries that, if punishment for each were inflicted on him, he might be kept in
prison for life. The mere fact that cumulative punishments may be imposed for distinct
offenses in the same prosecution is not material upon this question. If the penalty were
unreasonably severe for a single offense, the constitutional question might be urged; but
here the unreasonableness is only in the number of offenses which the respondent has
committed.'
!d. at 331 (citation omitted).
471 Id. at 331-32.
472 !d. at 332.
473 Id. at 334-35.
474 Id. at 337 (Field, J., dissenting).
475 !d. at 338.
476 !d. at 339.
477 !d.
478 !d.

!d. As Justice Field wrote:
Such punishments were at one time inflicted in England, but they were rendered
impossible by the declaration of rights, adopted by parliament on the successful
termination of the revolution of 1688, and subsequently confirmed in the bill of rights. It
was there declared that excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines
479
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The concept of cruel and unusual punishments, Field explained, "is embodied in the eighth amendment to the constitution of the United States, and in
the constitutions of several of the states, though Mr. Justice Story states in
his Commentaries on the Constitution 'that the provision would seem to be
wholly unnecessary in a free government, since it is scarcely possible that
any department of such a government should authorize or justify such
atrocious conduct."' 480 As Field wrote of the prohibition:
The inhibition is directed, not only against punishments of the character
mentioned, but against all punishments which by their excessive length or
severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged. The whole
inhibition is against that which is excessive either in the bail required, or
fine imposed, or punishment inflicted. Fifty-four years' confinement at
hard labor, away from one's home and relatives, and thereby prevented
from giving assistance to them or receiving comfort from them, is a punishment at the severity of which, considering the offenses, it is hard to believe that any man of right feeling and heart can refrain from shuddering.
It is no matter that by cumulative offenses, for each of which imprisonment may be lawfully imposed for a short time, the period prescribed by
the sentence was reached, the punishment was greatly beyond anything
required by any humane law for the offenses. 481

Justice Field saw the sentence under review as both cruel and unusual482 and he was especially concerned about the large number of
crimes O'Neil had been convicted of-as well as the resulting sentence.
As Field's dissent emphasized:
The state may, indeed, make the drinking of one drop of liquor an offense
to be punished by imprisonment, but it would be an unheard-of cruelty if
it should count the drops in a single glass, and make thereby a thousand
offenses, and thus extend the punishment for drinking the single glass of
liquor to an imprisonment of almost indefinite duration. The state has the
power to inflict personal chastisement, by directing whipping for petty offenses, repulsive as such mode of punishment is, and should it, for each offense, inflict 20 stripes, it might not be considered, as applied to a single
offense, a severe punishment, but yet, if there had been 307 offenses
committed, the number of which the defendant was convicted in this case,
and 6,140 stripes were to be inflicted for these accumulated offenses, the
judgment of mankind would be that the punishment was not only an unusual, but a cruel, one, and a cry of horror would rise from every civilized

imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. From that period this doctrine has
been the established law of England, intended as a perpetual security against the
oppression of the subject from any of those causes.
!d.
480 !d. (citing Story, Commentaries on the Constitution§ 1903).
481 !d. at 339-40.
482 !d. at 360 (Field, J., dissenting) ("In opening the record in this case we not only see
that the exclusive power of congress to regulate commerce was invaded, but we see that a
cruel, as well as an unusual, punishment was inflicted upon the accused, and that the
objection was taken in the court below, and immunity therefrom was specially claimed.").
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and Christian community of the country against it. It does not alter its
character as cruel and unusual that for each distinct offense there is a
small punishment, if, when they are brought together, and one punishment for the whole is inflicted, it becomes one of excessive severity. And
the cruelty of it, in this case, by the imprisonment at hard labor, is further
increased by the offenses being thus made infamous crimes. 483

Justice Field then turned his attention to whether there was a way to
set aside O'Neil's draconian sentence. "I have stated these particulars of
the proceedings and of the judgment of the state courts to show what great
wrongs were inflicted," Field wrote. 484 "If there is no remedy for them," he
observed, "there is a defect in our laws or in their administration which
cannot be too soon corrected." 485 "I think there is a remedy," Field then
clarified, noting that "it should be afforded by this court. " 486 "The fourteenth amendment," he wrote, "declares that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States, and that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law." 487 "I agree," Field wrote, "that
those inhibitions do not invest congress with any power to legislate upon
subjects which are within the domain of state legislation. " 488
Justice Field also commented on the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process and Privileges or Immunities Clauses. "They only operate," he said,
"as restraints upon state action, like the prohibitions upon legislation by
the states impairing the obligation of contracts, or to pass a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law." 489 "But in all cases touching life or liberty,"
Field emphasized, "I deem it the duty of this court, when once it has jurisdiction of a case, to enforce these restraints for the protection of the citizen
where they have been disregarded in the court below, though called to its
attention." This was necessary, Field wrote, so that "the life or liberty of
the citizen is not wantonly sacrificed because of some imperfect statement
of the party's rights. " 490
Justice Field's dissent also spoke presciently of how the Fourteenth
Amendment had altered the scope of the Eighth Amendment protection.
"The eighth amendment of the constitution of the United States, relating to
punishments of this kind," he began, "was formerly held to be directed
only against the authorities of the United States, and as not applicable to
the states." 491 As Field explained: "Such was undoubtedly the case previous
to the fourteenth amendment, and such must be its limitation now, unless

!d.
!d.
485 !d.
486 !d.
487 Id.
488 !d.
489 !d.
490 !d.
491 Id.
483

484

at 339-40.
at 341.

at 359.

at 360 (citing Barron v. Baltimore).
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exemption from such punishment is one of the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States, which can be enforced under the clause declaring that 'NO STATE SHALL MAKE OR ENFORCE ANY LAW Which
shall abridge' those privileges or immunities. " 492
In his dissent, Field emphasized that the Supreme Court had previously held in Slaughter-House Cases493 that the Fourteenth Amendment only
protected "against abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States as distinguished from privileges and immunities of citizens of
the states." 494 "Assuming such to be the case," Field wrote, "the question
arises, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States which are thus protected?" 495 Justice Field answered that question by
concluding that the U.S. Constitution-including its Bill of Rights-set
forth citizens' "privileges" and "immunities." "It may be difficult," Field
wrote, "to define the terms so as to cover all the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States, but, after much reflection, I think the definition given at one time before this court by a distinguished advocate-Mr.
John Randolph Tucker, of Virginia-is correct, that the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States are such as have their recognition
in or guaranty from the constitution of the United States. " 496
In particular, Field referenced "the first 10 amendments to the constitution" and "the amendments which followed the late civil war." 497 "The
rights thus recognized and declared," Field wrote of the Bill of Rights, "are
rights of citizens of the United States under their constitution, which could
not be violated by federal authority." 498 The Fourteenth Amendment, Field
added, made "freedmen" in "former slaveholding states" U.S. citizens and
thus "entitled in the future to all the privileges and immunities of such citizens."499 In Justice Field's view, the Fourteenth Amendment forbade any
state from violating any citizens' "privileges" or "immunities." 500

492 !d. at 360-61.
493 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
494 O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 361 (Field, J., dissenting).
495 !d. In discussing "privileges" and "immunities," Justice Field emphasized that "[t]hese
terms are not idle words, to be treated as meaningless," but "are of momentous import."
!d. They provided, he wrote, "a great guaranty to the citizens of the United States of those
privileges and immunities against any possible state invasion." Id.
496 Id.
497 Id.
498 !d. at 362.
499 !d. at 362-63.
500 As Field wrote:
While, therefore, the 10 amendments, as limitations on power, and, so far as they
accomplish their purpose and find their fruition in such limitations, are applicable only to
the federal government, and not to the states, yet so far as they declare or recognize the
rights of persons they are rights belonging to them as citizens of the United States under
the constitution; and the fourteenth amendment, as to all such rights, places a limit upon
state power by ordaining that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
them. Ifl am right in this view, then every citizen of the United States is protected from
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Given his reading of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Justice
Field found the Vermont Supreme Court's ruling unsatisfactory. 501 Speaking of the Constitution's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments,
Field wrote:
The inhibition is directed against cruel and unusual punishments, whether
inflicted for one or many offenses. A convict is not to be scourged until
the flesh fall from his body, and he die under the lash, though he may
have committed a hundred offenses, for each of which, separately, a
whipping of 20 stripes might be inflicted. An imprisonment at hard labor
for a few days or weeks for a minor offense may be within the direction of
a humane government; but, if the minor offenses are numerous, no authority exists to convert the imprisonment into one of perpetual confinement at hard labor, such as would be appropriate only for felonies of an
atrocious nature. It is against the excessive severity of the punishment, as
applied to the offenses for which it is inflicted, that the inhibition is directed.502

In other words, Justice Field opined that severe and disproportionate
corporal punishments, such as the lash, could be found to be unconstitutional.
Justice John Marshall Harlan also wrote a separate dissent endorsing
Justice Field's views. 503 Thus, Justice Harlan also found the punishment at
issue "cruel and unusual," with Harlan writing:
A judgment, therefore, of a state court, even if rendered pursuant to a
statute, inflicting, or allowing the infliction of a cruel and unusual punishment, is inconsistent with the supreme law of the land. The judgment
before us, by which the defendant is confined at hard labor in a house of
correction for the term of 19,914 days, or 54 years and 204 days, inflicts
punishment which, in view of the character of the offenses committed,
must be deemed cruel and unusual.5° 4

punishments which are cruel and unusual. It is an immunity which belongs to him, against
both state and federal action. The state cannot apply to him, any more than the United
States, the torture, the rack, or thumb-screw, or any cruel and unusual punishment, or any
more than it can deny to him security in his house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures, or compel him to be a witness against himself in a
criminal prosecution. These rights, as those of citizens of the United States, find their
recognition and guaranty against federal action in the constitution of the United States,
and against state action in the fourteenth amendment.
Id. at 363.
501 !d. at 364.
502 !d. Justice Field added that the denial ofreliefwas of the "gravest character, leaving
the defendant to a life of misery, one of perpetual imprisonment and hard labor." !d. at
364-65.
503 Harlan's dissent added that "Mr. Justice BREWER authorizes me to say that in the
main he concurs with the views expressed in this opinion." Id. at 371 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
504 Id. at 370-71 (Harlan, J., dissenting). On the issue of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Harlan added:
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The dissents in O'Neil foreshadowed the U.S. Supreme Court later
taking the Fourteenth Amendment-and its principles-more seriously.
The Court, inexplicably, however, continues to look the other way when it
encounters arbitrariness and racial bias in America's death penalty system.sos

III. THE STATE OF THE NATION
A. The American Death Penalty
America's death penalty has been in the news a lot lately along with
state-by-state efforts to halt executions. In California, which has the country's largest death row population, Gov. Jerry Brown cancelled plans to
build a new death row facility in that state in April 2011. 506 Jeanne Woodford-who, as San Quentin's warden, once oversaw executions-even led a
referendum effort there to try to abolish capital punishment. 507 A California ballot initiative to replace death sentences with life-without-parole sentences was launched in 2011 and taken to voters in 2012, narrowly failing
by a vote of 52 to 48 percent. 508 The long-running legal challenge to Cali-

I fully concur with Mr. Justice FIELD that, since the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment, no one of the fundamental rights of life, liberty, or property, recognized and
guarantied by the constitution of the United States, can be denied or abridged by a state in
respect to any person within its jurisdiction. These rights are principally enumerated in the
earlier amendments of the constitution. They were deemed so vital to the safety and
security of the people that the absence from the constitution, adopted by the convention of
1787, of express guaranties of them, came very near defeating the acceptance of that
instrument by the requisite number of states. The constitution was ratified in the belief,
and only because of the belief, encouraged by its leading advocates, that, immediately
upon the organization of the government of the Union, articles of amendment would be
submitted to the people recognizing those essential rights of life, liberty, and property
which inhered in Anglo-Saxon freedom, and which our ancestors brought with them from
the mother country. Among those rights is immunity from cruel and unusual punishments
secured by the eighth amendment against federal action, and by the fourteenth amendment
against denial or abridgment by the states.
!d. at 370.
505 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
506 California- Retentionist, HANDS OFF CAIN (AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE
WORLD),
http://www .handsoffcain.info/bancadati/schedastato. php?idstato= 1500013 8&idcontinente
=26 (last visited Dec. 7, 2012) (Apr. 26, 2011 entry).
507 Carol J. Williams, Former California Prisons Leader Joins Fight Against Death
Penalty, L.A. TIMES, May 12, 2011.
508 Howard Mintz, Defeat of Proposition 34: California's Death Penalty Battle Will
Continue, Nov. 7, 2012, available athttp://www.mercurynews.com/crimecourts/ci_21951068/defeat-proposition-34-califomias-death-penalty-battle-will; Franklin
E. Zimring, Endgame for Death Penalty in California, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Dec. 8,
2012, available at http://www.sfgate.com/opinion!article/Endgame-for-death-penalty-inCalifomia-4101011.php; California Secretary of State Debra Brown, Initiatives and
Referenda Cleared for Circulation, No. 1512 (11-0035) ("Death Penalty Repeal. Initiative
Statute."), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-measures/cleared-for-
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fornia's lethal-injection protocol, meanwhile, has led to a de facto moratorium on executions in that state. 509
Abolition and moratoria efforts have also been taking place elsewhere.
In late November 2011, Gov. John Kitzhaber, of Oregon, declared a moratorium on executions in that state "for the duration" of his term, which
doesn't end until January 2015. 510 And in 2013, Gov. Martin O'Malley, of
Maryland, testified before the state legislature to abolish the death penalty
in that state. "The death penalty is expensive, and the overwhelming evidence tells us that it does not work," O'Malley told the Senate Judiciary
Committee. Also, as the Associated Press reported of Maryland's successful
2013 repeal effort: "NAACP President and CEO Ben Jealous made the plea
against the death penalty by highlighting a series of exonerations, including
that of Kirk Bloodsworth, a Maryland man who spent two years on death
row and was later released from prison because of DNA evidence." 511
In the last ten years, a number of other states had already repealed
death penalty laws or declared executions-or particular lethal-injection
procedures-unconstitutional. Connecticut abolished the death penalty in
2012; Illinois did so in 2011; New Mexico abolished capital punishment in
2009; and New Jersey did so in 2007, too. 512 The New York Court of Appeals declared that state's death penalty scheme to be facially invalid in
2004,513 and judges in Arkansas and Montana recently ruled specific execution methods unconstitutional. 514 Even before Gov. Martin O'Malley testified in favor of repealing Maryland's death penalty in 2012, an administra-

circulation.htm. More than 500,000 signatures were necessary for the ballot initiative to
move forward. Kevin Fagan, Death Penalty Foes Launch Initiative Drive, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, Oct. 26, 2011.
509 Howard Mintz, No California Executions in 2012 as Legal Battle Over Lethal
Injection Continues, MercuryNews.com, available at
http://www.mercurynews.com/crime-courts/ci_19249256.
510 Helen Jung, Gov. John Kitzhaber Stops Executions in Oregon, Calls System
"Compromised and Inequitable," OREGONIAN, Nov. 22, 2011.
511 Associated Press, Gov. 0 'Malley Urges State Lawmakers to Repeal Death Penalty in
Maryland, WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/mdgovemor-to-testify-on-capital-punishment-ban/2013/02114112284114-767f-lle2-bl 02948929030e64_story.html.
512 David Ariosto, Connecticut Becomes llh State to Abolish Death Penalty, CNN, Apr.
25; State v. Hayes, No. CR070241859, 2010 WL 3328076 *4 n.3 (Conn. Super., July 28,
2010); People v. Gomez, 2011 II. App. (1st 092,185, 2011 WL 4580559 *19 n.l (Ill.
App., Sept. 30, 2011); Aaron Scherzer, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in New Jersey
and Its Impact on Our Nation's "Evolving Standards ofDecency," 15 MICH. J. RACE & L.
223, 223 (2009).
513 Parkerv. Phillips, 717 F. Supp. 2d 310,323 n.2 (W.D.N.Y. 2010).
514 Associated Press, Judge Rules Montana Execution Method Unconstitutional, HELENA
INDEPENDENT RECORD (Sept. 8, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://helenair.com/news/local!crimeand-courts/judge-rules-montana-execution-method-unconstitutional!article_c7e713b8f94d-llel-ba67-001a4bcf887a.html; Hobbs v. Jones, 2012 Ark. 293, _ S.W.3d _(June
22, 2012).
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tive law argument in the case of Evans v. Maryland515 succeeded in halting
the execution of a Maryland death row inmate and the state's death penalty more broadly. 516
The legal profession is also beginning to take closer notice of executions and the haphazard way they are being carried out. On December 7,
2011, the American Bar Association issued a report calling for a halt to
executions in the State of Kentucky. That report, by the Kentucky Assessment Team on the Death Penalty, was prepared by law professors, former
state supreme court justices, and practicing lawyers. The review found an
error rate of more than sixty percent in the trials of those sentenced to
death. It also found that 10 of the 78 defendants sentenced to death had
been represented by attorneys who were later disbarred. 517 In 2011, the
Chief Justice of Ohio's Supreme Court, Maureen O'Connor, also announced the formation of a Joint Task Force of the Supreme Court of Ohio
and the Ohio State Bar Association to review the administration of Ohio's
death penalty. 518
The public's growing ambivalence toward executions-as reflected in
such actions and in a number of public opinion polls-has become increasingly apparent. A 2011 Gallup Poll found that only 61% of respondents
supported the death penalty in the abstract, down from 64% the prior year
and down from 80% in 1994.519 Even more telling, a recent CNN poll
showed that when given a choice between life-without-parole sentences or
death sentences, more Americans (50%) opted for life-without-parole than
death (48%) for murderers. 520 This represents a significant shift, no doubt
driven by the rise in popularity of life-without-parole sentences. All thirtytwo of the states that still retain capital punishment now offer life-withoutparole sentences as an alternative to the death penalty, making lifewithout-possibility-of-parole a viable substitute for death sentences. 521

515

396 Md. 256, 914 A.2d 25 (2006).
Arnold Rochvarg, How Administrative Law Halted the Death Penalty in Maryland, 37
UNIV. BALT. L. F. 119 (2007).
517 Press Release, "Two Year Assessment of Death Penalty Procedures Prompts Call for
Suspension of Executions in Kentucky," American Bar Association, Dec. 7, 2011.
518 Speech of Chief Justice Maureen O'Connor, First State of the Judiciary Address, THE
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO (Sept. 8, 2011 ),
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/PIO/Speeches/2011/SOJ_ 090811.asp.
519 Frank Newport, In US., Support for Death Penalty Falls to 39-Year Low, GALLUP
(Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/150089/Support-Death-Penalty-Falls-YearLow.aspx.
52 CNN Political Unit, CNN Poll: Number Who Prefor Death Penalty on Decline,
POLITICAL TICKER (Oct. 12, 2011, 05:35PM),
http://politicalticker. blogs.cnn.com/20 1111 0/12/cnn-poll-number-who-prefer-deathpenalty-on-decline/.
521 Death Penalty States Offering Life Without Parole, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION
CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/life-without-parole (last visited Dec. 8, 2011 ).
The Supreme Court itself already requires, as a matter of due process, that jurors be
instructed on the availability of life-without-parole where a defendant's future
516

°
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Most troubling for America's death penalty, miscarriages of justice
continue to occur, with concrete and mounting evidence that innocent people are frequently convicted-and sometimes even executed. 522 The Innocence Project-started in 1992523-continues to draw attention to the court
system's human fallibility through DNA exonerations,524 with various polls
and statistics showing Americans' declining support for death sentences,
especially when offered the viable alternative of life-without-parole sentences.525 High-profile cases, such as Georgia's 2011 execution of Troy Davis,S26 drew much of the media coverage, with future cases sure to draw
even more as America's death penalty debate plays out. 527

dangerousness is at issue. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994); Shafter v.
South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 (2001).
522 SISTER HELEN PREJEAN, THE DEATH OF INNOCENTS: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF
WRONGFUL EXECUTIONS (2005); Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael Radelet, Miscarriages of
Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REv. 21 (1987).
523 E.g., Steven M. Pincus, It's Good to Be Free: An Essay about the Exoneration of
Albert Burrell, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 27 (2001); James S. Liebman, Shawn Crowley,
Andrew Markquart, Lauren Rosenberg, Lauren Gallo White & Daniel Zharkovsky, Los
Tocayos Carlos, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 711 (2012). The Innocence Project
continues to examine evidence in individual cases and its work will no doubt lead to
further exonerations.
524 The Innocence Project's website notes that "[t]here have been 302 post-conviction
DNA exonerations in the United States," and that "18 of the 302 people exonerated
through DNA served time on death row." "Another 16", the website notes, "were charged
with capital crimes but not sentenced to death." Facts on Post-Conviction DNA
Exonerations, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_DNA_Exonerations.
php (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
525 Facts about the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
http://www .deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet. pdf (last updated Aug. 6, 2013)
(citing polling data); Jonathan Simon, How Should We Punish Murder?, 94 MARQ. L.
REv. 1241, 1280 n.136 (2011); see also Note, A Matter ofLife and Death: The Effect of
Life-Without-Parole Statutes on Capital Punishment, 119 HARv. L. REv. 1838, 1839
(2006) ("Forty -eight states now have some form of life imprisonment without parole, with
a great many of the statues enacted over the last two decades."). The number of death
sentences and executions in the United States has fallen dramatically in the last decade.
There were more than 300 death sentences per year in 1995 and 1996, but less than 80 in
2011. Executions, which peaked at 98 in 1999, have not exceeded 60 per year since 2003.
Facts about the Death Penalty, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Washington, D.C., Aug. 6, 2013,
at 1, 3, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf.
526 Davis v. Humphrey, 2011 WL 4386165 *1 (2011). The case of Cameron
Willingham---executed in Texas in 2004 on the basis of highly suspect evidence-also
drew a lot of media attention in 2009 after an investigative report published in 2009 in
The New Yorker. David Grann, Trial by Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, THE
NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009.
527 Meanwhile, Europe and all other Western nations have already abandoned executions,
seeing them as clear-cut human rights violations. WILLIAM A. SCHAB AS, THE ABOLITION
OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2002); Abolitionist and
Retentionist Countries, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, http://www.amnesty.org/enldeathpenalty/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries (last visited Nov. 16, 2011 ).
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The arbitrariness of executions-as well as the risk of innocent people
being executed-has fueled much of the public's ambivalence. A study of
death penalty cases done at Columbia University found a sixty-eight percent error rate in capital cases, with eighty-two percent of all capital judgments reversed on appeal later replaced on retrial with a sentence less than
death or no sentence at all. That study also found that seven percent of the
murder conviction reversals resulted in acquittals. 528 Another study, published in 2013, revealed that Pennsylvania's death penalty system is likewise riddled with error. 529 That report, which looked at Pennsylvania resentencing proceedings, found that when capital cases were retried almost
all defendants (95%) received a sentence less than death. 530 The raw statistics as regards America's death penalty only reinforce the conclusion that
the death penalty is unfairly administered. 531
Not only do pronounced geographic disparities exist that are associated with executions,532 but racial prejudice is still found throughout America's death penalty system. 533 Only a small percentage of county prosecutors
actively pursue death sentences,534 and when death sentences and executions do occur, studies show that the race of the victim often plays a deci528 James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie West, A Broken System: Error Rates in
Capital Cases, 1973-1995 (2000).
529 Robert Brett Dunham, comp., The First 100 Re-Sentencings: Subsequent Dispositions
ofPennsylvania Capital Cases Reversed in Post-Conviction, DEATH PENALTY
INFORMATION CENTER (Jan. 28, 2013),
http://www .deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/RDunhamPaReversals. pdf.
530 Arbitrariness: Pennsylvania's Costly and Broken Death Penalty System, DEATH
PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/arbitrarinesspennsylvanias-costly-and-broken-death-penalty-system (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
531 Erwin Chemerinsky, Evolving Standards of Decency in 2003: Is the Death Penalty on
Life Support?, 29 U. DAYTONL. REv. 201, 207 (2004) (noting that law professor and litigator Anthony Amsterdam has said the death penalty as administered is essentially a lottery; "it's very much the luck of the draw in terms of the prosecutor, the judge, the jury").
532 Lindsey S. Vann, History Repeats Itself: The Post-Furman Return to Arbitrariness in
Capital Punishment, 45 U. RICH. L. REv. 1255, 1288 (2011) ("History has repeated itself.
The capital punishment system in America is as arbitrary as it was leading up to
Furman."); Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and Its Ramifications,
92 B.U. L. REv. 227, 233 (2012) ("[J]ust 10% of counties in the United States account for
all death sentences imposed from 2004 to 2009."); id. at 237 ("[S]ince 1976, only 15% of
the counties in the United States have sentenced anyone to death who subsequently has
been executed. Only fifty counties (1.6%) have sentenced five or more people to death
whom their respective state ultimately executed.").
533 See, e.g., Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Looking Across the Empathic Divide:
Racialized Decision Making on the Capital Jury, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REv. 573; David C.
Baldus eta!., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An
Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L.
REv. 1638, 1738 (1998) ("[T]he problem of arbitrariness and discrimination in the
administration of the death penalty is a matter of continuing concern and is not confined
to southern jurisdictions.").
534 Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and Its Ramifications, 92
BOSTONUNIV. L. REv. 227 (2012).
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sive role at sentencing. 535 African Americans who kill whites, it is now
clear, are much more likely to be sentenced to death than other capital defendants.536 Meanwhile, America's condemned-at least the ones actually
executed-are spending, on average, more than thirteen years on death row
between conviction and execution. 537
Even American judges have begun publicly acknowledging the cruelty,
racial bias and arbitrariness of America's error-laden system. In midDecember of 2011, Ohio Supreme Court Justice Paul Pfeifer told a legislative committee that Ohio's death penalty "has become what I call a death
lottery." "It's very difficult to conclude," he said, "that the death penalty,
as it exists today, is anything but a bad gamble," with Pfeifer noting that
only "four or five" of roughly one hundred capital indictments filed in
Ohio each year result in conviction and a death sentence. 538 On December
19, 2011, Teresa Hawthorne, a state district court judge in Dallas, Texas,
came to a similar conclusion, making a judicial ruling that Texas's death
penalty was unconstitutional because it could lead to arbitrary death sentences.539 In North Carolina, a judge there also found statistically significant racial disparities in the administration of that state's death penalty. 540
In fact, Justice William O'Neill, of Ohio's Supreme Court, recently
dissented in a case, issuing an opinion in which he explicitly found that the
death penalty should be declared unconstitutional. In that dissent, he broke
out his analysis into a discussion of whether the death penalty is cruel and
whether it is unusual. "[D]eath, even by lethal injection," O'Neill wrote,
"is a cruel punishment." "Capital punishment," he explained, "dates back
to the days when decapitations, hangings, and brandings were also the
norm." "Surely," he offered, "our society has evolved since those barbaric
days." "It is clear," O'Neill also noted, "that the death penalty is becoming
increasingly rare both around the world and in America." "By definition it
is unusual," he emphasized.
American judges are thus starting to assess the actual cruelty and unusualness of executions. In his dissent, Justice O'Neill put it this way: "I

535

Facts about the Death Penalty, supra note 48, at p. 2 (citing studies).
David C. Baldus, Catherine M. Grosso, George Woodworth & Richard Newell, Racial
Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The Experience of the United
States Armed Forces (1984-2005), 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1227, 1300 (2011)
("The data document white-victim and minority-accused/white-victim disparities in the
imposition of death sentences among all death-eligible cases that are consistent with
findings in numerous state systems on which comparable data are available.").
537 Becky Purser, Warner Robins Inmate on Death Row among Longest Serving in
Georgia, THE TELEGRAPH (Dec. 4, 2012),
http://www .macon.com/20 12112/04/22731 0 1/warner-robins-inmate-on-death.html.
538 Jim Provance, Ohio Justice Urges Repeal of Death Penalty, TOL. BLADE, Dec. 15,
2011.
539 Jennifer Emily, Dallas Criminal Courts Judge Rules Death Penalty Unconstitutional,
DALLAS MORN. NEWS, Dec. 24, 2011.
540 David Zucchino, North Carolina Judge Vacates Death Penalty under Racial Justice
Law, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2012.
536
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would hold that capital punishment violates the Eighth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States and Article 1, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution. The death penalty is inherently both cruel and unusual and therefore is unconstitutional." 541 Multiple U.S. Supreme Court Justices have also
expressed reservations about America's death penalty. 542 For instance, before retiring, Justice John Paul Stevens specifically concluded that "the imposition of the death penalty represents the pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social or
public purposes." 543 "A penalty with such negligible returns to the State,"
he concluded, is "patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment
violative of the Eighth Amendment. " 544

B. The Supreme Court's Jurisprudence
i. A "Progressive" Approach
The U.S. Supreme Court, as a body, has yet to hold executions unconstitutional per se. But the Court has already materially winnowed thecategories of death-eligible offenders and imposed some procedural safeguards
in capital cases. 545 And despite failing to declare executions unconstitutional, the Court did strike down a harsh, non-lethal corporal punishment
more than 100 years ago. In that 1910 case, Weems v. United States,S 46 the
Court grappled extensively with the Eighth Amendment's history and purpose. Ironically, it did so not in a case originating in the United States, but
on its review of a "judgment of the supreme court of the Philippine Islands" that affirmed the conviction of a man for falsifying a public document.547 The Weems case made clear that the U.S. Supreme Court-the
arbiter of the nation's laws-would not read the Eighth Amendment in a
purely historical fashion.
In that case, the criminal complaint, which started the prosecution,
had charged the man-a disbursing officer of the Bureau of Coast Guard
and Transportation of the U.S. Government of the Philippine Islands-with
"corruptly, and with intent then and there to deceive and defraud the United States government of the Philippine Islands and its officials, falsify[ing] a
public and official document. " 548 The man's sentence-for a falsification of
records involving wage payments-was "the penalty of fifteen years" of

541 State v. Wogenstahl, 1/25/2013 Case Announcements #2, 2013-0hio-164 (O'Neill, J.,
dissenting), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/20 13ohio 164.pdf.
542 John D. Bessler, Tinkering Around the Edges: The Supreme Court's Death Penalty
Jurisprudence, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1913 (2012).
543 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 86 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).
544 Id.
545

BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 239-40.

546 217 u.s. 349 (1910).
547

Id. at 357.

548 !d.
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cadena 549 together with a fine and the imposition of various civil penalties.550 "The punishment of fifteen years' imprisonment," the man argued
before the Supreme Court, "was a cruel and unusual punishment" under
the Bill of Rights for the Philippine Islands. 551
In its ruling, the Court in Weems found that the corporal punishment
imposed violated the bar on "cruel and unusual punishments." 552 The law
in the Philippine Islands, and the cadena sentence imposed under it, the
Court stated, "excite wonder in minds accustomed to a more considerate
adaptation of punishment to the degree of crime." 553 As the Court explained: "In a sense the law in controversy seems to be independent of degrees. One may be an offender against it, as we have seen, though he gain
nothing and injure nobody." 554 The Court described the harsh conditions
of confinement under a cadena sentence, 555 and emphasized the punish-

549 "The punishment of cadena temporal," the Supreme Court explained, "is from twelve
years and one day to twenty years," to be served in "penal institutions." Id. at 364. The
only two degrees of punishment higher in scale than cadena temporal were cadena
perpetua and death. !d. at 363-64. Those sentenced to either cadena temporal or cadena
perpetua were required by law to "labor for the benefit of the state." !d. at 364. According
to the law, prisoners so sentenced "shall always carry a chain at the ankle, hanging from
the wrists"; "be employed at hard and painful labor"; and "shall receive no assistance
whatsoever from without the institution." Id.
550 Id. at 358, 363. The "accessory penalties imposed" under cadena were noted to be (1)
"civil interdiction"; (2) "perpetual absolute disqualification"; and (3) "subjection to
surveillance during life." !d. at 364. Civil interdiction deprived the person punished of,
among other things, the rights of parental authority and the right to dispose of one's own
property. !d. The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification "is the deprivation of
office, even though it be held by popular election, the deprivation of the right to vote or to
be elected to public office, the disqualification to acquire honors, etc., and the loss of
retirement pay, etc." Id. at 364-65. The surveillance rule obligated the person punished to
fix his domicile, not being allowed to change it without the knowledge and permission of
the authority in charge of the surveillance. Id. at 364.
551 Id. at 359, 365.
552 !d. at377, 381-82.
553 !d. at 365.
554 !d.; see also id. ("The minimum term of imprisonment is twelve years, and that,
therefore, must be imposed for 'perverting the truth' in a single item of a public record,
though there be no one injured, though there be no fraud or purpose of it, no gain or desire
of it.").
555 The Supreme Court described a cadena sentence this way:
Let us confine it to the minimum degree of the law, for it is with the law that we are most
concerned. Its minimum degree is confinement in a penal institution for twelve years and
one day, a chain at the ankle and wrist of the offender, hard and painful labor, no
assistance from friend or relative, no marital authority or parental rights or rights of
property, no participation even in the family council. These parts of his penalty endure for
the term of imprisonment. From other parts there is no intermission. His prison bars and
chains are removed, it is true, after twelve years, but he goes from them to a perpetual
limitation of his liberty. He is forever kept under the shadow of his crime, forever kept
within voice and view of the criminal magistrate, not being able to change his domicil
without giving notice to the 'authority immediately in charge of his surveillance,' and
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ment's disproportionality-one that encompassed "hard" and "painful
labor" in chains-in relation to the crime. 556 "Such penalties for such offenses," the Court ruled, "amaze those who have formed their conception
of the relation of a state to even its offending citizens from the practice of
the American commonwealths, and believe that it is a precept of justice
that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense."557
In Weems, the Supreme Court described the prohibition against "cruel
and unusual punishment" as "fundamental law," saying the provision of
the Philippine Bill of Rights "was taken from the Constitution of the United States, and must have the same meaning." 558 While the proportionality
principle had been articulated by Beccaria almost a century and a half before, the U.S. Supreme Court felt it was treading on new ground. "What
constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment," the Court ruled, "has not
been exactly decided." 559 "It has been said," the Court noted, citing a Massachusetts case,560 "that ordinarily the terms imply something inhuman and
barbarous-torture and the like. " 561 Yet, the Court acknowledged, reflective of the record, the Eighth Amendment itself "received very little debate
in Congress. " 562
The Congressional Register, in fact, revealed only two comments from
the First Congress. Representative William Lougton Smith of South Carolina "objected to the words 'nor cruel and unusual punishment,' the import
of them being too indefinite." And a Representative Samuel Livermore, of
New Hampshire, also opposed the language, though his comments were
more extensive. 563 The record reflects that Mr. Livermore opposed the
adoption of the clause by arguing as follows:
The clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which account I
have no objection to it; but, as it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not
think it necessary. What is meant by the terms "excessive bail"? Who are
to be the judges? What is understood by "excessive fines"? It lays with the

without permission in writing. He may not seek, even in other scenes and among other
people, to retrieve his fall from rectitude. Even that hope is taken from him, and he is
subject to tormenting regulations that, if not so tangible as iron bars and stone walls,
oppress as much by their continuity, and deprive of essential liberty. No circumstance of
degradation is omitted. It may be that even the cruelty of pain is not omitted. He must
bear a chain night and day. He is condemned to painful as well as hard labor. What
painful labor may mean we have no exact measure. It must be something more than hard
labor. It may be hard labor pressed to the point of pain.
!d. at 366-67.
556 !d.
557 !d.
558 !d. at 367-68.
559 !d. at 368.
560 McDonald v. Commonwealth, 53 N.E. 874 (Mass. 1899).
561 Weems, 217 U.S. at 368.
562 !d.
563 /d. at 368-69; BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 186.
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court to determine. No cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it
is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve whipping,
and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we, in future, to be prevented from inflicting these punishments because they are cruel? If a more lenient mode of correcting vice and deterring others from the commission of
it could be invented, it would be very prudent in the legislature to adopt it;
but until we have some security that this will be done, we ought not to be
restrained from making necessary laws by any declaration of this kind. 564

In spite of this token opposition, which expressly contemplated that
corporal and capital punishments might one day be considered unlawful by
the judiciary, the Eighth Amendment's text was agreed to by a "considerable majority." 565
The Court in Weems first cited its 1866 decision in Pervear v. Massachusetts,S66 where "it was decided that the clause did not apply to state but
to national legislation." But in that case, the Court in Weems ruled, "we
went further, and said that we perceive nothing excessive, or cruel, or unusual in a fine of $50 and imprisonment at hard labor in the house of correction for three months, which was imposed for keeping and maintaining,
without a license, a tenement for the illegal sale and illegal keeping of intoxicating liquors." 567 The Court in Weems, in clarifying that point, also
noted that in Wilkerson v. Utah 568 "[t]he court pointed out that death was
[a] usual punishment for murder, that it prevailed in the [Utah] territory
for many years, and was inflicted by shooting; also that the mode of execution was usual under military law." 569 The Court in Weems also commented on its prior decisions in In re Kemmler 570 and O'Neil v. Vermont. 571

Weems, 217 U.S. at 369; 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (1789); see also Steven R. Manley,
The Constitution, the Punishment ofDeath, and Misguided "Originalism," 1999 L. REv.
MicH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 913, 930 n.76 ("While Representative Livermore's remarks are
cited here for the proposition that the application of the Eighth Amendment has always
been a matter of controversy, they also, of course, nicely illustrate for those bent on
applying the Eighth Amendment according to contemporaneous perceptions that someone
in government in 1791 saw the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause as implicating
capital, as well as corporal, punishments. Livermore seemed also to envision the operation
of the Clause evolving over time.") (citations omitted; italics in original).
565 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 369.
566 5 Wall. 475, 18 L. Ed. 608 (1866).
567 Weems, 217 U.S. at 369.
568 99 u.s. 130 (1878).
569 Weems, 217 U.S. at 369-70 (italics added). "It was hence concluded," the Court wrote,
speaking of the firing squad, "that it was not forbidden by the Constitution of the United
States." !d. at 370.
570 136 U.S. 436 (1890). The Court in Weems emphasized that language in In re Kemmler
"was not meant ... to give a comprehensive definition of cruel and unusual punishment,
but only to explain the application of the provision to the punishment of death." Weems,
217 U.S. at 370-71. As the Court stated: "In other words, to describe what might make the
punishment of death cruel and unusual, though of itself it is not so. It was found as a fact
by the state court that death by electricity was more humane than death by hanging." !d. at
371.
564
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After combing through its precedents, the Court in Weems turned to
the history of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, citing a legal
commentator who spoke of the "cruel and unusual" words in the U.S.
Constitution in their "constitutional sense." 572 "The law writers are indefinite," the Court noted, citing Joseph Story and Thomas Cooley. Story-in
his influential treatise on the Constitution-wrote that the provision "is an
exact transcript of a clause in the Bill of Rights framed at the revolution of
1688." 573 The Eighth Amendment, he explained, "would seem to be wholly
unnecessary in a free government, since it is scarcely possible that any department of such a government should authorize or justify such atrocious
conduct." 574 Cooley-in his treatise, Constitutional Limitations-had expressed the "difficulty of determining precisely what is meant by cruel and
unusual punishment," but concluded, by contrast, that it was probable that
"any punishment declared by statute for an offense which was punishable
in the same way at common law could not be regarded as cruel or unusual,
in a constitutional sense. " 575
Both Patrick Henry and James Wilson, the Court in Weems recounted, had "referred to the tyranny of the Stuarts," with Henry and others
insisting on the adoption of a Bill of Rights to guard against government
excesses. 576 The Court in Weems also focused on the views of those who
pushed for the ratification of a U.S. Bill of Rights. "Their predominant political impulse was distrust of power, and they insisted on constitutional
limitations against its abuse," the Court noted in Weems. 577 "But surely,"
the Court emphasized, "they intended more than to register a fear of the
forms of abuse that went out of practice with the Stuarts. " 578 As the Court
explained:

144 U.S. 323 (1892); see also Weems, 217 U.S. at 371 (discussing 0 'Neil v. Vermont).
The Court in Weems also discussed a number of state court decisions interpreting the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 375-80 (citing
State v. Driver, 78 N.C. 423 (1878); Hobbs v. State, 32 N.E. 1019 (Ind. 1893);
Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 6 Rand. 694 (Va. 1828); Foote v. State, 59 Md. 264 (1882);
Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. Cas. 447 (1824); Territory v. Ketchum, 65 P. 169
(N.M. 1901)).
573 Weems, 217 U.S. at 371.
574 !d. (citing 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1903 (5th ed. 1905)). Story explained that it was "adopted as an admonition to
all departments of the national government, to warn them against such violent
proceedings as had taken place in England in the arbitrary reigns of some of the Stuarts."
!d.
575 !d. at 375. Cooley also doubted if the right existed "to establish the whipping post and
the pillory in states where they were never recognized as instruments of punishment, or in
states whose constitutions, revised since public opinion had banished them, have
forbidden cruel and unusual punishments." !d. at 378 (citing THOMAS M. CooLEY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 472 (7th ed. 1903)).
576 Id. at 372.
577 Id.
578 !d.
571

572
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Surely, their jealousy of power had a saner justification than that. They
were men of action, practical and sagacious, not beset with vain imagining, and it must have come to them that there could be exercises of cruelty by laws other than those which inflicted bodily pain or mutilation.
With power in a legislature great, if not unlimited, to give criminal character to the actions of men, with power unlimited to fix terms of imprisonment with what accompaniments they might, what more potent instrument of cruelty could be put into the hands of power? And it was believed that power might be tempted to cruelty. This was the motive of
the clause, and if we are to attribute an intelligent providence to its advocates we cannot think that it was intended to prohibit only practices
like the Stuarts', or to prevent only an exact repetition of history. 579

The Court in Weems thus rejected an approach to the Eighth
Amendment focused solely on an eighteenth-century historical analysis. 580
Indeed, the Court specifically noted that the writings of legal scholars established the "progressive" nature of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. 581 As the Court wrote of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, foreshadowing what would, in 1958, morph into its oftcited "evolving standards of decency" test: "The clause of the Constitution,
in the opinion of the learned commentators, may be therefore progressive,
and is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public
opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice. " 582 Although the Court
in Weems conceded that legislatures generally possessed the power "to define crimes and their punishment," 583 it emphasized that such legislative

579

!d. at372-73.

In particular, the Court in Weems ruled as follows:
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an experience
of evils but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form
that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions
and purposes. Therefore a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than
the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not
ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the words of
Chief Justice Marshall, 'designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions
can approach it.' The future is their care, and provision for events of good and bad
tendencies of which no prophecy can be made. In the application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what may be. Under any
other rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in
efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little value, and be converted by
precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in
reality. And this has been recognized. The meaning and vitality of the Constitution have
developed against narrow and restrictive construction.
Id. at 373.
581 Id. at 378.
582 Id. (citing Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 427 (1885); Mackin v. United States, 117
u.s. 348, 350 (1886)).
583 !d. at 378.
580
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power had it limits-and that it was up to the judiciary to set those limits.s84
Ultimately, the Court in Weems determined that the law of the Philippine Islands "has no fellow in American legislation" 585 and that the sentence imposed under it was "cruel and unusual." 586 As the Court spoke of
the harsh cadena sentence:
Let us remember that it has come to us from a government of a different
form and genius from ours. It is cruel in its excess of imprisonment and
that which accompanies and follows imprisonment. It is unusual in its
character. Its punishments come under the condemnation of the Bill of
Rights, both on account of their degree and kind. And they would have
those bad attributes even if they were found in a Federal enactment, and
not taken from an alien source. 587

"[E]ven if the minimum penalty of cadena temporal had been imposed," the Court ruled in Weems, "it would have been repugnant to the
Bill of Rights." 588 In short, a non-lethal corporal punishment was found to
be unconstitutional.
ii. The "Evolving Standards of Decency" Test
It was in 1958, in Trap v. Dulles, 589 that the U.S. Supreme Court first
articulated its "evolving standards of decency" test. 590 In that case, the petitioner-a native-born American-was a private in the U.S. Army, serving

As the Court in Weems explained:
We concede the [legislative] power in most of its exercises. We disclaim the right to
assert a judgment against that of the legislature, of the expediency of the laws, or the right
to oppose the judicial power to the legislative power to define crimes and fix their
punishment, unless that power encounters in its exercise a constitutional prohibition. In
such case, not our discretion, but our legal duty, strictly defined and imperative in its
direction, is invoked. Then the legislative power is brought to the judgment of a power
superior to it for the instant. And for the proper exercise of such power there must be a
comprehension of all that the legislature did or could take into account,-that is, a
consideration of the mischief and the remedy. However, there is a certain subordination of
the judiciary to the legislature. The function of the legislature is primary, its exercise
fortified by presumptions of right and legality, and is not to be interfered with lightly, nor
by any judicial conception of its wisdom or propriety. They have no limitation, we repeat,
but constitutional ones, and what those are the judiciary must judge. We have expressed
these elementary truths to avoid the misapprehension that we do not recognize to the
fullest the wide range of power that the legislature possesses to adapt its penal laws to
conditions as they may exist, and punish the crimes of men according to their forms and
frequency.
!d. at 378-79.
585 !d. at 377.
586 Id. at 381.
587 Id. at 377.
588 Id. at 382.
589 356 u.s. 86 (1958).
590 !d. at 101.
584
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in French Morocco. 591 He had escaped from a stockade at Casablanca,
where he had been confined after being disciplined, and had been picked
up the next day walking along a road towards Rabat. 592 After being courtmartialed, the petitioner was convicted of desertion and was sentenced to
three years at hard labor, forfeiture of pay, and a dishonorable discharge.593 When the petitioner later applied for a passport, he was denied
on the ground that under the Nationality Act of 1940, he had lost his U.S.
citizenship by virtue of his conviction for wartime desertion, thus rendering
him stateless. 594 The issue in Trap was thus whether such a forfeiture of
citizenship comported with the Constitution. 595
In Trap, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner's loss of citizenship was an unlawful deprivation. "Citizenship," the Court ruled, "is not a
license that expires upon misbehavior. " 596 "[T]he deprivation of citizenship," it held, "is not a weapon that the Government may use to express its
displeasure at a citizen's conduct, however reprehensible that conduct may
be." 597 After concluding that the denationalization statute was a penal law
that served to punish,598 the Court turned its attention to whether denationalization itself "is a cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning
of the Eighth Amendment. " 599 The Court framed the issue as follows:
"Since wartime desertion is punishable by death, there can be no argument
that the penalty of denationalization is excessive in relation to the gravity
of the crime. The question is whether this penalty subjects the individual to
a fate forbidden by the principle of civilized treatment guaranteed by the
Eighth Amendment. " 600
Before answering that question, the Supreme Court tersely put the
death penalty itself into a separate box. "At the outset," the Court wrote,
"let us put to one side the death penalty as an index of the constitutional
limit on punishment. " 601 As the Court explained: "Whatever the arguments
may be against capital punishment, both on moral grounds and in terms of
accomplishing the purposes of punishment-and they are forceful-the
death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a day
when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional concept of cruelty." 602 "But it is equally plain," the Court clarified,
"that the existence of the death penalty is not a license to the Government

Id. at 87.
Id.
593 Id. at 88.
594 Id at 87-88 90
595
at 87-88, 99.
596
at 92. ' .
597 !d. at 92-93.
598 Id. at 97-99.
599 Id. at 99.
6oo Id.
601 Id.
591

592

Id
Id

602

!d. (italics added).
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to devise any punishment short of death within the limit of its imagination."603 The Court did acknowledge, at the outset, that "[t]he exact scope
of the constitutional phrase 'cruel and unusual' has not been detailed by
this Court. " 604
The Supreme Court in Trap began its discussion of the Eighth
Amendment issue before it by emphasizing the origins of the "cruel and
unusual punishments" prohibition. "The phrase in our Constitution," it
noted, "was taken directly from the English Declaration of Rights," noting
that the principle it represents "can be traced back to the Magna Carta." 605
"The basic concept under the Eighth Amendment," the Court emphasized,
"is nothing less than the dignity of man. " 606 "While the State has the power
to punish," it wrote, "the Amendment stands to assure that this power be
exercised within the limits of civilized standards." 607 "Fines, imprisonment
and even execution may be imposed depending upon the enormity of the
crime," the Court ruled, "but any technique outside the bounds of these
traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect. " 608
The Court then set forth its famous test. The Eighth Amendment's
words "are not precise" and the scope of the "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibition, the Court held, "is not static"; instead, the Eighth
Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. " 609 In analyzing the Eighth
Amendment, the Court in Trap also stated that "[w]hether the word 'unusual' has any qualitative meaning different from 'cruel' is not clear. " 610 As
the Court explained: "On the few occasions this Court has had to consider
the meaning of the phrase, precise distinctions between cruelty and unusualness do not seem to have been drawn." 611 After citing Weems, O'Neil,
and Wilkerson, the Court emphasized: "These cases indicate that the Court
simply examines the particular punishment involved in light of the basic
prohibition against inhuman treatment, without regard to any subtleties of
meaning that might be latent in the word 'unusual."' 612 "If the word 'unusual' is to have any meaning apart from the word 'cruel,"' the Court wrote,
"the meaning should be the ordinary one, signifying something different
from that which is generally done." 613

Id.
!d. The Supreme Court stated, however, that "the basic policy reflected in these words
is firmly established in the Anglo-American tradition of criminal justice." !d. at I 00.
605 !d. at 100.
606 !d.
607 !d.
608 !d.
609 !d. at 100-10 I.
610 !d. at 100 n.32.
611 Id.
612 !d. (citations omitted).
613 !d.
603

604
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On the specific issue before it, the Court in Trap ruled that denationalization "certainly" constituted a "cruel and unusual punishment." 614 Denationalization, it emphasized in its 1958 decision, "was never explicitly
sanctioned by this Government until 1940 and never tested against the
Constitution until this day." 615 Holding that "use of denationalization as a
punishment is barred by the Eighth Amendment," the Court reasoned as
follows: "There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive
torture. There is instead the total destruction of the individual's status in
organized society. It is a form of punishment more primitive than torture,
for it destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in
the development." 616 "The punishment," it wrote, "strips the citizen of his
status in the national and international political community." 617 "In short,"
it concluded, "the expatriate has lost the right to have rights." 618
The concept of human dignity was at the core of the Court's ruling in
Trap. In invalidating the punitive expatriation of persons with no other
nationality, the Court's plurality opinion, written by Chief Justice Earl
Warren, adopted this reasoning of a judge below: "In my faith, the American concept of man's dignity does not comport with making even those we
would punish completely 'stateless'-fair game for the despoiler at home
and the oppressor abroad, if indeed there is any place which will tolerate
them at all." 619 "This punishment," Chief Justice Warren wrote, "is offensive to cardinal principles for which the Constitution stands. " 620 The punishment, he explained, "subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing
fear and distress." 621 "The threat" itself, Warren added, referring to the
"disastrous consequences" of banishment, "makes the punishment obnoxious. " 622 In holding that the Eighth Amendment barred the punishment of
denationalization, the Court-in striking down another non-lethal punish-

Id. at 100 n.32.
!d.
616 !d. at 101.
617 !d. As the Court explained of the plight of anyone deprived of citizenship: "His very
existence is at the sufferance of the country in which he happens to find himself. While
any one country may accord him some rights, and presumably as long as he remained in
this country he would enjoy the limited rights of an alien, no country need do so because
he is stateless. Furthermore, his enjoyment of even the limited rights of an alien might be
subject to termination at any time by reason of deportation." Id.
618 !d. at 102.
619 Jd. at 101 n.33 (citing 239 F.2d 527, 530).
620 !d. at 102.
621 !d.
622 Id. "The civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity," Warren wrote, "that
statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime." !d. As Warren explained:
"The United Nations' survey of the nationality laws of 84 nations of the world reveals that
only two countries, the Philippines and Turkey, impose denationalization as a penalty for
desertion." !d. at 103.
614
615
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ment-also emphasized that the Constitution had to be read as written and
in light of its principles. 623
iii. Existing Eighth Amendment Case Law
The U.S. Supreme Court has decided scores of Eighth Amendment
cases. Those cases fall into three broad categories, corresponding with the
three clauses that make up the Eighth Amendment itself. While the Bail and
Excessive Fines Clauses forbid "excessive" governmental action, the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause forbids punishments that are "cruel and
unusual. " 624 Central to the Supreme Court's interpretation of all three
clauses is the concept of proportionality, that is, whether the fine or bail
amount is excessive or whether the punishment is disproportionate in relation to the crime. 625 For example, the Court-using the Eighth Amendment-has declared the death penalty's use unconstitutional for those who
rob or kidnap but do not kill the victim. 626 Still, the Court-through the
years-has permitted the death penalty in other contexts, with the Court
continually hearing stay of execution requests. 627
The U.S. Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as regards executions has, in actuality, been all over the map. In 1971, in
McGautha v. California, 628 the Supreme Court held that a defendant's due
process rights were not infringed by the death penalty's imposition without
governing standards. 629 "In light of history, experience, and the present
limitations of human knowledge," the Court ruled, "we find it quite im-

!d. at 103-104. The Court put it this way:
The provisions of the Constitution are not time-worn adages or hollow shibboleths.
They are vital, living principles that authorize and limit governmental powers in our Nation. They are the rules of government. When the constitutionality of an Act of Congress
is challenged in this Court, we must apply those rules. If we do not, the words of the Constitution become little more than good advice.
When it appears that an Act of Congress conflicts with one of these provisions, we
have no choice but to enforce the paramount commands of the Constitution. We are sworn
to do no less. We cannot push back the limits of the Constitution merely to accommodate
challenged legislation. We must apply those limits as the Constitution prescribes them,
bearing in mind both the broad scope oflegislative discretion and the ultimate
responsibility of constitutional adjudication. We do well to approach this task cautiously,
as all our predecessors have counseled. But the ordeal of judgment cannot be shirked. In
some 81 instances since this Court was established it has determined that congressional
action exceeded the bounds of the Constitution. It is so in this case.
!d.
624 U.S. CONST., amend. VIII.
625 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012); Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 435 (2001); United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S.
321, 336-37 & n.lO (1998); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987).
626 Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977) (per curiam); Hooks v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
917 (1977) (per curiam).
627 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008).
628 402 u.s. 183 (1971).
629 !d. at 196.
623
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possible to say that committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury
the power to pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution." 630 In 1972, in its landmark ruling in Furman v.
Georgia, 631 however, the Court struck down capital punishment laws as
unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 632 While
each Justice wrote separately, there were five votes to strike down thenexisting death penalty laws as they were being applied. 633
The Court's current stance, by contrast, derives from its 1976 decision
in Gregg v. Georgia, 634 in which the Court upheld death penalty laws purporting to guide juror discretion. 635 In that case, the Court stated: "We
now hold that the punishment of death does not invariably violate the
Constitution." 636 Essentially, in interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the Court bowed to public sentiment as expressed by state
legislation. In the wake of Furman, 35 states had reenacted death penalty
laws. 637 "Despite the continuing debate, dating back to the 19th century,
over the morality and utility of capital punishment," the Court ruled in
Gregg, "it is now evident that a large proportion of American society continues to regard it as an appropriate and necessary criminal sanction. " 638
Still, the Court set new limits. In other cases decided in 1976, the Court
explicitly refused to uphold statutes calling for mandatory death sentences-the very kind of sentences that had been used in the Founding Fathers'
time. 639
In the twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court has heard multiple
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to executions and various
aspects of capital punishment laws. 640 And since its 1958 decision in Trap
v. Dulles, 641 the "evolving standards of decency" test has remained the
governing legal standard for assessing cruel and unusual punishment
claims. 642 In evaluating such claims, the Supreme Court thus continues to

!d. at 207.
408 u.s. 238 (1972).
632 !d.
633 !d.
634 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
635 !d. at 197-98, 206-207.
636 Id. at 169.
637 Alice Lynd, Unfair and Can't Be Fixed: The Machinery of Death in Ohio, 44 U. ToL.
L. REv. 1, 10 (2012).
638 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179. In fact, the American debate over the morality and utility of
capital punishment dates back even further, to America's founding period. BESSLER,
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 66-161.
639 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325
(1976).
640 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 236-41.
641 356 u.s. 86 (1958).
642 E.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010). A torrent of scholarship has
been written about the Supreme Court's "evolving standards of decency" test, much of it
focused on capital punishment. E.g., Jennifer Carter, Capital Punishment: A Struggle to
630
631
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repeat that the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 643
In applying that test, the Court primarily examines legislative enactments and jury verdicts. 644 But it also looks to state practices on a collective
scale, taking notice of how often states use a particular punishment. 645 The

SatisfY Evolving Standards ofDecency- Reviewing the Debate in the United States and
Canada, 17 Sw. J. INT'LL. 237 (2011); Katheryn Klimko, Evolving Standards as a
Judicial Mandate: Necessary or Superfluous?, 34 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 785 (2011);
Michael D. Dean, State Legislation and the "Evolving Standards ofDecency": Flaws in
the Constitutional Review of Death Penalty Statutes, 35 U. DAYTONL. REv. 379 (2010);
Jacob Lemon-Strauss, The States Are Right: Arguing for the Continued Use ofState
Legislatures in Farming a National Consensus for the Evolving Standards ofDecency, 47
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1319 (20 10); Corinna Barrett Lain, Lessons Learned from the
Evolution of "Evolving Standards," 4 CHARLESTONL. REv. 661 (2010); Corinna Barrett
Lain, The Unexceptionalism of "Evolving Standards, " 57 UCLA L. REv. 365 (2009);
Craig Haney, Evolving Standards ofDecency: Advancing the Nature and Logic of Capital
Mitigation, 36 HOFS1RA L. REv. 835 (2008); Dwight Aarons, The Abolitionist's Dilemma:
Establishing the Standards for the Evolving Standards ofDecency, 6 PIERCE L. REv. 441
(2008); William W. Berry III, Fallowing the Yellow Brick Road ofEvolving Standards of
Decency: The Ironic Consequences of "Death-Is-Different" Jurisprudence, 28 PACE L.
REv. 15 (2007); Dr. Saby Ghoshray, Tracing the Moral Contours of the Evolving
Standards ofDecency: The Supreme Court's Capital Jurisprudence Post-Roper, 45 J.
CATH. LEGAL STUD. 561 (2006); William C. Heffernan, Constitutional Historicism: An
Examination of the Eighth Amendment Evolving Standards ofDecency Test, 54 AM. U. L.
REv. 1355 (2005); Brian W. Varland, Marking the Progress of a Maturing Society:
Reconsidering the Constitutionality ofDeath Penalty Application in Light ofEvolving
Standards ofDecency, 28 HAMLINE L. REv. 311 (2005); Erwin Chemerinsky, Evolving
Standards ofDecency in 2003-Is the Death Penalty on Life Support?, 29 U. DAYTONL.
REv. 201 (2004); Mark A. Godsey & Thomas Pulley, The Innocence Revolution and Our
"Evolving Standards ofDecency" in Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 29 U. DAYTON L.
REv. 265 (2004); Denise LeBoeuf, Evolving Standards ofDecency: Cracks in the
Foundation, 29 U. DAYTON L. REv. 293 (2004); Mark Alan Ozimek, The Case for a More
Workable Standard in Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Atkins v. Virginia and Categorical
Exemptions under the Imprudent "Evolving Standards ofDecency" Doctrine, 34 U. TOL.
L. REv. 651 (2003); Candace Ada Mueller, The Evolving Standards in Prison Condition
Cases: An Analysis ofWilson v. Seiter and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,
13 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 155 (1993); Margaret Jane Radin, The Jurisprudence of
Death: Evolving Standards of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L.
REv. 989 (1978).
643 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
644 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022 ("The Court first considers 'objective indicia of society's
standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice' to determine whether
there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue."); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788-89 (1982) ("[T]he Court [in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977)] looked to the historical development of the punishment at issue, legislative
judgments, international opinion, and the sentencing decisions juries have made before
bringing its own judgment to bear on the matter. We proceed to analyze the punishment at
issue in this case in a similar manner.").
645 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023 ("Actual sentencing practices are an important part of the
Court's inquiry into consensus.").

399

2 Br. ]. Am. Leg. Studies (2013)
Court considers the outcomes of jury verdicts even though it allows death
penalty sentences to be imposed by more conviction-prone, "deathqualified" juries. 646 Such "death-qualified juries" are stripped in advance of
death penalty opponents, thus skewing the Court's Eighth Amendment
calculus. 647 Obviously, juries stripped of death penalty opponents will return more death sentences, especially since-because of the American tradition of juror unanimity-all it takes is one hold-out juror to reject a death
sentence. 648 Although the Court says juries are supposed to express the
"conscience of the community," 649 it is hard to see how they can when
death penalty opponents are systematically excluded from sitting in judgment in the first place. 650
In practice, the Supreme Court-in applying its "evolving standards"
test-routinely does a nose-count of jurisdictions either prohibiting or
permitting a specific punishment, also looking at how often it is inflicted in
practice. 651 For instance, the paucity of executions for juvenile offenders
was a significant factor in the Court declaring such executions unconstitutional in 2005. 652 This tallying-of states and numbers-is expressly done
for the purpose of identifying whether or not a "national consensus" has
been reached as to a societal practice. 653 The Court has also, at times,
looked at the "consistency of the direction of change." 654 The Eighth
Amendment, of course, nowhere mentions "evolving standards" or "con-

Margaret C. Stevenson, Bette L. Bottoms & Shari S. S. Diamond, Jurors' Discussions
of a Defendant's History of Child Abuse and Alcohol Abuse in Capital Sentencing
Deliberations, 16 PSYCHOL. PuB. POL'Y & L. 1, 8 (2010) (citing studies).
647 See Wainwright v. Witt, 470 U.S. 1039 (1985); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162
(1986); Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1 (2007).
648 Donald M. Houser, Reconciling Ring v. Arizona with the Current Structure of the
Federal Capital Murder Trial: The Case for Trifurcation, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 349,
356 (2007).
649 Witherspoon v. State of Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
650 See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 84 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring):
Of special concern to me are rules that deprive the defendant of a trial by jurors
representing a fair cross section of the community. Litigation involving both challenges
for cause and peremptory challenges has persuaded me that the process of obtaining a
"death qualified jury" is really a procedure that has the purpose and effect of obtaining a
jury that is biased in favor of conviction.
651 See, e.g., Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 83, at 13 ("The Supreme Court in recent
years has frequently done nose counts or tallies of state law to determine the evolving
meaning of the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.").
652 Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-65 ("[E]ven in the 20 States without a formal prohibition on
executing juveniles, the practice is infrequent. Since Stanford, six States have executed
prisoners for crimes committed as juveniles. In the past ten years, only three have done
so: Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia.").
653 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022 ("The Court first considers 'objective indicia of society's
standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice' to determine whether
there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue.") (citation omitted).
654 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315 ("It is not so much the number of these States that is
significant, but the consistency of the direction of change.").
646
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sensus," let alone trending public sentiment, but speaks of prohibiting
"cruel and unusual punishments." 655
In resolving disputes over the meaning of the "cruel and unusual punishments" language, the Justices also focus, at times, on their own "independent judgment" 656 or the Eighth Amendment's general wording. 657 This
makes sense because judicial independence is a firmly rooted American
value and life-tenured judges should be the ones to determine what the
Constitution means. The power of judicial review has been established
since Marbury v. Madison, 658 and the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly
asserted its judicial independence. 659 That America's judiciary is independent-and must remain so-is thus a settled principle of law. 660 As St.
George Tucker, a professor of law at the College of William and Mary,
wrote in the 1790s: "The American Constitutions appear to be the first in
which this absolute Independence of the Judiciary has been carried into full
Effect. " 661

655

U.S. CONST., amend. VIII.
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022 ("the Court must determine in the exercise of its own
independent judgment whether the punishment in question violates the Constitution").
657 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) ("general language should not,
therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken"); Joy M.
Donham, Third Strike or Merely a Foul Tip?: The Gross Disproportionality ofLockyer v.
Andrade, 38 AKRoNL. REv. 369, 395 n.166 (2005) ("[s]ince the Eighth Amendment
contains such general language, the Framers intended future generations to define the
clause"); compare J. Gregory Sidak, The President's Power of the Purse, 1989 DUKEL.J.
1162, 1236 (1989) ("Judge Richard Posner has observed, while reading the general
language of the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the eighth amendment, that
'[p ]articularizing not only would have been time-consuming but might have sparked
debilitating controversy, since it is easier to agree on generalities than on particulars."')
(quoting RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 226-27 (1988)).
658 1 Cranch 137, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
659 Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533,545 (2001); Millerv. French, 530
U.S. 327, 350 (2000); Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 179-80 (1994); Commodity
Futures Trading Com'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986); Northern Pipeline Const. Co.
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58-60 (1982); United States v. Will, 449 U.S.
200, 217-21 (1980); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 356 (1871); Greely v. Thompson, 51
U.S. 225, 240 (1850).
660 NATHANIEL CHIPMAN, SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT 123-24 (1793)
("To prevent both legislative and executive abuses, the intervention of an independent
judiciary is of no small importance. To the judges, the ministers of this power it belongs
to interpret all acts of the legislature, agreeably to the true principles of the constitution, as
founded in the principles of natural law, and to make an impartial application, in all cases
of disputed right. By this provision, the rights and interests of the legislative and executive
branches will be kept in union with the rights and interests of the individual citizens."); id.
at 160 ("The abilities, integrity, and independence of the Judges, is a shield, both to the
rulers, and to the people. They give a steady nerve to the mild energy of government, and
ultimate security to private rights.").
661 St. George Tucker Notebook, Law Lectures (circa 1790s), Book 5, p. 201, available at
https://digitalarchive.wm.edu/handle/10288/13361; see also St. George Tucker Notebook,
Law Lectures (circa 1790s), Book 7, p. 55, available at
656
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Because it is living judges who must decide what is cruel and what is
unusual, it is only logical that present-day Supreme Court Justices should
have the final say on what those terms mean. After all, the Founding Fathers are no longer around to do so, and the words they chose-"cruel and
unusual"-suggest a modern-day approach in any event. The concept of
cruelty is in the eye of the beholder, and one cannot possibly determine if a
punishment is unusual without performing some evaluation of modern-day
practice. The Constitution itself certainly nowhere states that once traditional, eighteenth-century punishments are to remain forever constitutional. On the contrary, the death penalty is nowhere exempted from the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause, meaning that if current Justices find capital punishment both cruel and unusual, it must be declared unconstitutional.
Some Justices, attempting to divine the "original meaning" of the
phrase "cruel and unusual punishments," continue to myopically examine
eighteenth-century practices in death penalty cases. 662 That emphasis on
founding era mores is misguided. In America's pre-Fourteenth Amendment
era, slavery was still being used, and in the founders' time harsh corporal
punishments, such as branding, ear cropping, and the pillory, were also
considered acceptable practices. 663 To compare eighteenth-century society
with twenty-first century America is to compare apples and oranges. Brutal
corporal punishments, often associated with slavery, have long been abandoned and de-legitimized by America's criminal justice system, 664 so other

https://digitalarchive. wm.edu/handle/1 0288/13361 ("The separation of the judiciary
power from the legislative, & executive, & the perfect independence of the former, in
every respect, seems to have been an Object of the particular Attention of the people of
America, not only in their federal, but in their State Constitutions.").
662 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 94 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on the 'inflict[ion]' of 'cruel and unusual punishments' must be
understood in light of the historical practices that led the Framers to include it in the Bill
of Rights."); id. at 97 ("By the late 18th century, the more violent modes of execution had
'dwindled away,' and would for that reason have been 'unusual' in the sense that they
were no longer 'regularly or customarily employed."') (citations omitted).
663 The U.S. Constitution itself forbade Congress to restrict the slave trade prior to 1808.
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9. Branding, ear cropping, the pillory, and public whipping were also
still in use when the Bill of Rights was ratified. Ryan J. Huschka, Sorry for the Jackass
Sentence: A Critical Analysis of the Constitutionality of Contemporary Shaming
Punishments, 54 U. KAN. L. REv. 803, 823 (2006) ("The most convincing evidence that
shaming was acceptable at the time of the Bill of Rights is that the punishment of standing
in the pillory and whipping were not abolished untill839, well after the adoption of the
Bill of Rights."); Ahmed A. White, A Different Kind ofLabor Law: Vagrancy Law and
the Regulation ofHarvest Labor, 1913-1924,75 U. COLO. L. REv. 667,679 (2004) ("Most
American colonies in the eighteenth century subjected vagrants to the same array of
barbaric punishments as did the English at that time: whipping, branding, ear-cropping,
commitment to the house of corrections, imprisonment, and even enslavement.").
664 See, e.g., State v. Nipper, 81 S.E. 164, 165 (N.C. 1914) ("In view of the enlightenment
of this age, and the progress which has been made in prison discipline, we have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that corporal punishment by flogging is not reasonable
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eighteenth-century criminal justice practices-as some Justices point toshould not be considered a legitimate benchmark with which to judge current practices. 665
In attempting to justify executions, some Supreme Court Justices cite
language in the U.S. Constitution that contemplates the death penalty's use.
For example, Justice Scalia points to the Fifth Amendment, which requires
a presentment or indictment of a grand jury to hold a person to answer for
a "capital" crime, and which also prohibits deprivation of "life" without
due process of law. 666 "This," Scalia contends, "clearly permits the death
penalty to be imposed, and establishes beyond doubt that the death penalty
is not one of the 'cruel and unusual punishments' prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment." 667 Originalist Justices have likewise cited the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause, prohibiting being "twice put in jeopardy
of life" for the same offense, 668 as well as the Fourteenth Amendment,
which enjoins the taking of "life" without due process of law. 669
Such reasoning is fallacious, however. To begin with, America's
founders themselves would be appalled by the idea that a society should
never advance or evolve or be forever locked into past practices. 670 In
Sketches of the Principles of Government, published in 1793, Nathaniel
Chipman-who cited Beccaria's On Crimes and Punishments in his own
treatise-wrote that punishment serves "the end of preventing crimes, and
securing obedience to the laws" and that a society's limits on the right of
punishment are not "permanent and invariable. " 671 "The right of punishing
is, in practice," Chipman wrote, "frequently limited, only by the will of the
legislature, and the decisions of the judiciary." 672 Chipman expressly emphasized that "the penalties, which, in one state of society and manners,
are adequate to that end, may, in a different state, be wholly inadequate."673

and cannot be sustained. That which degrades and imbrutes a man cannot be either necessary or reasonable.").
665 E.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 337, 340 348 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting;
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas) ("The Court makes no pretense
that execution of the mildly mentally retarded would have been considered 'cruel and
unusual' in 1791.").
666 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 88 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring).
667 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1141 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
668 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 380 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
669 Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 350-51 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
670 The common law itself has always been subject to change. See Jacob v. State, 22 Tenn.
493, 1842 WL 1984 *13 (Tenn. 1842) ("The common law of a country will, therefore,
never be entirely stationary, but will be modified, and extended by analogy, construction
and custom, so as to embrace new relations, springing up from time to time, from an amelioration or change of society.").
671 NATHANIEL CHIPMAN, SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT 193, 196 (1793).
672 Id. at 196.
673 !d. at 197.
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In A General Abridgement and Digest of American Law, published in
1824, Massachusetts lawyer Nathan Dane-who also cited Beccarialikewise included a section on punishment. 674 In his treatise, Dane described the way in which punishments had already changed from colonial
days to his book's publication date. "When our country was first settled,"
Dane wrote, "there were many more capital and infamous punishments,
than exist at present; probably because our ancestors came from a country
in which these were very numerous. " 675 After discussing the laws of England, Massachusetts and elsewhere, Dane noted that "punishments have
been varied in other respects; the pillory, gallows, whipping, and branding," he emphasized "have almost disappeared," with "solitary imprisonment, and hard labour in state prisons, having been generally substituted in
their place. " 676 By an act of Congress dated May 16, 1812, Dane wrote
"[c]orporal punishment in the army of the United States, was abolished," 677
with Dane referencing the "Act of Massachusetts of February 27, 1813,"
substituting-in the court's discretion-corporal punishments for terms of
imprisonment and hard labor. 678
Indeed, what goes unstated by originalists is that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were plainly intended to protect rights, with both constitutional amendments adopted when the death penalty itself was still the
usual punishment for various crimes. Ironically, Justice Scalia-a selfdescribed "faint-hearted originalist"-concedes that no modern-day judge
would any longer countenance public lashing or the branding of criminals'
hands. 679 In effect, while Justice Scalia insists that the punishment of death

674

6 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAWS 636-37
(1824).
675 !d. at 637.
676 !d.
677 !d. (citing Act of Congress, May 16, 1812, sec. 7).
678 !d. (citing Act of Massachusetts, Feb. 27, 1813). The Massachusetts law read as follows:
That whenever any person or persons, shall or may be prosecuted to conviction, before the Supreme Judicial Court of this Commonwealth, for any crime or misdemeanour
which is now by law punishable by whipping, standing in the pillory, sitting on the gallows, or imprisonment in the common gaol of the county, such court may at their discretion, in cases not already provided for, in lieu of the punishments aforesaid, order and
sentence such convict or convicts to suffer solitary imprisonment for a term not exceeding
three months, and to be confmed to hard labour for a term not exceeding five years, according to the aggravation of the offense.
!d.
679 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 861 (1989)
("What if some state should enact a new law providing public lashing, or branding on the
right hand, as punishment for certain criminal offenses? Even if it could be demonstrated
unequivocally that these were not cruel and unusual measures in 1791, and even though
no prior Supreme Court decision has specifically disapproved them, I doubt whether any
federal judge--even among the many who consider themselves originalists-would
sustain them against an eighth amendment challenge."); id. ("I am confident that public
flogging and handbranding would not be sustained by our courts, and any espousal of
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should be allowed to persist680 in American law, 681 he and other wellknown originalists-including Robert Bork-have freely acknowledged
that harsh corporal punishments would be unconstitutional. 682
Simple rhetorical questions forcefully rebut their entire line of argument: if American judges can no longer allow an offender's "limb" to be
lopped off, how can U.S. judges continue to allow an offenders "life" to be
taken? And if it is "cruel and unusual" to cut off an offender's ear or to
brand his hand, how can it not be "cruel and unusual" to take that offender's life? The fact that early Americans may not have viewed all executions
as cruel does not mean that today's judges must reach the same conclusion.
And the fact that capital punishment was not unusual in the founding era
says nothing about its present status. Things have changed; the law itself
has changed. A usual punishment, after all, can become unusual over time.
Indeed, even a traditional punishment, if administered in an arbitrary and
discriminatory manner, may become unusual in light of intervening legal
principles, such as due process and equal protection.

originalism as a practical theory of exegesis must somehow come to terms with that
reality."); id. at 865 ("I hasten to confess that in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted
originalist. I cannot imagine myself, any more than any other federal judge, upholding a
statute that imposes the punishment of flogging.").
680 In the first decade of the twenty-first century, executions took place every year in the
United States. The annual number of executions in that decade ranged from a high of 85
executions in 2000 to a low of37 executions in 2008. Facts about the Death Penalty,
DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (Oct. 28, 2011).
681 See Craig Haney & Richard L. Wiener, Death Is Different: An Editorial Introduction
to the Theme Issue, 10 PSYCHOL. PuB. PoL'Y & L. 373, 375 (2004) ("[S]upporters of the
death penalty view the legal issues in very different terms. Some, like Supreme Court
Justice Antonin Scalia, complain loudly about the 'death is different jurisprudence' that
they believe complicates capital punishment law unnecessarily, delays a capital
defendant's final reckoning far too long, and renders this area oflaw unpredictable.");
Rachel E. Barkow, Originalists, Politics, and Criminal Law on the Rehnquist Court, 74
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1043, 1063 n.127 (2006) ("Justices Scalia and Thomas are
consistently opposed to procedural protections in death penalty cases").
682 See Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration: Why Is This Right Different from All
Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 781,823 n.173 (1994) ("Though the Court has not
explicitly addressed the eighth amendment status of punishments such as whipping and
limb amputation, even conservative scholars such as Judge Robert Bork have indicated
their belief that such punishments would be unconstitutional."); MAY IT PLEASE THE
COURT 234 (Peter Irons & Stephanie Guitton eds., 1993) (during an oral argument before
the Supreme Court, Justice Potter Stewart asked the following question: "What if a state
said for the most heinous kind of first-degree murders we are going to inflict breaking a
man on the wheel and then disemboweling him while he is still alive and then burning
him up: What would you say to that?" Bark's response: "I would say that that practice is
so out of step with modem morality and modem jurisprudence that the state cannot return
to it. That kind of torture was precisely what the framers thought they were outlawing
when they wrote the cruel and unusual punishments clause.").
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iv. Excessive and Disproportionate Punishments
The Supreme Court, in a series of cases, has already ruled that the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause bars some executions as excessive
and disproportionate punishments. 683 In 1977, in Coker v. Georgia, 684 the
Court held that the death penalty could not be imposed for the nonhomicidal rape of an adult woman. 685 That ruling was later extended to
non-homicidal child rape in Kennedy v. Louisiana, a 2008 case. 686 In 1982
in Enmund v. Florida, 687 the Court likewise held that the death penalty
may not be imposed upon a person "who aids and abets a felony in the
course of which a murder is committed by others but who does not himself
kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force
will be employed." 688 In 1986, in Ford v. Wainwright, 689 the Court further
held that insane offenders could not be executed. 690
And the list goes on, with the Supreme Court already having addressed both juvenile offenders and those with profound intellectual disabilities. In 1998, in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 691 the Court held that America's evolving standards no longer permitted the execution any offender
under the age of sixteen. 692 Then, in 2005, in Roper v. Simmons, 693 the
Court-overruling a 1989 decision, Stanford v. Kentucky694-outlawed the
execution of juvenile offenders altogether, ruling that no offender under the

Aside from restricting the death penalty's use for certain categories of offenders and
crimes, the Supreme Court has also held that the Eighth Amendment safeguards the way
in which capital trials are conducted. E.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29
(1980) (plurality opinion) (states must give narrow and precise definition to the
"aggravating" factors that can result in a death sentence); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (in any capital prosecution a defendant has wide latitude to
raise as a "mitigating" factor "any aspect" of his or her "character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death"); accord Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-12 (1982); Johnson v. Texas,
509 U.S. 350, 359-62 (1993).
684 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion).
685 !d. at 592.
686 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
687 458 u.s. 782 (1982).
688 Id. at 797. Compare Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 137-38, 157-58 (1987) (allowing
the death penalty for certain accomplices who neither killed nor intended to kill so long as
the accomplices are major participants in the underlying felony and act with reckless
disregard for life).
689 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
690 !d. at 410.
691 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
692 Id. at 818-38.
693 543 u.s. 551 (2005).
694 492 U.S. 361 (1989). Stanford v. Kentucky had determined that the Eighth Amendment
permitted the execution of offenders over the age of fifteen but under the age of eighteen.
!d. at 370-71.
683
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age of eighteen could be put to death. 695 In the Court's 2002 decision in
Atkins v. Virginia, 696 the Court-employing similar logic-overruled another 1989 case, Penry v. Lynaugh,697 and held that the mentally retarded
could no longer be executed either. 698 Although a significant number of
death row inmates have severe mental illnesses, 699 the Court has yet to take
up whether those inmates may be executed in a manner consistent with the
U.S. Constitution.7° 0
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court-as well as lower-court judgeshave already indicated that the infliction of various corporal punishments
would run afoul of the Eighth Amendment. 701 Thus, members of the Court
have expressed the view that the following forms of torturous or degrading
punishments are unconstitutional: the rack and the thumbscrew/02 cadena

Roper, 543 U.S. at 577. The Supreme Court has yet to restrict the death penalty's
imposition for the severely mentally ill, though many people believe it should do so. Lyn
Entzeroth, The Challenge and Dilemma of Charting a Course to Constitutionally Protect
the Severely Mentally Ill Capital Defendant from the Death Penalty, 44 AKRON L. REv.
529, 530-31 (2011) ("The American Bar Association, the American Psychiatric
Association, the American Psychological Association, and the National Alliance for the
Mentally Ill all endorse a death penalty exemption for the severely mentally ill.").
696 536 u.s. 304 (2002).
697 492 u.s. 302 (1989).
698 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
699 Lyn Suzam1e Entzeroth, The Illusion ofSanity: The Constitutional and Moral Danger
ofMedicating Condemned Prisoners in Order to Execute Them, 76 TENN. L. REv. 641,
641 n.5 (2009).
700 See Jean Mattimoe, The Death Penalty and the Mentally Ill: A Selected and Annotated
Bibliography, 5 THE CRIT: CRITICAL STUD. J. 1 (2012) ("[!]ega! scholars have speculated
that the Court may eventually create another categorical exemption for the severely
mentally ill").
701 Early American jurists, by contrast, did not classify corporal punishments as
unconstitutional. In reTurner, 1 Ware 83, 24 F. Cas. 340, 340-42 (D.C. Me. 1825)
(rejecting a claim that it was a cruel and unusual punishment to chain a black seaman to
the deck of a vessel); Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 6 Rand. 694, 1828 WL 860 (Va. Ga.
1828) (a Virginia act making those convicted of gaming subject to stripes was held not to
constitute a cruel and unusual punishment under state law; "The punishment of offenses
by stripes is certainly odious, but cam1ot be said to be unusual.") (italics in original).
702 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 349 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Eighth
Amendment is addressed to always-and-everywhere 'cruel' punishments, such as the rack
and the thumbscrew."); see also Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 372
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Racks and thumbscrews, well-known instruments for
inflicting pain, were not in use because they were regarded as cruel punishments.");
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 330 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[T]here are
certain punishments that inherently involve so much physical pain and suffering that
civilized people cannot tolerate them--e.g., use of the rack, the thumbscrew, or other
mont. Regardless of public sentiment with respect to imposition of one of these
punishments in a particular case or at any one moment in history, the Constitution
prohibits it."); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(describing "the rack and thumbscrew" as "historic punishments that were cruel and
unusual"); Twining v. State ofNew Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 125 (1908) (Harlan, J.,
695
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tempora/,7° 3 whipping/ 04 the hitching post/05 branding706 and ear cropping.707 In other instances, lower courts have ruled-often as a matter of
constitutional law-that corporal punishments, including ones previously
allowed by law, can no longer be employed.7° 8
By contrast, the Court has upheld the constitutionality of sentences
imposing fines, imprisonment, and hard labor.7° 9 For example, in Lockyer
v. Andrade,710 the Court upheld a California decision affirming two consecutive terms of 25 years to life in prison for a "third strike" conviction
involving the theft of nine videotapes worth $84.70 from a Kmart store. 711
In that regard, it is important to remember that the Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude, excluded "duly
dissenting) (describing "the thumbscrew" and "the rack" as "cruel or unusual
punishments"); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 691 (1977) (White, J.,
dissenting) (describing the use of"a thumbscrew" as an act of"torture").
703 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382 (1910) ("even if the minimum penalty of
cadena temporal had been imposed, it would have been repugnant to the Bill of Rights").
The punishment of cadena temporal was a Filipino practice requiring inmates-who
would be confined for years at a time-to "always carry a chain at the ankle, hanging
from the wrists" and be "employed at hard and painful labor." Id. at 363-64. Under the
law in question, "prison bars and chains" would be removed only after twelve years. I d. at
366. Although the Court in Weems was interpreting the Philippine Bill of Rights, which
prohibited the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment, the Court emphasized that the
provision "was taken from the Constitution of the United States, and must have the same
meaning." Id. at 367.
704 Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (Blackmun, J.).
705 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002) ("We agree with the Court of Appeals that
the attachment of Hope to the hitching post under the circumstances alleged in this case
violated the Eighth Amendment.").
706 Furman, 408 U.S. at 283 n.28 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("No one, of course, now
contends that the reference in the Fifth Amendment to 'jeopardy of ... limb' provides
perpetual constitutional sanction for such corporal punishments as branding and
earcropping, which were common punishments when the Bill of Rights was adopted.").
101 Id.
708

James v. Commonwealth, 1825 WL 1899 (Pa. 1825) ("We all agree in this, that this
customary ancient punishment for ducking scolds, was never adopted, and therefore, is
not the common law of Pennsylvania."); State v. Cawood, 2 Stew. 360, 1830 WL 516 *3
(Ala. 1830) ("It cannot be, as insisted by the counsel for the plaintiffs in error, that a
conspiracy is not an offense known to our laws; because the villanous judgment which
was awarded to it by the common law, would not be tolerated by our constitution, as
being, if not cruel, at least unusual."; "This doctrine in the case of a common scold,
underwent a very able discussion in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania a few years ago,
in which Judge Duncan delivered a very learned opinion, deciding, that though the
ducking stool could no longer be used, fine and imprisonment might be substituted.").
709 Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475 (1866).
710 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
711 I d. at 66, 70; see also I d. at 77 ("The gross disproportionality principle reserves a
constitutional violation for only the extraordinary case. In applying this principle for §
2254( d)(1) purposes, it was not an unreasonable application of our clearly established law
for the California Court of Appeal to affirm Andrade's sentence of two consecutive terms
of 25 years to life in prison.").
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convicted" convicts from its provisions when sentences are imposed "as a
punishment for crime." 712 Fines, imprisonment and prison labor have long
been considered traditional criminal-law sanctions. 713 While a criminal justice system can certainly employ more than one "usual" punishment at the
same time, the question the U.S. Supreme Court must confront as regards
executions is this: have executions, in practice, become too "unusual" to be
constitutional any longer?
Under the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court-using proportionality principles-has already struck down "excessive" fines as unconstitutional.714 A leading case is United States v. Bajakajian, 715 where a defendant pleaded guilty to failing to report exported currency after he was
charged with trying to board an international flight while carrying
$347,144. A federal district court in California determined that the entire
amount was subject to forfeiture under the applicable federal statute, but
that a full forfeiture would be grossly disproportional to the offense and
would violate the Excessive Fines Clause. The district court judge thus ordered that defendant forfeit only $15,000, a decision the government appealed. After the Ninth Circuit affirmed, the U.S. Supreme Court did too,
holding in its 5-4 opinion that the forfeiture of the entire amount of money
would violate the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause.716
Writing for the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas held that a forfeiture
is a "fine" and that "full forfeiture of respondent's currency would be
grossly disproportional to the gravity of his offense." 717 In coming to that
conclusion, Justice Thomas focused on the text and history of the Eighth
Amendment. After noting that the Court "has had little occasion to interpret, and has never actually applied, the Excessive Fines Clause," Justice
U.S. CONST., amend. XIII.
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) ("[b]ail, fines, and punishment
traditionally have been associated with the criminal process"); Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349, 350 (1910) ("we perceive nothing excessive, or cruel, or unusual in a fine
of $50 and imprisonment at hard labor in the house of correction for three months")
(citing Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. 475 (1866)).
714 Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 103 (1997) ("The Eighth Amendment protects
against excessive civil fines, including forfeitures."); Department of Revenue of Montana
v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 778 (1994) ("A civil forfeiture may violate the Eighth
Amendment's proscription against excessive fines."). Compare United States v. Ursery,
518 U.S. 267, 287 (1996) (forfeitures "are subject to review for excessiveness under the
Eighth Amendment") and United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 331 n.6 (1998) ("a
modem statutory forfeiture is a 'fine' for Eighth Amendment purposes if it constitutes
punishment even in part") with Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260 (1989) (holding that the Excessive Fines Clause does
not apply to awards of punitive damages in cases between private parties); see also
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 434 (2001) ("[t]he
Due Process Clause of its own force also prohibits the States from imposing 'grossly
excessive' punishments on tortfeasors") (citations omitted).
715 524 u.s. 321 (1998).
716 Id. at 324-26.
717 /d. at 324, 334.
712
713
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Thomas explained that a "fine" is "a payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense" 718 and that "excessive" means "surpassing the usual, the proper, or a normal measure of proportion. " 719 "The text and history of the Excessive Fines Clause," Thomas wrote, "demonstrate the centrality of proportionality to the excessiveness inquiry," though Thomas
emphasized that "they provide little guidance as to how disproportional a
punitive forfeiture must be to the gravity of an offense in order to be 'excessive. "' 720
Justice Thomas-in focusing on proportionality in that contextconcluded that neither the text nor the history of the Eighth Amendment
answered the constitutional question of "just how proportional to a criminal offense a fine must be." 721 "[T]he text of the Excessive Fines Clause
does not answer it," "[n]or does its history," Thomas ruled. 722 "The
Clause," Thomas noted, "was little discussed in the First Congress and the
debates over the ratification of the Bill of Rights. " 723 After noting that the
Excessive Fines Clause "was taken verbatim from the English Bill of Rights
of 1689," Thomas emphasized that none of the English sources suggest
"how disproportional to the gravity of an offense a fine must be in order to
be deemed constitutionally excessive. " 724
"The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive
Fines Clause," Thomas opined in Bajakajian, "is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the
gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish. " 725 Finding the text and
history of the Eighth Amendment unhelpful, Justice Thomas concluded,
"We must therefore rely on other considerations in deriving a constitution718

/d. at 327-28 (citing Browning-Ferris Industries ofVt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989)).
719 Id. at 335 (citing 1 N. Webster, American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)
(defining excessive as "beyond the common measure or proportion") & S. Johnson, A
Dictionary of the English Language 680 (4th ed. 1773 (defining excessive as "[b]eyond
the common proportion")).
720 !d. at 335.
721 /d.
722 !d.
723 !d.
724 !d. at 335-36 (citing Earl of Devonshire's Case, 11 State Tr. 1367, 1372 (H.L.1689) &
Magna Charta, 9 Hen. III, ch. 14 (1225), 1 Stat. at Large 6-7 (1762 ed.)). The Earl of
Devonshire was fined £30,000 by the Court of King's Bench during the reign of James II,
a sum that was found to be "excessive and exorbitant," "against Magna Charta, the
common Right of the Subject, and the Law of the Land," and "a great Violation of the
Privileges of the Peers of England." 1 THE HISTORY AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF
LORDS, FROM THE RESTORATION IN 1660, TO THE PRESENT TIME 362-64 (1742) (italics in
original).
725 !d. at 334 (citing Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1993) & Alexander v.
United States, 509 U.S. 544, 559 (1993)). The question of whether a fine is
constitutionally excessive, Justice Thomas wrote, was entitled to "de novo" review,
without any deference to the district court's determination of excessiveness. !d. at 336
n.10.
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al excessiveness standard. " 726 He found two such considerations "particularly relevant. " 727 "The first, which we have emphasized in our cases interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause," Thomas wrote, "is
that judgments about the appropriate punishment for an offense belong in
the first instance to the legislature. " 728 "The second," Thomas added, "is
that any judicial determination regarding the gravity of a particular criminal offense will be inherently imprecise." 729 Finding both principles "counsel against requiring strict proportionality between the amount of a punitive forfeiture and the gravity of a criminal offense," the majority in Bajakajian adopted the standard of "gross disproportionality," the standard
also articulated in the Court's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
precedents.730
In applying the "gross disproportionality" standard, words that do
not appear in the Constitution itself, the Court in Bajakajian found that a
forfeiture of $357,144 would violate the Excessive Fines Clause. 731 Justice
Thomas emphasized that the crime "was solely a reporting offense"; that
the offense was "unrelated to any other illegal activities"; that the money
"was the proceeds of legal activity and was to be used to repay a lawful
debt"; that "it was perfectly legal" for the defendant to "possess the
$357,144 in cash and to remove it from the United States"; and that the
defendant "is not a money launderer, a drug trafficker, or a tax evader." 732
Justice Thomas also specifically rejected the contention that "the proportionality of full forfeiture is demonstrated by the fact that the First Congress enacted statutes requiring full forfeiture of goods involved in customs
offenses or the payment of monetary penalties proportioned to the goods'
value. " 733 Thomas pointed out that the type of forfeiture imposed by these
early customs statutes was civil or remedial, not criminal, in nature.734
In Bajakajian, Justice Kennedy's dissent expressed outrage, finding
that the Constitution "does not forbid forfeiture of all of the smuggled or
unreported cash." 735 "For the first time in its history," the dissent began,

!d. at 336.
/d.
728 /d. (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) ("Reviewing courts ... should
grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in
determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes") & Gore v. United States,
357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) ("Whatever views may be entertained regarding severity of
punishment, ... these are peculiarly questions oflegislative policy")).
729 !d.
730 !d. Justice Thomas noted that the "gross disproportionality" standard had been
developed by the Court in its Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause precedents. !d.
731 /d. at 337; see also id. at 337 n.ll ("The only question before this Court is whether the
full forfeiture ofrespondent's $357,144 ... is constitutional under the Excessive Fines
Clause. We hold that it is not.").
732 !d. at 337-38 & n.13.
733 /d. at 340.
734 !d. at 340-43.
735 /d. at 354 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
726
727
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"the Court strikes down a fine as excessive under the Eighth Amendment. " 736 As Justice Kennedy wrote: "The decision is disturbing both for its
specific holding and for the broader upheaval it foreshadows. At issue is a
fine Congress fixed in the amount of the currency respondent sought to
smuggle or to transport without reporting. If a fine calibrated with this
accuracy fails the Court's test, its decision portends serious disruption of a
vast range of statutory fines. " 737 The dissent agreed with the gross disproportionality test, but took issue with the Court's application of it. "This
test would be a proper way to apply the Clause," Kennedy wrote, "if only
the majority were faithful in applying it." 738 "The majority's assessment of
the crime accords no deference, let alone substantial deference, to the
judgment of Congress," Kennedy emphasized. 739
Apart from the Excessive Fines Clause arena, judges have already concluded that certain modes of execution-among them, burning at the
stake/40 crucifixion/41 and breaking on the wheeF42-would be excessive
and thus unconstitutional.743 As Justice William Douglas, for example,
wrote in his concurrence in Robinson v. California: "The historic punishments that were cruel and unusual included 'burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel,' quartering, the rack and the thumbscrew, and
in some circumstances even solitary confinement. " 744
In 1857, the Supreme Court of Ohio-after noting that, under English law, drawing and quartering, being dragged to the place of execution,
or being disemboweled or burned alive, were sometimes "[s]uperadded"also opined as follows: "These cruel devices for purposes of torture in inflicting the punishment of death for what was deemed the more atrocious
crimes, as well as the ignominous inventions, as the punishment for minor
offenses, by mutilation or dismemberment, such as the cutting off the hand
or the ears, or fixing a lasting stigma by slitting the nostrils, or branding

!d. at 344.
/d.
738 /d. at 348.
739 !d.
740 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 435, 446-47 (1890) (describing burning at the stake as "cruel
and unusual"); Twining v. State of New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 125 (1908) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (describing "burning at the stake" as a "cruel or unusual" punishment); accord
Furman, 408 U.S. at 385 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (writing that capital punishment "is not
a punishment such as burning at the stake that everyone would ineffably find to be
repugnant to all civilized standards").
741 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 446-47 (describing crucifixion as "cruel and unusual").
742 !d. (describing breaking on the wheel as "cruel and unusual").
743 In a dissent in one case, Justice John Paul Stevens-joined by Justice Blackmunnoted that "[t]o that list we might have added the garrotte, a device for execution by
strangulation developed-and abandoned-centuries ago in Spain." Gomez v. United
States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653, 658 n.10 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
744 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
736
737
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the hand or cheek, or by the use of the pillory, the stocks, or the ducking
stool, etc., have been wholly discarded in this country, as relics of barbarism, inconsistent with the humane and enlightened spirit of the age." 745
In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld, or declined to hear
legal challenges to, the following methods of execution: hanging 746 and
firing squads, 747 electrocution748 and lethal gas, 749 and lethal injection.750 In
Baze v. Rees 751 -the 2008 case upholding Kentucky's lethal injection protocol-the Supreme Court first explained that "[a] total of 36 States have
now adopted lethal injection as the exclusive or primary means of implementing the death penalty, making it by far the most prevalent method of
execution in the United States. " 752 The Court's opinion, written by Chief
Justice John Roberts, and joined by Justices Kennedy and Alita, then
opined: "Some risk of pain is inherent in any method of execution-no
matter how humane-if only from the prospect of error in following the
required procedure. It is clear, then, that the Constitution does not demand
the avoidance of all risk of pain in carrying out executions." 753 "Through-

745

Robbins v. State, 1857 WL 73 *20 (Ohio 1857).
Campbell v. Wood, 511 U.S. 1119 (1994) (denying a petition for writ of certiorari). By
the middle of the nineteenth century, hanging was the "nearly universal form of
execution" in the United States. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008).
747 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-35 (1879).
748 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Louisiana ex ref. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S.
459 (1947). In 1888, New York became the first state to authorize electrocution as a
method of execution. Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1082 & n.4 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting from denial of cert. ). Electrocution remained a predominant mode of execution
for nearly a century. Baze, 553 U.S. at 42. Compare Bryan v. Moore, 528 U.S. 1133
(2000) (mem.) (dismissing a challenge to Florida's electric chair as moot after the Florida
legislature adopted lethal injection as an alternative means of execution).
749 Gomez v. United States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653, 653
(1992) (refusing to consider on the merits a claim that execution by lethal gas is cruel and
unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment). The Supreme Court also refused to hear a
challenge to the constitutionality oflethal gas in an earlier case. Gray v. Lucas, 463 U.S.
1237, 1239-40 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring in denial of cert.) (rejecting an Eighth
Amendment challenge to lethal gas because the petitioner had not shown that '"the pain
and terror resulting from death by cyanide gas is so different in degree or nature from that
resulting from other traditional modes of execution as to implicate the eighth amendment
right'") (quoting Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048, 1061 (5th Cir. 1983)).
750 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008).
751 553 u.s. 35 (2008).
752 Baze, 553 U.S. at 42.
753 !d. at 47. The constitutionality of certain methods of execution has been attacked in the
past, with at least some judges inclined to find particular methods of execution
unconstitutional. Gomez v. United States Dist. Court for the Northern Dist. of Cal., 503
U.S. 653, 654, 656-57 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that lethal gas is
unconstitutional because of "the availability of more humane and less violent methods of
execution"); Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1093 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from
denial of cert.) (arguing that electrocution is unconstitutional); Campbell v. Wood, 114 S.
Ct. 2125, 2126 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The public condemnation of hanging
is overwhelming. Not only have 46 of the 48 States that once regularly imposed hanging
746
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out our history," Chief Justice Roberts wrote, "whenever a method of execution has been challenged in this Court as cruel and unusual, the Court
has rejected the challenge. " 754
On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has also squarely held
that prisoners must be protected from harm, even prospective harm. For
example, in Nelson v. Campbell/55 the Supreme Court held that a federal
civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was an appropriate vehicle for a prisoner to challenge Alabama's proposed use of a "cut-down" procedure to
access his compromised veins during a lethal injection procedure.l56 In that
case, the petitioner, David Nelson, alleged three days before his scheduled
execution that the use of the "cut-down" procedure would violate the
Eighth Amendment. 757 Petitioner had been informed by the warden that
prison personnel would cut a 0.5-inch incision into petitioner's arm and
catheterize a vein 24 hours before the scheduled execution. 758 Writing for
the Court and allowing the section 1983 claim to proceed, Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor concluded that "the gravamen of petitioner's entire claim is
that use of the cut-down would be gratuitous." 759 "Merely labeling something as part of an execution procedure," O'Connor emphasized, "is insufficient to insulate it from a§ 1983 attack." 760

abandoned the practice, but many state legislatures rejected the practice because it was
perceived as inhumane and barbaric, precisely the concern that lies at the core of the
Eighth Amendment."); Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 715 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt,
J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing that hanging violates the Eighth Amendment
because it involves risks of pain and mutilation not presented by lethal injection).
754 Baze, 553 U.S. at 62. "Our society," Roberts added, however, "has nonetheless steadily
moved to more humane methods of carrying out capital punishment." "The firing squad,
hanging, the electric chair, and the gas chamber," he wrote, "have each in tum given way
to more humane methods, culminating in today's consensus on lethal injection." Id. From
a constitutional perspective, Chief Justice Roberts explained his position as follows: "The
broad framework of the Eighth Amendment has accommodated this progress toward more
humane methods of execution, and our approval of a particular method in the past has not
precluded legislatures from taking the steps they deem appropriate, in light of new
developments, to ensure humane capital punishment." Id. "The fact that society has
moved to progressively more humane methods of executions," Roberts emphasized, "does
not suggest that capital punishment itself no longer serves valid purposes; we would not
have supposed that the case for capital punishment was stronger when it was imposed
predominantly by hanging or electrocution." Id. at 62 n.7.
755 541 u.s. 637 (2004).
756 Id. at 639.
757 Id.
758 I d. at 641.
759 I d. at 645 (italics in original). As Justice O'Connor noted: "petitioner has been careful
throughout these proceedings, in his complaint and at oral argument, to assert that the cutdown, as well as the warden's refusal to provide reliable information regarding the cutdown protocol, are wholly unnecessary to gaining venous access." Id. at 645-46 (italics in
original).
760 Id. at 645.
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Indeed, in Farmer v. Brennan/61 the Supreme Court ruled that a prison official may be held liable for "deliberate indifference" to a prisoner's
Eighth Amendment right to protection against violence while in custody if
the official "knows that [the] inmat[ e] face[ s] a substantial risk of serious
harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to
abate it." 762 "The Amendment," the Court ruled, "also imposes duties on
these officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must 'take reasonable measures to guarantee the
safety of the inmates."' 763 In yet another case, dealing with a prisoner's
exposure to second-hand smoke, the Court also opined that a prisoner's
Eighth Amendment claim could be based upon "future harm" to health.7 64

IV. THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
A. The Fourteenth Amendment's Ratification
The U.S. Bill of Rights originally applied only to the federal government.765 In the landmark case of Barron v. Baltimore/66 the Supreme
Court-in an opinion written by Chief Justice John Marshall-held that
"[t]hese amendments contain no expression indicating an intention to apply them to the state governments. " 767 The Fifth Amendment, he wrote in
that case, "must be understood as restraining the power of the general government, not as applicable to the states. " 768 As Marshall wrote: "The constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States
for themselves, for their own government, and not for the government of
the individual states. Each state established a constitution for itself, and in
that constitution, provided such limitations and restrictions on the powers
of its particular government, as its judgment dictated." 769

511 u.s. 825 (1994).
!d. at 828, 834, 847; accord Ortiz v. Jordan, 131 S. Ct. 884, 892-93 (2011) (citing that
language).
763 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832.
764 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see
also id. ("It would be odd to deny an injunction to inmates who plainly proved an unsafe,
life-threatening condition in their prison on the ground that nothing yet had happened to
them."); Washington v. Medical StaffT.C.S.O., No. A-06-CA-130-SS, 2006 WL
2052848 *5 (W.D. Tex., July 21, 2006) ("The Eighth Amendment embraces the treatment
of medical conditions which may cause future health problems.").
765 Barker v. People, 3 Cow 686 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824) ("The provision in the constitution
of the United States, that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted, is a
resiriction [sic] upon the government of the United States only; and not upon the
government of any state.").
766 32 u.s. 243 (1833).
767 !d. at 250.
768 Id. at 247.
769 Id.; see also Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. 410, 434 (1847) ("The prohibition alluded to as
contained in the amendments to the constitution ... were not designed as limits upon the
761

762
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The Fourteenth Amendment, however, made the Eighth Amendment
and other individual rights applicable to the states. 770 The Fourteenth
Amendment, ratified in 1868, begins: "All persons born or naturalized in
the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the state wherein they reside. " 771 Coming on the heels
of the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery, 772 the Fourteenth
Amendment gave American citizens-including all newly emancipated citizens-additional legal rights. As the remainder of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads: "No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. " 773
The Fourteenth Amendment's ratification thus changed the nature of
the U.S. Constitution in profound ways. 774 First, the Fourteenth Amendment changed the federal-state power structure. States-and not just the
federal government-were now explicitly prohibited from taking certain
actions, and the federal courts themselves became more powerful instruments of justice. Second, the Fourteenth Amendment-as determined in a
series of subsequent cases-applied various provisions of the U.S. Bill of
Rights to the states through the Supreme Court's "selective incorporation"
doctrine. 775 This legal development gave federal judges the power to protect
the rights of American citizens from abusive state power-even power traditionally exercised by Southern states to repress minorities. 776 Finally,
along with replicating the Fifth Amendment's "due process of law" provision, the Fourteenth Amendment went further, realizing the Declaration of
State governments in reference to their own citizens. They are exclusively restrictions
upon federal power ... ").
77 Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433-34 (2001)
("Despite the broad discretion that States possess with respect to the imposition of criminal penalties and punitive damages, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution imposes substantive limits on that discretion. That Clause
makes the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual
punishments applicable to the States.").
771 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
772 U.S. CONST., amend. XIII ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
773 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
774 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV (ratified July 9, 1868).
775 McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034 (2010).
776 Akhil Reed Amar, America's Lived Constitution, 20 YALE L.J. 1734, 1779 (2011)
("Reconstruction Republicans used Section 1 of that Amendment to take special aim at
the abusive practices of state governments of the Deep South, a region that had lagged
behind national norms of liberty and equality. Even if a particular state legislature
consistently authorized a given punishment, that consistency hardly made the practice
"usual" when judged by the national baseline envisioned by the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
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Independence's emphasis on equality by putting in place the new guarantee
to "equal protection of the laws." 777
Unfortunately, it took considerable time before the U.S. Supreme
Court actually recognized the Fourteenth Amendment's legal significance.
Indeed, after the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed its Barron v. Baltimore holding for many decades. 778 In almost
open defiance of the Fourteenth Amendment's plain language, the Courtin case after case-simply stuck to its prior ruling in Barron. 779 This happened in spite of the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment's advocates
plainly intended to make the U.S. Bill of Rights-including the Eighth
Amendment-applicable to the states.780 Indeed, legislators pushing for the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly said so during the debates while it was being considered.781
Not until the early 1960s-over ninety years after the Fourteenth
Amendment's ratification-was the Eighth Amendment finally held applicable to the states. 782 In Robinson v. California/ 83 the 1962 case that did it,

U.S. CONST., amend. XIV (ratified July 9, 1868).
In 1866, the Supreme Court considered the question of whether fines and penalties
imposed under a Massachusetts law were "excessive, cruel, and unusual." Pervear v.
Commonwealth, 72 U.S. 475, 479 (1866). Adhering to its holding in Barron v. Baltimore,
the Court in Pervear held that the Eighth Amendment "does not apply to State but to
National legislation." !d. at 479-80. In affirming the judgment of the Massachusetts court,
the Court in Pervear also emphasized in dicta: "[I]t appears from the record that the fine
and punishment in the case before us was fifty dollars and imprisonment at hard labor in
the house of correction for three months. We perceive nothing excessive, or cruel, or
unusual in this." !d. at 480. A "NOTE" to the Pervear case also notes that "[t]he same
order was made in four other cases, presenting, as the Chief Justice said, 'substantially the
same facts and governed by the same principles."' !d. (citations omitted).
779 Twitchell v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 74 U.S. 321, 322, 325-26 (1868) (citing
Barron v. Baltimore with approval and rejecting the habeas corpus petition of a man
convicted of murder and sentenced to be hanged in spite of his argun1ent based on the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875)
("The first amendment to the Constitution ... like the other amendments proposed and
adopted at the same time, was not intended to limit the powers of the State governments
in respect to their own citizens, but to operate upon the National government alone.")
(citing Barron); see also Eilenbecker v. District Court of Plymouth County, 134 U.S. 31,
34 (1890) ("[T]he first eight articles of the amendments to the constitution have reference
to powers exercised by the government of the United States, and not to those of the states.
The limitation, therefore, of articles 5, 6, and 8 of those amendments, being intended
exclusively to apply to the powers exercised by the government of the United States,
whether by congress or by the judiciary, and not as limitations upon the powers of the
states, can have no application to the present case ... ") (citations omitted).
780 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 204-205.
781 !d. Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan also explained in 1866 that the Fourteenth
Amendment "prohibits the hanging of a black man for a crime for which the white man is
not to be hanged." Id. at 206.
782 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2018 (2010) (citing Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962) for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment was made applicable to
the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
777
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the Supreme Court held that punishing someone for being addicted to narcotics is a cruel and unusual punishment.784 In spite of the Fourteenth
Amendment's recognition of citizens' "privileges or immunities," the right
to be free from "cruel and unusual punishments" was not grounded-as
might have been expected-in the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or
Immunities Clause. Instead, as it had done with other individual rights in
the Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court used the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause to make the Eighth Amendment applicable to the
states. Since 1962, the Supreme Court has routinely reaffirmed that the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause made the Eighth Amendment
applicable to the states.785

B. Due Process and Equal Protection
The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause unequivocally prohibits
the federal government from depriving an individual "of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." 786 States are similarly restricted by
the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides in part: "nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." 787 Initially, the U.S. Supreme Court looked to what procedures were
required by the English common law to define the contours of due process.788 For example, in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co., 789 the Supreme Court analyzed the types of procedures the framers of
the Fifth Amendment would have considered "the law of the land. " 790 That
"frozen-in-history" approach, however, soon gave way to a non-historical
methodology, with the Court asking instead-as two scholars put it"whether a given procedure was essential to modern-as opposed to 17th
century-notions of fairness. " 791

783

370 u.s. 660 (1962).

!d. at 666-68.
785 E.g., Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018; Baze, 553 U.S. at 47.
786 U.S. CONST., amend. V. The Fifth Amendment also states: "nor shall any person be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy oflife or limb." !d. The right to be
784

free from bodily harm has long been noted in the American legal system, and dates back
to the time of the Founding Fathers. See ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF LAWS OF THE
STATE OF CONNECTICUT 179 (1795):
Not only is a man protected against loss of limb, but the body and the limbs, are protected
against all menaces, assaults, beating, and wounding. Such acts are a breach of the peace,
and punishable by fine. The person injured, has an action of trespass for assault and
battery, against the wrong-doer, to recover damages for the injury he has sustained. This
security of our body and limbs, from all corporal injuries, is an inestimable right.
787 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
788 John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private
Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REv. 511, 550 (1994).
789 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
790 !d. at 276.
791 Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values
ofProcedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 468-69 (1986); see also Adamson v.
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The U.S. Supreme Court, in fact, has repeatedly emphasized that "due
process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation warrants. " 792 As Justice Felix Frankfurter once explained, due
process is, "perhaps, the least frozen concept of our law-the least confined to history and the most absorptive of powerful social standards of a
progressive society." 793 Thus, it has been concluded that even "ancient"
procedural rules "must satisfy contemporary notions of due process. " 794 In
Mathews v. Eldridge/ 95 the Court-in setting forth its flexible balancingof-interests approach-articulated the following three areas of importance
for a court to consider in determining what process is due:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.796

The private interest at stake in the death penalty debate-the right of
an inmate to remain alive-is of utmost importance.797 Indeed, the right to
"life" has, since America's very inception, been considered a basic right,
or-to use the exact wording of the Declaration of Independence-an "unalienable" right.7 98 The Supreme Court, in a number of cases, has confirmed that principle, characterizing the "right to life" as "fundamental." 799
California, 332 U.S. 46, 61 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (asking whether
procedures are necessary for the "protection of ultimate decency in a civilized society").
792 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
334 (1976) (quoting Morrissey); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1,
15 n.l5 (1978) (same); Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997) (same); Lujan v. G &
G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 189, 196-97 (2001) (same); see also Connecticut v.
Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10 (1991) ("Due process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.").
793 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20-21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
794 Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., County ofMarin, 495 U.S. 604, 630 (1990)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
795 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
796 !d. at 335; see also Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005) ("we generally have
declined to establish rigid rules and instead have embraced a framework to evaluate the
sufficiency of particular procedures").
797 Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1493-97 (lOth Cir. 1990) (holding that a
prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he was murdered while in
custody); Harris v. Maynard, 843 F.2d 414, 416 (lOth Cir. 1988) (holding that "wanton or
obdurate disregard of or deliberate indifference to the prisoner's right to life as a condition
of confinement is a substantive constitutional deprivation whether it falls under the due
process clause or the Eighth Amendment").
798 Butts v. People of State oflll., 333 U.S. 640, 651 (1948); see also Elizabeth R.
Jungman, Beyond All Doubt, 91 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1077 (2003) ("Capital cases necessarily
implicate a defendant's fundamental right to life."). "The self-evident truths and the
unalienable rights" set forth in the Declaration of Independence, Justice Thurgood
Marshall once remarked, "were intended, however, to apply only to white men." Regents
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The risk of wrongful convictions and executions is, in the twenty-first
century, well documented, 800 making the possibility of "erroneous deprivation" of life-to borrow the words of Mathews-a real one. While deterring crime is a legitimate government function, there is no persuasive evidence that executions deter crime more effectively than life-without-parole
sentences, 801 making death sentences unnecessary. The Founding Fathersliving in an era when American penitentiaries were not yet a universal reality-themselves often expressed the view that any punishment beyond that
which was necessary was "tyrannical." 802 The first U.S. penitentiary, Philadelphia's Walnut Street Prison, was not even opened until 1790, and it
took several decades before America's penitentiary system was built out on
a state-by-state basis. Pennsylvania itself authorized two new penitentiaries-the Western Penitentiary in 1818 and the Eastern Penitentiary in

of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 388 (1978) (opinion of Marshall, J.);
accord Bell v. State of Maryland, 378 U.S. 226,286 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(the "ideal" of the Declaration "was not fully achieved with the adoption of our
Constitution because of the hard and tragic reality of Negro slavery").
799 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409 (1986); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 462 (1938) (referring to the "fundamental human rights of life and liberty"); Woods
v. Nierstheimer, 328 U.S. 211, 216 (1946) (referring to the "fundamental rights to life and
liberty guaranteed by the United States Constitution"); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540,
550 (1888) (referring to "the fundamental rights oflife, liberty, and property"); Powell v.
Commonwealth ofPennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 685 (1888) (same); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (referring to "the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness"); Hurtado v. People of State of California, 110 U.S. 516, 539 (1884)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The phrase 'due process oflaw' is not new in the constitutional
history of this country or of England. It antedates the establishment of our institutions.
Those who had been driven from the mother country by oppression and persecution
brought with them, as their inheritance, which no government could rightfully impair or
destroy, certain guaranties of the rights of life, liberty, and property which had long been
deemed fundamental in Anglo-Saxon institutions."); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36,
116 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (describing the right to "life" as one of the
"fundamental rights which can only be taken away by due process oflaw"); West Virginia
Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) ("One's right to life, liberty and
property * * * and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on
the outcome of no elections."); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Colorado General Assembly, 377
U.S. 713, 736-37 (1964) ("A citizen's constitutional rights can hardly be infringed simply
because a majority of the people choose that [they] be.").
800 The Innocence List, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
http://www .deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-list-those-freed-death-row (last visited Aug.
29, 2013) (listing 142 cases where defendants had their convictions overturned, with a
subsequent acquittal at re-trial or where charges were dropped, or where defendants were
given a pardon by a governor based on new evidence of innocence).
801 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, DETERRENCE AND THE
DEATH PENALTY (Apr. 2012) (finding that deterrence studies are flawed and do not factor
in the effects ofnoncapital punishments).
802 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 50 (discussing the copying of
Beccaria's maxim to that effect by John Adams).
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1821-after the Walnut Street Prison proved inadequate to the state's
needs. 803
Although the Declaration of Independence mentions the concept of
equality, the Equal Protection Clause, which now unequivocally reaches
state actors, 804 was not added to the Constitution until the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. That provision specifically commands
that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." 805 Unlike the Thirteenth Amendment, which exempted those convicted of crimes from its protection, the Fourteenth
Amendment protects every person, even inmates, without exception. In the
non-capital context, that Fourteenth Amendment's unequivocal language
has already been used to strike down discriminatory policies at schools on
the basis of race 806 and gender. 807 The Supreme Court so held based on the
Fourteenth Amendment's plain language-and "even though those who
drafted the Amendment evidently thought that separate was not unequal."808 In short, the Equal Protection Clause, like the Due Process Clause,
has been read in a contemporary fashion based upon its plain and unequivocal language-and not in accord with the antiquated personal views
and prejudices of its drafters. 809
The Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence has, significantly,
regularly concerned itself "with governmental classifications that 'affect

Meskell, supra note 140, at 853-54; L.A. Tulin, Book Review, 37 YALE L. J. 1168,
1168-69 (1928) (reviewing HARRY ELMER BARNES, TIIE EVOLUTION OF PENOLOGY IN
PENNSYLVANIA (1927)).
804 Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 257 (2009). It is well settled that
the Equal Protection Clause applies to administrative as well as legislative acts. Engquist
v. Oregon Dept. of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 597 (2008).
805 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV (ratified July 9, 1868); see also Parents Involved in Cmty
Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 743 (2007) ("the Equal Protection Clause
'protect[s] persons, not groups"') (quotingAdarand, 515 U.S. at 227) (emphasis in
original).
806 Brown v. Bd ofEduc. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (prohibiting segregated
schools).
807 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (male-only admissions policy at
Virginia Military Institute violated the Equal Protection Clause); Miss. Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982) (female-only admission policy at a traditionally
single-sex public college violated the Equal Protection Clause).
808 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 732 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
809 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Cultural Crises of the Fuller Court, 104 YALE L.J. 2309,
2337-42 (1995) ("[e]qual protection had not been identified with social integration when
the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted in 1866, nor when it was ratified in 1868, nor
when Plessy [v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537] was decided in 1896"). The Equal Protection
Clause has also been used to invalidate discriminatory practices injury selection. J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex ret. T. B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (discrimination injury selection on the basis
of gender violates the Equal Protection Clause); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 44
(1992) (racial discrimination injury selection offends the Equal Protection Clause).
803
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some groups of citizens differently than others."' 810 In some circumstances,
an equal protection claim can be sustained "even if the plaintiff has not
alleged class-based discrimination," but instead claims to have been "irrationally singled out as a so-called 'class of one."' 811 In Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 812 the Court specifically held that a property owner stated
a valid claim under the Equal Protection Clause because she had been "intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated" and because
there was "no rational basis for the difference in treatment. " 813 Although
the word "unusual" in the Eighth Amendment invites the Court to gauge
what is currently being done throughout the country to assess a punishment's constitutionality, the Court also, because of the Fourteenth
Amendment, needs to be sure not to allow arbitrary or unequal applications of the law that violate the Equal Protection Clause.
The Equal Protection Clause-as the Supreme Court itself has heldis concerned with arbitrary and discriminatory governmental conduct.
"'The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," the Court has emphasized, "'is to secure every person within the
State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution
through duly constituted agents."' 814 As the Court ruled as long ago as
1887 in Hayes v. Missouri, 815 the Fourteenth Amendment "requires that all
persons subjected to ... legislation shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed. " 816 Thus, "when it appears that an individual is being singled out by the government, the specter of arbitrary classification is fairly
raised, and the Equal Protection Clause requires a 'rational basis for the
difference in treatment."' 817

810 Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008) (quoting McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961)); see also Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974)
('"Equal Protection' ... emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State between classes of
individuals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable"); San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 60 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("the basic concern of
the Equal Protection Clause is with state legislation whose purpose or effect is to create
discrete and objectively identifiable classes").
811 Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008) (citing Village of
Willowbrook v. Olech).
812 528 u.s. 562 (2000).
813 !d. at 564. In that case, a municipality had attempted to condition the connection to the
municipal water supply on the granting of a 33-foot easement instead of the norm-a 15foot easement-required of other property owners.
814 Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota Cnty., 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923) (quoting Sunday
Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 352 (1918)); accord Olech, 528
U.S. at 564 (quoting the same language).
815 120 u.s. 68 (1887).
816 Id. at 71-72.
817 Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 602 (2008). In Engquist, the Supreme
Court pointed out that "[t]here are some forms of state action" involving "discretionary
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Indeed, the prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments" has
long been associated with preventing arbitrary abuses at criminals' sentencing proceedings. 818 In Batson v. Kentucky, 819 the Supreme Court held that

decisionmaking" where "allowing a challenge based on the arbitrary singling out of a
particular person would undermine the very discretion that such state officials are
entrusted to exercise." !d. at 603. In that case, the Court used the example of a traffic
officer handing out speeding tickets to some people but not others. Id. at 603-4. The Court
emphasized: "[A]n allegation that speeding tickets are given out on the basis of race or
sex would state an equal protection claim, because such discriminatory classifications
implicate basic equal protection concerns. But allowing an equal protection claim on the
ground that a ticket was given to one person and not others, even if for no discernible or
articulable reason, would be incompatible with the discretion inherent in the challenged
action." !d. at 604. Of course, death sentences and executions-the most severe
punishments ever conceived by lawmakers-are a far cry from parking tickets.
818 See, e.g., 1 FRANCIS HARGRAVB, ED., A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE-TRIALS, AND
PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH-TREASON, AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS xi (4th ed.
1776) (italics in original):
As to smaller Crimes and Misdemeanors, they are differenc'd with such a variety of
extenuating or aggravating Circumstances, that the Law has not, nor indeed could affix to
each a certain and determinate Penalty; this is left to the Discretion and Prudence of the
Judge, who may punish it either with Fine or Imprisonment, Pillory or Whipping, as he
shall think the nature of the Crime deserves; but tho' he be intrusted with so great Power,
yet he is not at liberty to do as he lists, and inflict what arbitrary Punishments he pleases;
due regard is to be had to the Quality and Degree, to the Estate and Circumstances of the
Offender, and to the greatness or smallness of the Offense; that Fine, which would be
mere Trifle to one Man, may be the utter Ruin and Undoing of another; and those Marks
of Ignominy and Disgrace, which would be shocking and grievous to a Person of a liberal
Education, would be slighted and despised by one of the vulgar sort. A Judge therefore
who use this discretionary Power to gratify a private Revenge, or the Rage of a Party, by
inflicting indefinite and perpetual Imprisonment, excessive and exorbitant Fines, unusual
and cruel Punishments, is equally guilty of perverting Justice and acting against Law, as
he, who in a Case, where the Law has ascertained the Penalty, wilfully and knowingly
varies from it... . [W]here a Court has a Power of setting Fines, that must be understood of
setting reasonable Fines; an excessive Fine, says Lord Coke, is against Law, and so it is
declared to be by the Act for declaring the Rights and Liberties ofthe Subject, &c. The
same Statute declares the illegality of unusual and cruel Punishments.
It was the non-observance of these Rules, which occasioned the dissolution of the Star
Chamber ... when once its Authority was abus'd to wreak the Malice of particular
Persons, and prostituted to the base Ends of a Court-Faction, when no Limits were
observed in the Exercise of its Jurisdiction, nor Humanity in its Sentences, when the
Judges thereof, however dignified by their Posts, became a Disgrace to human Nature by
their barbarous and cruel butcherings, punishing pretended Libels not only with perpetual
Imprisonments, but with brandings in the Face and mutilation of Members, when the Case
was thus (as it appears to have been from some Instances in this Collection) it was then
high time to tear it up by the Roots, as a Grievance no longer to be borne with. A Judge
therefore ought to be strictly careful that he conform to the Rules of Law not only as to
the nature of the Punishment, but likewise as to the degrees thereof.
It is indeed no easy matter to settle the precise Limits, how far a Court of Justice may
go; every Case must depend upon its own particular Circumstances. But some Fines and
some Punishments are so monstrously extravagant, that no body can doubt their being so;

423

2 Br. ]. Am. Leg. Studies (2013)
the unlawful exclusion of jurors based on race required reversal because it
"violates a defendant's right to equal protection," "unconstitutionally discriminate[s] against the excluded juror," and "undermine[s] public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice. " 820 The Supreme Court, in
other instances, has also invalidated capital sentences based on racial bias
and the dictates of the Equal Protection Clause. 821 In one case involving the
exclusion through peremptory strikes of 10 of the 11 African Americans
eligible to serve on the jury, 822 the Court held that "[d]efendants are
harmed, of course, when racial discrimination in jury selection compromises the right of trial by impartial jury." 823 "[T]he statistical evidence alone,"
the Court held, "raises some debate as to whether the prosecution acted
with a race-based reason when striking prospective jurors. " 824
The Supreme Court has emphasized that "death is different." 825 Yet,
when it comes to the death penalty's actual infliction, the Court-raising
the specter of a slippery slope-has shunned reliance on statistical studies 826
showing that racial discrimination is prevalent in capital charging and sentencing.827 In McCleskey v. Kemp, 828 the Court instead held that the Equal
Protection Clause-while aimed at eliminating racial discrimination829only prohibits intentional discrimination that can be proven through means
other than statistics. 830 In effect, unlike what it does in jury selection cases,

such were the Fines of Sir Samuel Barnardiston and Mr. Hampden, such were the
repeated Pilloryings and barbarous Whippings of Oates, Dangerfield, and Johnson.
819 476 US. 79 (1986).
820 !d. at 86-87.
821 Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 342 (2003) (noting that statistical evidence could
support a finding of discrimination injury selection); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231,
240-41, 266 (2005) (considering statistical evidence in case dealing with improper
exclusion of black jurors); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293 (1987)
(noting that the Supreme Court "has accepted statistical disparities as proof of an equal
protection violation in the selection of the jury venire in a particular district").
822 Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 326, 331.
823 Dretke, 545 U.S. at 237.
824 Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 342.
825 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 605-06 (2002) ("[T]here is no doubt that '[d]eath is
different."') (citation omitted).
826 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
827 E.g., U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to Senate and House Committees on the
Judiciary: Death Penalty Sentencing 5 (Feb. 1990) (reporting on studies showing "pattern
of evidence indicating racial disparities in the charging, sentencing, and imposition of the
death penalty").
828 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
829 Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009) ("[T]he 'moral imperative of racial neutrality
is the driving force of the Equal Protection Clause,' and racial classifications are permitted only 'as a last resort."') (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 518-19
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
830 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The Equal
Protection Clause, this Court has held, prohibits only intentional discrimination; it does
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when it comes to death sentences themselves, an American death row inmate is required by the Court to prove that an individual prosecutor exhibited racial animus in that inmate's particular case-a tough row to hoe, to
be sure. 831

C. The Effect on What Is Considered "Cruel and Unusual"
One effect of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification-a byproduct
of its adoption-was to expand the Eighth Amendment's scope. When the
Eighth Amendment was ratified in 1791, it only constrained the actions of
the federal government832-then a small institution with only a few legislators and a few employees. 833 Although many states had similar protections
against "cruel and unusual," "cruel or unusual," or simply "cruel" punishments, 834 in the pre-Fourteenth Amendment era-rampant with racial
prejudice and slavery835-African Americans were often excluded from legal protection of such constitutional rights altogether. 836 To have a constitutional protection that ensured "equal protection of the laws" was thus a
remarkable achievement.
After the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, aimed at stamping out invidious racial discrimination, once lawful state actions became

not have a disparate-impact component.") (citing Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) & Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)).
831 Michael D. Hintze, Attacking the Death Penalty: Toward a Renewed Strategy Twenty
Years After Furman, 24 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 395, 421 (1993).
832 United States v. Henning, 4 Cranch C. C. 645, 26 F. Cas. 267, 271 (C.C.D.C. 1836) ("If
congress have a right to pass laws prohibiting those acts to be done in the district, they
have a right to affix penalties and punishment to the violation of those laws; and they are
not limited in the degree of punishment, if it be not 'cruel and unusual' within the
meaning of the 8th article of the amendments of the constitution.").
833 KRISHNA K. TUMMALA, ED., COMPARATIVE BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEMS 83 (2003) ("In
1791 the federal government employed roughly 4,500 individuals.").
834 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 176-81.
835 See generally WALTER JOHNSON, SOUL BY SOUL: LIFE INSIDE THE ANTEBELLUM SLAVE
MARKET (1999).
836 In Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. Cas. 47, 1824 WL 1072 (Va. Gen. 1824), the
General Court of Virginia held that the state's "cruel and unusual punishments" clause did
not even apply to "a free man of color." Id. at* 1, 3. As the Virginia court ruled:
"Notwithstanding the general terms used in the Bill of Rights, it is undeniable that it never
was contemplated, or considered, to extend to the whole population of the State. Can it be
doubted, that it not only was not intended to apply to our slave population, but that the
free blacks and mulattoes were also not comprehended in it?'' Id. at *3; see also Id.
("[N]obody has ever questioned the power of the Legislature, to deny to free blacks and
mulattoes, one of the first privileges of a citizen; that of voting at elections, although they
might in every particular, except color, be in precisely the same condition as those
qualified to vote. The numerous restrictions imposed on this class of people in our Statute
Book, many of which are inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, both of
this State and of the United States, as respects the free whites, demonstrate, that, here,
those instruments have not been considered to extend equally to both classes of our
population.").
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unlawful. The Thirteenth Amendment had abolished slavery, but in response, Southern states enacted "Black Codes"-laws attempting to limit
the rights of former slaves. 837 With the Fourteenth Amendment's "equal
protection" language, though, such laws were destined to fall. Now that
former slaves were citizens and were to be afforded equal protection, the
idea expressed at one time that racial minorities were not entitled to be
protected from "cruel" or "unusual" punishments under the Eighth
Amendment could no longer withstand judicial scrutiny. While a practice
such as whipping might be customary or usual in a given state, the federal
courts would ultimately be able to review the matter-and put a stop to
it. 838 In the modern era, the racial bias present in the death penalty's administration can no more be ignored than other forms of discrimination,
especially given the fundamental nature of the right to life.
In fact, in interpreting the Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court must
decide for itself whether executions, with all their arbitrariness and racial
bias, have become "cruel and unusual." Just as the Court has been called
upon in the past to decide what is an "infamous" crime or punishment, it
can judge for itself perfectly well whether executions are "cruel" and "unusual" at this juncture and thus unconstitutional. Early American legal
commentators themselves spoke of the "cruel and unusual punishments"
prohibition as reflecting "the improved spirit of the age" 839 and "the spirit
of our humane general constitution." 840
The case of Ex parte Wilson, 841 decided by the Supreme Court in
1885, is instructive. In that case, the Court found that "if the crime of
which the petitioner was accused was an infamous crime, within the meaning of the fifth amendment of the constitution, no court of the United
States had jurisdiction to try or punish him, except upon presentment or

837 Sean M. Heneghan, Employment Discrimination Faced by the Immigrant Worker: A
Lesson from the United States and South Africa, 35 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1780, 1787
(2012).
838 Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (Blackmun, J.).
839 JAMES BAYARD, A BRIEF EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 154
(2d ed. 1840) ("The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments, marks the improved
spirit of the age, which would not tolerate the use of the rack or the stake, or any of those
horrid modes of torture, devised by human ingenuity for the gratification of fiendish
passion.").
840 BENJAMINL. OLIVER, THE RIGHTS OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN 186 (1832):
Under the [Eighth] amendment the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments, is also
prohibited. The various barbarous and cruel punishments inflicted under the laws of some
other countries, and which profess not to be behind the most enlightened nations on earth
in civilization and refinement, furnish sufficient reasons for this express prohibition.
Breaking on the wheel, flaying alive, rendering assunder with horses, various species of
horrible tortures inflicted in the inquisition, maiming, mutilating and scourging to death,
are wholly alien to the spirit of our humane general constitution.
841 114 U.S. 417 (1885).
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indictment by a grand jury." 842 Just as the Court can decide what constitutes an "infamous" crime, it can decide with little difficulty what qualifies
as a "cruel and unusual" punishment.
In deciding whether the petitioner's crime was "infamous" or not, the
Supreme Court in Ex parte Wilson first noted that "the scope and effect"
of the Fifth Amendment provision at issue, "as of many other provisions of
the constitution, are best ascertained by bearing in mind what the law was
before. " 843 But after noting that the Fifth Amendment's purpose was "to
limit the powers of the legislature, as well as of the prosecuting officers, of
the United States," 844 the Supreme Court framed the question as "whether
imprisonment at hard labor for a term of years is an infamous punishment."845 "What punishments shall be considered as infamous," the Court
held in language reminiscent of the "evolving standards" approach, "may
be affected by the changes of public opinion from one age to another." 846
Ultimately, the Court in Ex parte Wilson ruled: "In former times, being put in the stocks was not considered as necessarily infamous. And by
the first judiciary act of the United States, whipping was classed with moderate fines and short terms of imprisonment in limiting the criminal jurisdiction of the district courts to cases 'where no other punishment than
whipping, not exceeding thirty stripes, a fine not exceeding one hundred
dollars, or a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months, is to be inflicted."847 "But at the present day," the Court emphasized, "either stocks
or whipping might be thought an infamous punishment. " 848 In other
words, the Supreme Court opined-as it would later with its "evolving
standards of decency" test-that a punishment might be classed one way in
one generation and a different way in another. 849 The lesson: the fact that

842 !d. at 422. The Fifth Amendment provides in part: "No person shall be held to answer
for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in
actual service in time of war or public danger." U.S. CONST., amend. V.
843 Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. at422.
844 !d. at 426.
845 !d. "Infamous punishments cannot be limited to those punishments which are cruel or
unusual," the Supreme Court ruled, "because ... 'cruel and unusual punishments' are
wholly forbidden, and cannot therefore be lawfully inflicted even in cases of convictions
upon indictments duly presented by a grand jury." Id. at 426-27.
846 Id. at 427. The Court noted that "Mr. Dane," a legal commentator, "while treating it as
doubtful whether confinement in the stocks or in the house of correction is infamous,
says, 'punishments, clearly infamous, are death, gallows, pillory, branding, whipping,
confinement to hard labor, and cropping."') (citation omitted).
847 !d. at 427-28 (quoting Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9).
848 !d. at 428.
849 In Ex parte Wilson, the Supreme Court-anxious to leave flexibility for future
decisionmaking-ultimately held as follows: "Deciding nothing beyond what is required
by the facts of the case before us, our judgment is that a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term of years at hard labor is an infamous crime, within the meaning
of the fifth amendment." !d. at 429.
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executions were deemed constitutional at one time does not make them
constitutional for all time.

V. TOWARD A PRINCIPLED EIGHTH AMENDMENT
A. The Punishment Continuum
When viewed on a continuum, as the Founding Fathers so often
viewed them, punishments range from de minimis all the way to death itself.850 In 1777, Thomas Jefferson methodically divided crimes into three
categories: (1) capital offenses or-in his words-"Crimes whose punishmt. Extends to Life"; (2) "Crimes whose punishment goes to Limb,"
such as castration for rapists; and (3) "Crimes punishable by Labor &c." 851
Cesare Beccaria had suggested a "scale of punishments," writing that "a
scale of misdeeds can be identified, at the top of which are those that are
immediately destructive to society and at the bottom those that cause the
least possible injustice to its individual members." 852 "If geometry were
applicable to the infinite and obscure combinations of human actions,"
Beccaria concluded, "there would be a corresponding scale of punishments,
descending from the most severe to the mildest." 853
Most punishments the Eighth Amendment is concerned with are meted out at criminals' sentencing proceedings. But other post-sentencing actions (i.e., those that occur within the confines of prisons) can also constitute Eighth Amendment violations. Thus, in Estelle v. Gamble, 854 the Supreme Court first applied the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to
deprivations that were not specifically part of a prisoner's sentence. 855 Not
all actions of guards or uses of force, of course, lead to Eighth Amendment
violations. As the Supreme Court quite appropriately clarified: "de minimis
uses of physical force" do not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
of "cruel and unusual punishments" unless the force used is "repugnant to
the conscience of mankind." 856

850 E.g., John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REv. 899, 957-58 (2011) ("Thomas Jefferson narrowly
failed in his attempt to get Virginia to enact his "Bill for Proportioning Crimes and
Punishments in Cases Heretofore Capital," which set forth a scale of crimes and
punishments in the manner suggested by Beccaria and Blackstone.").
851 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 144.
852 AARON THOMAS, ED., CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PuNISHMENTS AND OTHER
WRITINGS 18 (Aaron Thomas & Jeremy Parzen, trans. 2008).
853 !d.; see also id. at 50 (referring to "a scale of punishments"). Citing Beccaria,
Blackstone similarly spoke of"a corresponding scale of punishments, descending from
the greatest to the least." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 18 (19th ed. 1836).
854 429 u.s. 97 (1976).
855 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).
856 McMillian, 503 U.S. at 9-10; Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1178 (2010);
compare Hudson, 503 U.S. at 18 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The Court today ... broadly
asserts that any 'unnecessary and wanton' use of physical force against a prisoner
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In other words, the protection provided to inmates by the Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause has limits. "An inmate who complains of a 'push or shove' that causes no discernible injury," the Court has emphasized, "almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim." 857 As the Court has ruled, prison officials are free to
discipline prisoners, so long as the disciplinary rules serve a rational and
legitimate purpose 858 and prisoners are not disciplined in an "arbitrary"
manner. 859 In order to prevail on an excessive force claim, the inmate must
prove "not only that the assault occurred but also that it was carried out
'maliciously and sadistically' rather than as part of 'a good-faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline."' 860 In the death penalty context, the issue
becomes whether executions serve any rational or legitimate purpose now
that maximum-security prisons and life-without-parole sentences are so
widely available.

automatically amounts to cruel and unusual punishment, whenever more than de minimis
force is involved.").
857 Wilkins, 130 S. Ct. at 1178.
858 Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003) ("the challenged regulations bear a
rational relation to legitimate penological interests"); id. ("In Turner we held that four
factors are relevant in deciding whether a prison regulation affecting a constitutional right
that survives incarceration withstands constitutional challenge: whether the regulation has
a "'valid, rational connection"' to a legitimate governmental interest; whether alternative
means are open to inmates to exercise the asserted right; what impact an accommodation
of the right would have on guards and inmates and prison resources; and whether there are
'ready alternatives' to the regulation.") (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91); Overton, 539
U.S. at 133 ("Turning to the restrictions on visitation by children, we conclude that the
regulations bear a rational relation to MDOC's valid interests in maintaining internal
security and protecting child visitors from exposure to sexual or other misconduct or from
accidental injury. The regulations promote internal security, perhaps the most legitimate
of penological goals .... "); id. ("MDOC's regulation prohibiting visitation by former
inmates bears a self-evident connection to the State's interest in maintaining prison
security and preventing future crimes."); id. at 134 ("Withdrawing visitation privileges is
a proper and even necessary management technique to induce compliance with the rules
of inmate behavior, especially for high-security prisoners who have few other privileges
to lose.").
859 Overton, 539 U.S. at 136 ("Respondents also claim that the restriction on visitation for
inmates with two substance-abuse violations is a cruel and unusual condition of
confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The restriction undoubtedly makes
the prisoner's confinement more difficult to bear. But it does not, in the circumstances of
this case, fall below the standards mandated by the Eighth Amendment."); id. at 137
("This is not a dramatic departure from accepted standards for conditions of confinement.
Nor does the regulation create inhumane prison conditions, deprive inmates of basic
necessities, or fail to protect their health or safety. Nor does it involve the infliction of
pain or injury, or deliberate indifference to the risk that it might occur."). In Overton v.
Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003), the Supreme Court noted in dicta: "If the withdrawal of all
visitation privileges were permanent or for a much longer period, or if it were applied in
an arbitrary manner to a particular inmate, the case would present different
considerations." Id. at 137.
860 Wilkins, 130 S. Ct. at 1178.
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The social movement to substitute incarceration in place of death sentences-a movement that is still ongoing-has been taking place in America for centuries. It began in the Founding Fathers' time, when the cornerstones of state penitentiaries were laid, with the torch then being passed to
succeeding generations. In 1922, Justice Louis Brandeis-joined by Chief
Justice William Howard Taft and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes-noted
the development in the law. In a dissenting opinion, they pointed out that
"[c]onfinement in a penitentiary is the modern substitute for the death
penalty and for the other forms of corporal punishment which, at the time
of the adoption of the Fifth Amendment, were still administered in America
for most of the crimes deemed serious." 861 As Justice Brandeis reminded his
audience of New York's pre-Fifth Amendment laws: "The punishment,
other than death, then prescribed for serious crimes were mutilation, cutting off the ears or nailing them to the pillory, branding, whipping, the pillory, the stocks and the ducking stool." 862

B. The Abandonment of Corporal Punishments
Corporal punishments were once prevalent in the English863 and
American legal systems. 864 In eighteenth-century America, corporal punishments could thus be described as common-or usual-punishments. 865

861

United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 448 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
!d. at 448 n.14.
863 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 480 n.7 (2000) ("Subject to the limitations
that the punishment not 'touch life or limb,' that it be proportionate to the offense, and, by
the 17th century, that it not be 'cruel or unusual,' judges most commonly imposed
discretionary 'sentences' of fines or whippings upon misdemeanants. Actual sentences of
imprisonment for such offenses, however, were rare at common law until the late 18th
century, for 'the idea of prison as a punishment would have seemed an absurd expense."')
(quoting J. BAKER, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 584 (3d ed.l990); JOHN
BAKER, CRIMINAL COURTS AND PROCEDURE AT COMMON LAW 1550-1800, in Crime in
England 1550-1800, p. 43 (J. Cockburn ed.l977)).
864 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 189-90 & n.l2 (1957) (noting that Floyd, a
Catholic, was ordered "to stand two hours in the pillory, and to be branded in the forehead
with the letter K" and "to be whipped at the cart's tail," among other punishments, for
"uttering a few contemptible expressions"); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 168 (1873) ("A
criminal may be sentenced to a disgraceful punishment, as whipping, or, as in the old
English law, to have his ears cut off, or to be branded in the hand or forehead."); Murphy
v. Daytona Beach Humane Soc., Inc., 176 So.2d 922, 924 (Fla. App. 1965) (noting that,
until its abolition, the English star chamber exercised the power of cutting off ears and
branding the foreheads and slitting the noses of libelers); State v. Chandler, 2 Harr. 553,
1837 WL 154 *10 (Del. Gen. Sess. 1837) (noting that English law punished blasphemy
"by setting the offender in the pillory for the space of two hours, branding in the forehead
with the letter B, and public whipping on the bare back with thirty-nine lashes, well laid
on").
865 See James E. Robertson, Psychological Injury and the Prison Litigation Reform Act: A
"Not Exactly," Equal Protection Analysis, 37 HARv. J. ON. LEGIS. 105, 149 (2000)
("Corporal punishments once dominated the penal body. Whippings were a common
punishment in colonial times. Other common punishments included branding; severing of
862
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The whipping of slaves was a standard disciplinary practice, and many offenses-both civilian and military-were punished with lashes, 866 often in a
brutal or severe manner. 867 The first criminal-law statute passed by the
First Congress, for example, prescribed 39 lashes for falsifying federal records, larceny, and receiving stolen goods and one hour in the pillory for
perjury. 868 "An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States"another law passed by the First Congress-gave the federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction over "all crimes and offences that shall be cognizable under the
authority of the United States" where, among other things, "no other punishment than whipping, not exceeding thirty stripes . . . is to be inflicted." 869 Corporal punishments were purposely designed to inflict pain and
to shame and humiliate offenders. 870
But over time, as societal attitudes changed, corporal punishments
withered away. 871 Ear cropping, hand and forehead branding, and flogging
had been punishments in colonial times and in America's early years, as
judicial opinions from the time make clear. 872 In State v. Henderson, 873 the

ears and noses; and hanging."); Kathryn Preyer, Penal Measures in the American
Colonies: An Overview, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 326, 348-49, 353 (1982) (recounting that
eighteen-century punishments including whipping and public shaming).
866 Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 43, § 15, 1 Stat. 736-737 (up to 40 lashes, as well as up to 10years imprisonment, could be imposed for first mail-robbery conviction; up to 30 lashes
or imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, was the punishment for attempted
robbery of the mails); see also Duncan v. State of Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 191-92 (1968)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Nor had the Colonies a cleaner slate, although practices varied
greatly from place to place with conditions. In Massachusetts, crimes punishable by
whipping (up to 10 strokes), the stocks (up to three hours), the ducking stool, and fines
and imprisonment were triable to magistrates ... New York was somewhat harsher. For
example, 'anyone adjudged by two magistrates to be an idle, disorderly or vagrant person
might be transported whence he carne, and on reappearance be whipped from constable to
constable with thirty-one lashes by each."'); United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 71112, 749-50 (1964) (describing various seventeenth- and eighteenth-century laws that
imposed ear cropping, hours in the stocks, the pillory, or lashes as forms of punishment).
867 E.g., MARVIN L. MICHAEL KAY & LORIN LEE CARY, SLAVERY IN NORTII CAROLINA,
1748-1775, at 82 (1999).
868 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 262 n.6 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Act
of Apr. 30,1790, §§ 15-18,1 Stat.115-16).
869 An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (cited in
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1969 nn.3-4 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring)).
870 See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 98 (2003) ("Punishments such as whipping, pillory,
and branding inflicted physical pain and staged a direct confrontation between the
offender and the public.").
871 See Rita K. Lomio, Working against the Past: The Function ofAmerican History of
Race Relations and Capital Punishment in Supreme Court Opinions, 9 J. L. SOCIETY 163,
165 n.8 (2008) ("Certain practices such as branding, pillorying, and ear-cropping have
fallen out of use and law even without Eighth Amendment invocation.").
872 GEORGE LEE HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS: A STUDY IN
'TRADITION AND DESIGN 175 (1960) (noting that ear cropping and whipping were
punishments imposed by colonial magistrates); TERANCE D. MIETHE & HONG Lu,
PuNISHMENT: A COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 35 (2005) ("The early American
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Supreme Court of North Carolina faced this issue: "whether one convicted
of manslaughter may be sentenced to be burned in the hand." 874 The court,
citing English statutes, gave its answer as follows: "we are all of the opinion, that he may." 875 Colonial New Jersey likewise punished burglary by
branding the offender's hand for a first offense, and the offender's forehead
for subsequent offenses. 876 In an earlier era, a murderer escaping the gallows might be branded with an "M" and a thief not punished capitally
might be branded with a "T." 877 "A common form of mutilation or maiming was the detachment of an ear," a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit once explained, noting that "[t]he effect of branding,
mutilation, or maiming was often to cast the offender out of society once
and for all. " 878
But as noted, such punishments fell out of use over time. 879 For example, flogging fell into disuse at both the federal and state levels over the

colonists also burned particular letters on offenders' hands and forehead."); Abner Mikva,
What Justice Brennan Gave Us to Keep, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 655, 661 (1999) ("Earcropping, which involved clipping off a piece of the ear, was a common punishment in the
colonial days for people who stole or did other terrible things."); Erwin Chemerinsky,
Evolving Standards ofDecency in 2003-Is the Death Penalty on Life Support?, 29 U.
DAYTONL. REv. 201, 214 (2004) ("ear cropping and flogging were also in existence in
1787''); Samuel R. Gross, Still Urifair, Still Arbitrary-But Do We Care?, 26 OHIO N.U.
L. REv. 517, 520 (2000) ("Flogging and ear cropping were just two forms of mutilation
and torture that were commonly available in 1789"); Margaret Jane Radin, The
Jurisprudence ofDeath: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 989, 1031 (1978) ("Whipping and ear-cropping were thought
perfectly proper, neither torturous nor excessive, when the Bill of Rights was born."); J.
Matthew Martin, The Nature and Extent of the Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction by the
Cherokee Supreme Court: 1823-1835, 32 N.C. CENT. L. REv. 27, 41 (2009) (listing "ear
cropping" as a punishment in the Cherokee Nation in a section about criminal procedure
in the 1820s and 1830s); State v. Webb, 680 A.2d 147, 228 n.6 (1996) (Berdon, J.,
dissenting) (noting that a judge of the Connecticut Superior Court in 1773 ordered that a
burglar be "branded on his forehead" with a capital letter "B" with "a hot iron" and "have
one of his Ears Nailed to a post and Cut off' and also be "Whipt on his Naked body
fifteen Stripes"); compare State v. Frink, 1 Bay 168, 1791 WL 210 *1 (S.C. Com. Pl.
Gen. Sess. 1791) (a man convicted of manslaughter "was brought up to receive sentence
of burning in the hand, which had been usually inflicted instanter in open Court," but as
the jury had recommended him as a fit object for mercy, punishment was delayed pending
a review by the governor in Charleston); State v. Grisham, 2 N.C. 12, 1792 WL 50 *1
(N.C. Super. L. & Eq. 1792) (noting that the judge "gave judgment that the prisoner
should be branded in the hand; which was accordingly done in presence of the court").
873 2 Dev. & Bat. 543, 1837 WL 498 (N.C. 1837).
874 !d. at *1.
875 !d.
876

E. B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1116 (1997) (Becker, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
877 !d.
878 !d.
879 MICHAEL NEWTON, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF KIDNAPPINGS 51 (2002) (noting that
Delaware's governor remitted the ear-cropping portion of a man's sentence following his

432

The Anomaly of Executions
course of several decades. 880 To encourage enlistment, Congress first abolished flogging in the army in 1812,881 but then reinstated the punishment in
1833 in an attempt to prevent desertions. 882 A few years later, in 1839,
Congress abolished flogging for all federal crimes, 883 then outlawed flogging in the navy in 1850 884 and again in the army in 1861. 885 At the state
level, flogging also came to be seen as unacceptable. For example, in 1847,
New York's legislature abolished flogging in that state's prisons. 886 For
purposes of understanding the Eighth Amendment and judicial readings of
it, such history is informative.
In fact, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause has long been read
to bar corporal punishments and abuse or mistreatment of inmates. The
federal courts, cognizant that inmates are government wards, have repeatedly held that the Eighth Amendment requires that inmates be fed, clothed,
and treated for illness. "To incarcerate," the U.S. Supreme Court has itself
emphasized, "society takes from prisoners the means to provide for their
own needs." 887 As a result, prisoners are "dependent on the State for food,
clothing, and necessary medical care." 888 "Just as a prisoner may starve if

conviction in 1822); State v. Cannon, 190 A.2d 514, 157 (Del. 1963) (noting the abolition
of branding and cropping of ears). For a discussion of ear cropping under Massachusetts
law, see JANE KAMENSKY, GOVERNING THE TONGUE: THE POLITICS OF SPEECH IN EARLY
NEW ENGLAND 251 n.132 (1997).
880 E.g., Brian Hauck, Cara Hendrickson & Zena Yoslov, Capital Punishment Legislation
in Massachusetts, 36 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 479, 481 n.16 (1999) ("In 1805, the
Massachusetts legislature abolished whipping, branding, the stocks, and the pillory."); W.
J. Michael Cody & Andy D. Bennett, The Privatization of Correctional Institutions: The
Tennessee Experience, 40 VAND. L. REv. 829, 829 (1987) ("In 1829 the Tennessee
General Assembly, in accordance with a national reform movement, abolished traditional
methods for the punishment of crimes. Imprisonment replaced whipping, branding, and
stocks.").
881 ALAN TAYLOR, THE CIVIL WAR OF 1812: AMERICAN CITIZENS, BRITISH SUBJECTS, IRISH
REBELS, & INDIAN ALLIES 348 (2011 ); Michael I. Spak & Jonathon P. Tomes, CourtsMartial: Time to Play Taps?, 28 Sw. U. L. REv. 481, 483 n.13 (1999).
882 Spak & Tomes, supra note 881, at 483 n.13.
883 DAVID FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TODAY 396 (1976) (citing Act of Feb. 28,
1839, 5 Stat. 322 ch. 36, § 5).
884 MYRA C. GLENN, CAMPAIGNS AGAINST CORPORAL PuNISHMENT: PRISONERS, SAILORS,
WOMEN, AND CHILDREN IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 9 n.* (1984) (citing Act of Sept. 28,
1850); KENNETH J. HAGAN, IN PEACE AND WAR: INTERPRETATIONS OF AMERICAN NAVAL
HISTORY 70 (2008). Traditions died hard, however. See W. JEFFREY BOLSTER, BLACK
JACKS: AFRICAN AMERICAN SEAMENINTHEAGEOF SAIL 180 (1997) (noting that a seaman
in 1853 overheard a captain telling another captain that "he sailed under the old law, & he
should trust himself and that he should flog as much as ever").
885 CLAYTON R. NEWELL & CHARLES R. SHRADER, OF DUTY WELL AND FAITHFULLY DONE:
A HISTORY OF THE REGULAR ARMY IN THE CIVIL WAR 46 (20 11 ).
886 W. DAVID LEWIS, FROM NEWGATE TO DANNEMORA: THE RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY IN
NEW YORK, 1796-1848, at 251 ( 1965).
887 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011).
888 /d.
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not fed," the Supreme Court noted in Brown v. Plata, 889 "he or she may
suffer or die if not provided adequate medical care." 890 "A prison that deprives prisoners of basis sustenance, including adequate medical care, is
incompatible with the concept of human dignity and has no place in civilized society," the Court ruled as late as 2011. 891 "If a government fails to
fulfill this obligation," the Court held, "the courts have a responsibility to
remedy the resulting Eighth Amendment violation." 892
As a result, the Eighth Amendment is often used in civil rights cases to
remedy the failure of prison officials to meet prisoners' basic health needs.
In a recent case dealing with overcrowding in California's prisons, the Supreme Court took note of the large number of prisoners being housed in
squalid, sardine-like conditions. 893 The overcrowding-and lack of sufficient staff and medical and mental health services within the prisons 894had led to rampant disease 895 and preventable deaths, 896 including a num-

131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
!d. at 1928.
891 !d.
892 !d.
893 !d. at 1923 ("For years the medical and mental health care provided by California's
prisons has fallen short of minimum constitutional requirements and has failed to meet
prisoners' basic health needs. Needless suffering and death have been the welldocumented result."); id. at 1923 ("The degree of overcrowding in California's prisons is
exceptional. California's prisons are designed to house a population just under 80,000, but
at the time of the three-judge court's decision the population was almost double that. The
State's prisons had operated at around 200% of design capacity for at least 11 years.
Prisoners are crammed into spaces neither designed nor intended to house inmates. As
many as 200 prisoners may live in a gymnasium, monitored by as few as two or three
correctional officers. As many as 54 prisoners may share a single toilet.") (citations
omitted).
894 Id. at 1932 ("The record documents the severe impact of burgeoning demand on the
provision of care. At the time of trial, vacancy rates for medical and mental health staff
ranged as high as 20% for surgeons, 25% for physicians, 39% for nurse practitioners, and
54.1% for psychiatrists."); id. at 1933 ("Delays are no less severe in the context of
physical care. Prisons have backlogs of up to 700 prisoners waiting to see a doctor. A
review of referrals for urgent specialty care at one prison revealed that only 105 of 316
pending referrals had a scheduled appointment, and only 2 had an appointment scheduled
to occur within 14 days. Urgent specialty referrals at one prison had been pending for six
months to a year.") (citations omitted); id. at 1934 ("The effects of overcrowding are
particularly acute in the prisons' reception centers, intake areas that process 140,000 new
or returning prisoners every year. Crowding in these areas runs as high as 300% of design
capacity. Living conditions are 'toxic,' and a lack of treatment space impedes efforts to
identify inmate medical or mental health needs and provide even rudimentary care.")
(citations omitted).
895 !d. at 1933 ("Crowding also creates unsafe and unsanitary living conditions that
hamper effective delivery of medical and mental health care. A medical expert described
living quarters in converted gymnasiums or dayrooms, where large numbers of prisoners
may share just a few toilets and showers, as '"breeding grounds for disease."'); id. at
1933-34 ("Cramped conditions promote unrest and violence, making it difficult for prison
officials to monitor and control the prison population. On any given day, prisoners in the
889
890
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her of suicides. 897 Such conditions, not surprisingly, eventually draw the
attention of lawyers and the courts.

general prison population may become ill ... and overcrowding may prevent immediate
medical attention necessary to avoid suffering, death, or spread of disease. After one
prisoner was assaulted in a crowded gymnasium, prison staff did not even learn of the
injury until the prisoner had been dead for several hours."); id. at 1934 n.7 ("Correctional
officials at trial described several outbreaks of disease. One officer testified that
antibiotic-resistant staph infections spread widely among the prison population and
described prisoners 'bleeding, oozing with pus that is soaking through their clothes when
they come in to get the wound covered and treated.' Another witness testified that inmates
with influenza were sent back from the infirmary due to a lack of beds and that the disease
quickly spread to 'more than half the 340 prisoners in the housing unit, with the result
that the unit was placed on lockdown for a week.") (citations omitted).
896 Id. at 1925 n.4 ("In 2007, the last year for which the three-judge court had available
statistics, an analysis of deaths in California's prisons found 68 preventable or possibly
preventable deaths. This was essentially unchanged from 2006, when an analysis found 66
preventable or possibly preventable deaths. These statistics mean that, during 2006 and
2007, a preventable or possibly preventable death occurred once every five to six days.")
(citations omitted).
897 !d. at 1924-25 ("Prisoners in California with serious mental illness do not receive
minimal, adequate care. Because of a shortage of treatment beds, suicidal inmates may be
held for prolonged periods in telephone-booth sized cages without toilets. A psychiatric
expert reported observing an inmate who had been held in such a cage for nearly 24
hours, standing in a pool of his own urine, unresponsive and nearly catatonic. Prison
officials explained they had '"no place to put him.'" Other inmates awaiting care may be
held for months in administrative segregation, where they endure harsh and isolated
conditions and receive only limited mental health services. Wait times for mental health
care range as high as 12 months. In 2006, the suicide rate in California's prisons was
nearly 80% higher than the national average for prison populations; and a court-appointed
Special Master found that 72.1% of suicides involved 'some measure of inadequate
assessment, treatment, or intervention, and were therefore most probably foreseeable
and/or preventable."') (citations omitted); id. at 1925 ("Prisoners suffering from physical
illness also receive severely deficient care. California's prisons were designed to meet the
medical needs of a population at 100% of design capacity and so have only half the
clinical space needed to treat the current population. A correctional officer testified that,
in one prison, up to 50 sick inmates may be held together in a 12-by 2{}-foot cage for up
to five hours awaiting treatment. The number of staff is inadequate, and prisoners face
significant delays in access to care. A prisoner with severe abdominal pain died after a 5week delay in referral to a specialist; a prisoner with "constant and extreme" chest pain
died after an 8-hour delay in evaluation by a doctor; and a prisoner died of testicular
cancer after a 'failure of MDs to work up for cancer in a young man with 17 months of
testicular pain.'") (citations omitted); id. at 1925-26 ("Many more prisoners, suffering
from severe but not life-threatening conditions, experience prolonged illness and
unnecessary pain."); id. at 1933 ("This shortfall of resources relative to demand
contributes to significant delays in treatment. Mentally ill prisoners are housed in
administrative segregation while awaiting transfer to scarce mental health treatment beds
for appropriate care. One correctional officer indicated that he had kept mentally ill
prisoners in segregation for '6 months or more.' App. 594. Other prisoners awaiting care
are held in tiny, phone-booth sized cages. The record documents instances of prisoners
committing suicide while awaiting treatment."); id. at 1934 ("Living in crowded, unsafe,
and unsanitary conditions can cause prisoners with latent mental illnesses to worsen and
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In that particular case, Brown v. Plata, 898 the Court noted that
"[c]ourts must be sensitive to the State's interest in punishment, deterrence,
and rehabilitation, as well as the need for deference to experienced and
expert prison administrators faced with the difficult and dangerous task of
housing large numbers of convicted criminals. " 899 Still, the Court held that
"[c]ourts may not allow constitutional violations to continue simply because a remedy would involve intrusion into the realm of prison administration."900 As the Court stated: "The State's desire to avoid a population
limit, justified as according respect to state authority, creates a certain and
unacceptable risk of continuing violations of the rights of sick and mentally
ill prisoners, with the result that many more will die or needlessly suffer.
The Constitution does not permit this wrong." 901
Although prisoners lose the right to their freedom by virtue of their
criminality/ 02 the Supreme Court reiterated in Brown that "the law and the
Constitution demand recognition of certain other rights. " 903 As the Court
put it: "Prisoners retain the essence of human dignity inherent in all persons. Respect for that dignity animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. " 904 In its 2011 decision, the Court
found that the need to remedy unconstitutional conditions in California's
prisons was so urgent because "[p]risoners in the general population will
become sick ... with routine frequency; and overcrowding may prevent the
timely diagnosis and care necessary to provide effective treatment and to
prevent further spread of disease. " 905 "Even prisoners with no present
physical or mental illness may become afflicted," the Court noted, adding:
"all prisoners in California are at risk so long as the State continues to provide inadequate care." 906

develop overt symptoms. Crowding may also impede efforts to improve delivery of care.
Two prisoners committed suicide by hanging after being placed in cells that had been
identified as requiring a simple fix to remove attachment points that could support a
noose. The repair was not made because doing so would involve removing prisoners from
the cells, and there was no place to put them.").
898 131 S. Ct. 1910,1928 (2011).
899 !d.
900 Id. at 1928-29.
901 Id. at 1941.
902 Id. at 1928 ("As a consequence of their own actions, prisoners may be deprived of
rights that are fundamental to liberty.").
903 !d.
904 !d.
905 !d. at 1940.
906 !d. As the Supreme Court wrote: "Relief targeted only at present members of the
plaintiff classes may therefore fail to adequately protect future class members who will
develop serious physical or mental illness. Prisoners who are not sick or mentally ill do
not yet have a claim that they have been subjected to care that violates the Eighth
Amendment, but in no sense are they remote bystanders in California's medical care
system. They are that system's next potential victims." !d.
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The concept of "human dignity"-also referred to as the "dignity of
man"-has long been a touchstone of the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.907 Thus, it is well established that "state prisoners are entitled
to reasonably adequate food" 908-one thing needed for basic survival. "A
prison's failure to provide sustenance for inmates," the Supreme Court has
determined, "may actually produce physical 'torture or a lingering
death."' 909 An Eighth Amendment violation will therefore be found-even
in the death penalty-prone Fifth Circuit-where a denial of food constitutes
a denial of the "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. " 910 "Because
depriving a prisoner of adequate food is a form of corporal punishment,"
the Fifth Circuit specifically ruled in 1991, "the [E]ighth [A]mendment imposes limits on prison officials' power to so deprive a prisoner." 911 Deathrow inmates traditionally get a last meal, but executions-by their very
nature-deprive inmates of all rights whatsoever. If new evidence of innocence-or a constitutional violation that occurred at trial-comes to light
later, nothing can be done; it is too late.
Just as non-lethal corporal punishments are considered unconstitutional, so too should executions be treated as such. Indeed, the concepts of
cruelty and unusualness-linked together as they are in the Eighth
Amendment-both point to that conclusion. On the cruelty front, this is
especially so given that lethal punishments are more severe than non-lethal
ones. How can it be less cruel, for instance, to take someone's life than it is
to cut off that person's ear? Given how arbitrary, discriminatory and errorridden America's death penalty has proven to be, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees to due process and equal protection only reinforce the
conclusion that executions are unconstitutional. Not only is it cruel to inject another human being with lethal chemicals, but when such a punishment is carried out so sporadically and arbitrarily that it resembles a staterun lottery, the punishment of death must be considered unusual in the
extreme.

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion) ("The basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man."); Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (quoting that language from Trap).
908 Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock Cnty., 929 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir. 1991); see also
Marquez v. Woody, No. 10-40378, 2011 WL 3911080 *4 (5th Cir., Sept. 6, 2011) ("It is
clearly established that 'state prisoners are entitled to reasonably adequate food."').
909 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1928 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) & In re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)).
910 Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 214 n.3 (5th Cir. 1998); accord Marquez v. Woody, No.
10-40378, 2011 WL 3911080 *4 (5th Cir., Sept. 6, 2011) ("Accepting Marquez's
competent summary judgment evidence as true, as we must at this stage, Lemaster's
actions clearly violated the Eighth Amendment because she refused to provide Marquez
with a soft food despite the fact that a doctor prescribed him such a diet. It would be
difficult to argue that Marquez did not need to eat soft food when it is apparent that
Marquez has no teeth and when Marquez presented a prescription for a soft food diet to
Lemaster which indicated that such a diet was medically necessary.").
911 Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbuck Cnty., 929 F.2d 1078, 1083 (5th Cir. 1991).
907
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Significantly, the U.S. Supreme Court has already held that the punishment of denationalization may not be imposed on a prisoner as it deprives a person of the "right to have rights." 912 Ironically, the death penalty
does just that. It deprives the convicted inmate of the Eighth Amendment
right to food, shelter and basic medical care, and it deprives the inmate of
the "right of access to the courts." 913 Once executed, an inmate can no
longer assert any rights at all. An execution, for example, deprives the inmate of the right to prove his or her innocence-and to be adjudged not
guilty-should new, exculpatory evidence be brought to light after the inmate's execution. 914 Indeed, executions deprive inmates of every single right
inmates typically have. In so doing, executions fly in the face of existing
and long-settled Eighth Amendment precedents aimed at safeguarding inmates from harm.
The question that the U.S. Supreme Court needs to squarely confront
is whether this contradiction in the law makes any sense? Stated differently,
should the Supreme Court rule that the death penalty must go the way of
the stocks, the pillory, and the whipping post9 15 and be ruled "cruel and
unusual," just as corporal punishments in prisons are already a relic of the
past? 916 In early America, the lex talionis principle-an eye for an eye, a
tooth for a tooth-was still in vogue, with Jefferson himself once proposing
that offenders who maimed be maimed themselves. 917 Yet, Jefferson candidly acknowledged that this approach to crime and punishment would fall
out of favor, telling his mentor George Wythe: "The 'Lex talionis' will be

912

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-2 (1958) (plurality opinion). But see People v. Potter,
4 N.Y. Leg. Obs. 177, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 235 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846) ("[T]he governor may
grant a pardon on a condition which does not subject the prisoner to an unusual or cruel
punishment. Banishment is neither. It is sanctioned by authority, and has been inflicted, in
this form, from the foundation of our government."); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524,
537 (1952) ("Deportation is not a criminal proceeding and has never been held to be
punishment. No jury sits. No judicial review is guaranteed by the Constitution.") (citing
Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 290 (1904); Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 275
(1912); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32
(1924)).
913 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (Brennan, J., concurring).
914 In Texas, questions have already been raised as to whether that state recently convicted
and executed an innocent man based on faulty evidence. See David Grann, Trial by Fire:
Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009.
915 E.g., Radix v. Caruso, 461 F. Supp.2d 574, 591-92 (W.D. Mich. 2006) (noting that
Congress abolished the pillory in 1839); Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 427 (1885)
(same); Daniel E. Hall, When Caning Meets the Eighth Amendment: Whipping Offenders
in the United States, 4 WIDENERJ. PuB. L. 403, 421 n.103 (1995) ("The Act of February
28, 1839, abolished whipping and standing in the stocks.") (citing Act of Feb. 28, 1839,
ch. 36, § 5, 25 Stat. 321, 322 (1839)).
916 The death penalty's constitutionality was debated in the 1970s. See, e.g., Arthur J.
Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83
HARv. L. REv. 1773 (1970). However, American society has changed a lot since then, as
has our understanding of mental illness and human rights issues generally.
917 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 142.
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revolting to the humanized feelings of modern times." "An eye for an eye,
and a hand for a hand," Jefferson wrote, "will exhibit spectacles in execution, whose moral effect would be questionable. " 918 With the exception of
executions, which continue to sporadically occur, Jefferson's prediction
came true. The American judicial system no longer tolerates the lopping off
of offenders' limbs or the maiming of inmates, just as no judge today
would order that, as a punishment for rape, a rapist be raped. Why then
should a killer be killed?
If the meaning of cruel is carefully considered, executions-the intentional killing of human beings-must thus be found to fall within that rubric. That executions are inherently cruel must also, in some fashion, be
taken into account when judges determine if executions are unusual. That
is because it would be highly unusual for any civilized society to inflict a
cruel and unnecessary punishment, especially in a more or less random
fashion. The American people are living at a time when there is a greater
awareness of human rights principles than ever. Although the Constitution
requires a punishment be both cruel and unusual to be unconstitutional,
the cruelty of a punishment must surely be found to contribute to its unusualness. Conversely, the rarity and sheer unusualness of executions mutually reinforces the notion that they are cruel. It is inherently cruel and inhumane, after all, to arbitrarily or discriminatory inflict the punishment of
death.

C. To Kill or Not to Kill?
The Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is in a state of
chaos and confusion. Instead of construing the actual phrase "cruel and
unusual punishments" in the Eighth Amendment, the Court has adopted a
nice-sounding legal standard-the "evolving standards of decency" test-to
evaluate Eighth Amendment claims. In doing so, the Court has lost its way
by failing to focus on what the Constitution states in no uncertain terms:
that "cruel and unusual punishments" are unconstitutional. While early
American jurists grappled with what "cruel" and "unusual" meant in particular factual contexts such as the ducking of scolds, today's Justices grapple not with the meaning and proper interpretation of the words "cruel"
and "unusual," but with somehow trying to divine the "evolving standards
of decency of a maturing society." Instead of just focusing on whether executions are "cruel" and have become "unusual," as the Constitution requires, the Court tries to gauge trends, the consistency of the direction of
the change, or if a "national consensus" has been reached. In the twentyfirst century, a return to first principles-interpret the text, not decades-old
judicial gloss imposed on it-seems to be in order.
Turnipseed v. State919-an 1844 case decided before slavery was abolished through Abraham Lincoln's Thirteenth Amendment-illustrates how

918
919

Id. at 141.
6 Ala. 664, 1844 WL 301 (Ala. 1844).
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American judges, though operating in a completely different time, once
focused on the words of a legal provision to decide upon its meaning. In
that case, a person was indicted by an Alabama grand jury for inflicting
"on a negro woman named Rachel, a slave," a "cruel and unusual punishment. " 920 The accused contested the indictment but was tried by a jury and
found guilty of the crime, with the punishment being the assessment of a
fifty dollar fine. 921 The Alabama law under which the accused was indicted
provided: "No cruel or unusual punishment shall be inflicted on any slave,
and any master, or other person having charge of a slave, who shall be
guilty of inflicting such punishment, or authorizing, or permitting the same,
shall be subject to indictment therefor, and on conviction thereof, be punished by a fine not less than fifty, and not exceeding one thousand dollars;
and in addition thereto, be required to give security for his good behavior
for the space of twelve months." 922
When the jury's verdict was appealed, the convicted defendant argued
that "[t]he indictment is double in charging the infliction of punishment
both cruel and unusual" 923 and that "[t]he indictment is too general: it
should have stated what and how the punishment was inflicted. " 924 As to
the first objection, the Alabama Supreme Court acknowledged that "[i]t is
certainly a general rule, that the defendant cannot be charged, in one count
of an indictment, with two distinct offenses." 925 In rejecting the "objection
of duplicity," the Alabama court held, however, that the law did not require two separate indictments and that the indictment in question "is not
bad for duplicity." 926 The court first emphasized: "True, the statute makes
two offences, or rather does not require that the punishment inflicted upon
a slave shall be both cruel and unusual to subject the offender to its sanctions: it is enough if the proof show it to be either the one or the other. To
punish cruelly is one, and unusually is another breach of criminallaw." 927
"The statute, it is apprehended," the court then held, "does not use the
epitheths as synonymous, nor in contrast with each other; but it was merely intended to make the enactment sufficiently broad to embrace a high
offence against good morals, no matter under what circumstances committed. ,928
In so holding, the Alabama Supreme Court-in that unsavory factual
context-focused on the concept of cruelty and unusualness separately. As

!d. at *1.
Id.
922 !d. (citing Clay's Dig. 431 ).
923 !d. The defendant--described as "[t]he plaintiff in error" on appeal-contended on
appeal that "[t]o punish cruelly is one offense, and unusually is another; and they should
have been so charged." !d.
924 Id.
925 Id.
926 Id. at *2.
927 !d. at *1.
928 !d.
920
921
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the 1844 ruling stated: "Cruel, as indicating the infliction of pain of either
mind or body, is a word of most extensive application; yet every cruel punishment is not, perhaps, unusual; nor, perhaps, can it be assumed that every uncommon infliction is cruel." 929 "But be this as it may," the court then
held, "there may be punishment that is both cruel and unusual; thus, if a
slave should be punished, even without bodily torture, in a manner offensive to modesty, decency and the recognized proprieties of social life, the
offender would be chargeable in the broad terms employed in the indictment."930 "An offence, committed under such circumstances," the court
concluded, "might be charged according to its true character, without subjecting the indictment to the imputation of duplicity; and upon conviction,
the accused would be liable to but one penalty." 931
As to the defendant's second objection-that the indictment was too
vaguely worded-the Alabama Supreme Court agreed. 932 "In the present
case," the court began, "the statute merely denounces the cruel and unusual punishment of a slave as a public offence, and prescribes the punishment."933 "It does not," it said of the statute, "declare with particularity
what are its elements; and consequently, in framing the indictment the
statute affords but little aid. " 934 Under the circumstances, the Alabama Supreme Court held that "the general terms in which the charge is made
against the defendant, is not sufficient; but it should be alleged what punishment was inflicted and how, that the court might judge whether the accused should have been put upon his trial; that he may know what he is to
defend against, and the jury know how to apply the evidence. " 935 "This
brings us to the conclusion," the court wrote, "that the indictment is defective, because of the generality of the terms in which the defendant is
charged. " 936 The court-beholden to the Deep South's peculiar institution
of slavery-thus reversed the conviction, finding that the "defect" in the
indictment warranted that result. 937
In this day and age, state-sanctioned killing-the ultimate penal sanction-must be considered unconstitutional. Executions are cruel, and they
have become unusual. The U.S. Supreme Court has already held, in fact,
that "'the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain ... constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment."' 938 Not
only do executions carry with them the risk of serious physical pain and

Id. (italics in original).
Id.
931 !d.
932 !d. at *3.
933 !d.
934 !d.
935 Id.
936 Id.
937 Id.
938 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,319 (1986) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 670 (1977)).
929
930
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suffering/ 39 but the psychological injury associated with death sentenceswhich amounts to a threat of possible execution-must be taken into consideration in gauging their cruelty. 940 The overall harm, equivalent to cruel
and inhumane treatment or torturous conduct/41 must no longer be countenanced by American law despite prior court rulings to the contrary. 942 A
judicial death sentence places the inmate at risk for the future deprivation
of life-something far more credible and serious than, say, idle threats or
verbal abuse of inmates by prison officials which normally does not result

939 Karin Buhmann, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't? The Lundbeck Case of
Pentobarbital, the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and Competing
Human Rights Responsibilities, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 206, 208 (2012).
94 Compare Newman v. Alabama, 466 F. Supp. 628, 635 (D. Ala. 1979) ("The
cumulative effect of these deficiencies and abuses is a threat to life and limb that violates
the Eighth Amendment."); Crawford v. Wisconsin Dep't ofCorr., No. 09-C-0616G *7
(E.D. Wis., Sept. 30, 2011) ("Threats and harassment may constitute cruel and unusual
punishment.") (citing DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2000)); French v.
Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1257 (7th Cir. 1985) (where prison conditions included prison
rapes, assaults, and one prisoner being doused with lighter fluid and attempted to be set
aflame, the court held that "[t]he constitution cannot countenance such widespread
abuses") with Pabon v. Lemaster, Civil Action No. 07-805, 2008 WL 1830500 *3 (W.D.
Pa. 2008) ("To the extent that Plaintiff claims these verbal threats, abuse and harassment
constituted cruel and unusual punishments, Defendants are entitled to dismissal of the
claims because such verbal threats and abuse do not constitute a sufficiently objective
deprivation under the Eighth Amendment.") (citations omitted); Williams v. Fleming,
Civil Action No. 7:07CV00199, 2007 WL 2693644 *3 n.5 (Sept. 13, 2007) ("To the
extent that Williams alleges that the threat of force feeding was cruel and unusual
punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, his claim fails because he does not
allege any physical or mental injury."); Walton v. Terry, 38 Fed. Appx. 363, 364-65 (9th
Cir. 2002) ("verbal threats do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment"); Grant v.
Fernandez, No. C 96-1788, 1997 WL 118257 *2 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 5, 1997) ("allegations
of harassment and threats generally fail to state a cognizable claim under§ 1983").
941 See, e.g., State v. Fielder, No. W2009-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 3689134 * 13 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 2011) ("Among the facts found by the trial court to constitute exceptional
cruelty to the victim was the manner of use of the Ski! saw to threaten amputation of the
victim's hand and cutting his face, and the threats to the lives of the victim's family. This
mental torture was clearly beyond the elements of the offenses."); id. ("The proof showed
that Defendant immobilized the victim's hand while the Ski! saw was operated in the
threatening manner it was used. Furthermore, the proof supports the inference that
Defendant allowed the victim to be frightened by serious threats to his life and the lives of
his family.").
942 See Lucas v. State, 841 So.2d 380, 389 (Fla. 2003) (twenty-five years on death row
does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment); Foster v. State, 810 So.2d 910, 916
(twenty-three years on death row does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment);
Knight v. State, 746 So.2d 423, 437 (Fla. 1998) (more than two decades on death row
does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment); United States v. Walker, 66 M.J. 721,
756 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2008) ("no American court appears to have found that a
lengthy confinement followed by execution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment").
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in an Eighth Amendment violation. 943 Just as American physicians have
concluded that participation in executions violates their solemn ethical
oaths/44 so too should American lawyers and judges decide that executions
are not compatible with their profession-or the practice of law.
By extinguishing the inmate's life, executions inflict the most harm
that one can possibly do to an inmate. In its existing Eighth Amendment
case law, however, the Supreme Court has already firmly rejected the notion that "significant injury"-let alone death-is even a "threshold" requirement for stating an excessive force claim. 945 "What is necessary to
establish an 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,"' the Court has
ruled, "varies according to the nature of the alleged constitutional violation."946 When prison officials fail to attend to an inmate's serious medical
needs, the appropriate inquiry is whether officials exhibited "deliberate
indifference." 947 "This standard is appropriate," the Court states, "because
the State's responsibility to provide inmates with medical care ordinarily
does not conflict with competing administrative concerns." 948 "Because
society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health
care," the Court held in Hudson v. McMillian/ 49 "deliberate indifference
to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only if those
needs are 'serious."' 950
Because death sentences inflict severe mental anguish and torment on
par with other acts of psychological cruelty, they should be declared unconstitutional. Judicial precedents, in fact, already recognize Eighth
Amendment claims based on psychological 951 or emotional distress/ 52 in-

943

Hahn v. Bauer, No. 09-2220,2010 WL 396228 *10 (D. Minn. Jan. 27, 2010) (citing
cases).
944 Travis Cade Armstrong, "Veneer of Medical Respectability": How Physician
Participation in Lethal !Jyections Perpetuates the Illusion of a Humane Execution, 51 S.
TEx. L. REv. 469, 484-85 (2009); Emily Pokora, Should State Codes ofMedical Ethics
Prohibit Physician Participation in State-Ordered Executions?, 37 W. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 2
(2009).
945 Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 U.S. 1175, 1178 (2010).
946 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992). "What is necessary to show sufficient
harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause depends upon the claim
at issue, for two reasons." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). First, "[t]he
general requirement that an Eighth Amendment claimant allege and prove the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain should ... be applied with due regard for
differences in the kind of conduct against which an Eighth Amendment objection is
lodged." Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320. Second, "the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishments 'draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society,' and so admits of few absolute limitations."
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (citations omitted).
947 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5-6 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).
948 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320).
949 503 u.s. 1 (1992).
950 Id. at 9.
951 Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 939 (7th Cir. 2003) (allegation of strip search of
male prisoner in front of female prison guards sufficed to state an Eighth Amendment
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humane or undignified punishments/53 or-in some cases-threatening
conduct. 954 And the suffering of death-row inmates, many of whom attempt suicide or abandon their appeals and choose to die/ 55 is only exacerbated by the many years or decades they spend on death row in relative
isolation. In this regard, the failure of the Supreme Court to take up the
question of whether it is "cruel and unusual" punishment to execute inmates who have spent in some cases more than 25 years on death row is
inexplicable. 956 In a dissent in Solesbee v. Balkcom, 957 a case decided more
than sixty years ago, Justice Felix Frankfurter himself noted that the "onset
of insanity while awaiting execution of a death sentence is not a rare phenomenon." 958

claim if the search was "conducted in a harassing manner intended to humiliate and inflict
psychological pain"; "physical injury need not result for the punishment to state a cause of
action, for the wanton infliction of psychological pain is also prohibited"); Jordan v.
Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1522-31 (9th Cir. 1993) (en bane) (severe "psychological" pain
and trauma can violate the Eighth Amendment); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518,
1522-25 (lOth Cir. 1992) (placing a revolver to a prisoner's head without justification and
threatening to kill the inmate create an actionable Eighth Amendment claim based on
"psychological injury"); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 16 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("It is not hard to imagine inflictions of psychological harm-without corresponding physical harm-that might prove to be cruel and unusual punishment."); Madrid
v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1264 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("[I]fthe particular conditions of
segregation being challenged are such that they inflict a serious mental illness, greatly
exacerbate mental illness, or deprive inmates of their sanity, then defendants have deprived inmates of a basic necessity of human existence--indeed, they have crossed into
the realm of psychological torture.").
952 Chandler v. Baird, 926 F.2d 1057, 1066 (11th Cir. 1991) (inmate's statement that "I'm
sure I was depressed from it" was sufficient, when coupled with allegations of harsh
conditions of administrative confinement, to state a claim for violation of the Eighth
Amendment standards for prison conditions); Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1381
(4th Cir. 1993) ("[I]n order to withstand summary judgment on an Eighth Amendment
challenge to prison conditions a plaintiff must produce evidence of a serious or significant
physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions.").
953 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 ("Our more recent cases ... have held that the [Eighth]
Amendment proscribes more than physically barbarous punishments. The Amendment
embodies 'broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and
decency ... "') (citations omitted) (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir.
1968)).
954 Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1986) (where complaint alleged that a
guard pointed a lethal weapon at the prisoner, cocked it, and threatened him with instant
death accompanied by racial epithets, the court held that "a prisoner retains at least the
right to be free from the terror of instant and unexpected death at the whim of his
allegedly bigoted custodians").
955 John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: "Volunteers," Suicide and Competency, 103
MICH. L. REV. 939 (2005).
956 See Thompson v. McNeil, 129 S. Ct. 1299 (2009); Johnson v. Bredesen, 130 S. Ct. 541
(2009); Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995).
957 339 U.S. 9 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
958 !d. at 14.
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The Supreme Court's "deliberate indifference" standard actually already applies to Eighth Amendment claims about conditions of confinement.959 To make out a conditions-of-confinement claim, the Court has
determined, extreme deprivations are required because routine discomfort
is "part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against
society." 960 As the Supreme Could held in Wilson v. Seiter, 961 "only those
deprivations denying 'the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities' are
sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. " 962
Because the death penalty, however, deprives an inmate of his or her life, it,
if anything, must certainly be considered an extreme-and therefore unconstitutional-deprivation. And because death sentences-the terrifying
prerequisite to the execution of inmates-also appear deliberately indifferent to the physical and mental health of inmates, they, too, should be considered unlawful.
The law makes crystal clear that, in a prison setting, prison officials
can protect themselves. At the same time, though, they must not cross the
line into the gratuitous infliction of inmate suffering. Officials confronted
with a prison disturbance, the Supreme Court has held, "must balance the
threat unrest poses to inmates, prison workers, administrators, and visitors
against the harm inmates may suffer if guards use force. " 963 In Whitley v.
Albers, 964 the Court specifically ruled that the "deliberate indifference"
standard is inappropriate where force is used to quell a prison disturbance.965 In dealing with prison riots or unrest, "the question whether the
measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering ultimately turns on 'whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm."' 966
The Whitley standard was extended to all excessive force claims in
Hudson v. McMillian. 967 Under Whitley, the Court ruled in Hudson, "the
extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor that may suggest
'whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary' in a
particular situation, 'or instead evinced such wantonness with respect to
the unjustified infliction of harm as is tantamount to a knowing willingness
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Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347).
961 501 u.s. 294 (1991).
962 Id. at 298 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347).
963 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6 (citing Whitley).
964 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
965 !d. at 320-21.
966 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7 (citations omitted). The "core judicial inquiry," the Court reemphasized in Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175 (20 10), is "not whether a certain
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at 1178.
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that it occur."' 968 "In determining whether the use of force was wanton and
unnecessary," the Court added, "it may also be proper to evaluate the need
for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount
of force used, the threat 'reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,'
and 'any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response."' 969 The
utter lack of necessity for executions within prisons make them unconstitutional as there is no need to kill an incarcerated inmate, particularly one
tied down to a prison gurney.
Executions, because they are unnecessary, are nothing more than acts
of sadistic vengeance. "When prison officials maliciously and sadistically
use force to cause harm," the Court has ruled in another context, "contemporary standards of decency always are violated." 970 "Otherwise," the
Court has determined, "the Eighth Amendment would permit any physical
punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some
arbitrary quantity of injury." 971 Under the Court's precedents, even injuries
far less significant than death are already expressly prohibited. As Justice
Harry Blackmun wrote in 1992 in his concurrence in Hudson, explaining
the ruling's significance: "The Court today appropriately puts to rest a seriously misguided view that pain inflicted by an excessive use of force is
actionable under the Eighth Amendment only when coupled with 'significant injury,' e.g., injury that requires medical attention or leaves permanent
marks." 972
At executions, of course, the level of injury is off the charts: the inmate's death. And the intent to harm the inmate is clear: the state, through
its judicial process and using execution protocols to carry out its will, methodically plans the inmate's death, often for years or decades in advance.
Bizarrely, the Supreme Court has held that executions pass constitutional
muster even though injuries characterized as "minor"-as the Fifth Circuit
described the prisoner's in Hudson-can be Eighth Amendment violations.973 Though the Supreme Court acknowledged in Hudson that not every "malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action,"974 it expressly excluded only de minimis uses of force from the
Eighth Amendment's scope. 975 As the Court ruled: "The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of 'cruel and unusual' punishments necessarily excludes
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321).
Id. (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321).
970 !d. at 9. "This is true," the Court emphasized, "whether or not significant injury is
evident." Id.
971 Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1178 (2010).
972 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 13-14 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
973 !d. at 10 (citation omitted).
974 !d. (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973) ("Not every push or
shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates a
prisoner's constitutional rights.")).
975 "An inmate who complains of a 'push or shove' that causes not discernible injury
almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim," the Supreme Court
emphasized in Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1178 (2010).
968
969
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from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided
that the use of force is not of a sort 'repugnant to the conscience of mankind."'976
A comparison of the injuries suffered by the inmate in Hudson-and
found to be actionable-should be contrasted with those inflicted at executions. "The blows directed at Hudson, which caused bruises, swelling,
loosened teeth, and a cracked dental plate," the Court concluded in Hudson, "are not de minimis for Eighth Amendment purposes." 977 Thus, the
Court in Hudson refused to dismiss the prisoner's section 1983 claim alleging the use of excessive force. 978 "Injury and force," the Court also emphasized in its per curium opinion in Wilkins v. Gaddy, 979 "are only imperfectly correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately counts. " 980 As the Court
wrote in that 2010 decision: "An inmate who is gratuitously beaten by
guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely
because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury." 981 Executions, by contrast, inflict death itself.

VI. Conclusion
The history of the death penalty is one of successive restrictions on its
use. The death penalty was once inflicted for a whole host of offenses. England's "Bloody Code" made more than 200 crimes punishable by death,
and laws in the American colonies were modeled on English practice. 982 In
the late eighteenth century, however, many of America's founders and
framers read and were inspired by the writings of an Italian philosopher,
Cesare Beccaria. In the 1760s, Beccaria wrote On Crimes and Punishments, a book in which he called for proportion between crimes and pun-

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10 (citations omitted).
Id.
978 Id.
979 130 S. Ct. 1175 (2010).
980 !d. at 1178.
981 !d. at 1178-79. In Wilkins, the inmate alleged that he was "punched, kicked, kneed,
choked, and body slammed 'maliciously and sadistically' and '[w]ithout any
provocation."' !d. at 1179. The District Court in that case dismissed the inmate's action
sua sponte because the purported assault-which allegedly left the inmate with "a bruised
heel, pack pain, and other injuries requiring medical treatrnent"-involved "de minimis
force." Id. After the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit summarily affirmed the
district court's ruling, id. at 1177, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 1176. In
reserving judgment on the inmate's specific allegations, the Court in Wilkins held as
follows: "In holding that the District Court erred in dismissing Wilkins' complaint based
on the supposedly de minimis nature of his injuries, we express no view on the underlying
merits of his excessive force claim. In order to prevail, Wilkins will ultimately have to
prove not only that the assault actually occurred but also that it was carried out
"maliciously and sadistically" rather than as part of "a good-faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline." Id. at 1180.
982 Jonathan Simon, Sanctioning Government: Explaining America's Severity Revolution,
56 U. MIAMIL. REv. 217,223 (2001).
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ishments and opposed both torture and capital punishment. That treatise
influenced Europeans such as Sir William Blackstone and Jeremy Bentham,
as well as leading American revolutionaries, including John Adams, Dr.
Benjamin Rush, and Thomas Jefferson. 983
Today, executions are seen in other parts of the world-including in
England, America's mother country-as human rights violations. Europe
has treaties in place that already forbid the use of executions/ 84 and the
unmistakable trend worldwide is toward abolition. 985 Some countries even
refuse to extradite offenders to the United States unless assurances are given that the death penalty will not be sought. 986 And here in the United
States, the number of executions and death sentences has declined markedly. The number of U.S. executions fell from 98 in 1999 to 43 in 2012, and
the number of American death sentences fell from more than 300 per year
in 1995 and 1996 to 78 in 2011. 987 In truth, executions are rarely and arbitrarily imposed-and often in a racially discriminatory manner.
The death penalty has a long, sordid history, dating back to the very
beginnings of recorded history. 988 In the United States, executions were
once used to quell slave rebellions, and their use has long been associated
with racial prejudice. 989 Executions are now heavily concentrated in the
South, the same region where slavery was once so stubbornly entrenched
and where racially motivated extra-judicial lynchings were prevalent. 990 In
fact, multiple studies show that the odds of receiving a death sentence increase dramatically for African Americans who kill whites. This disturbing
state of affairs runs counter to basic precepts of U.S. law, including equal
protection of the laws, though-to date-the U.S. Supreme Court has insisted on more than statistical proof to demonstrate racial bias in capital
cases. 991

BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 48-49, 70-71.
Protocol No.6 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, opened for
signature Apr. 28, 1983, E.T.S. No. 114 (entered into force Mar. I, 1985); Protocol No.
13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty in All Circumstances, opened for signature
May 3, 2002, E.T.S. No. 187 (entered into force July 1, 2003).
985 Figures on the Death Penalty, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/numbers (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
986 Joseph Anzalone, Extraordinary Times Demand Extraordinary Measures: A Proposal
to Establish an International Court for the Prosecution of Global Terrorists, 16 U.C.
DAVIS J. lNT'L L. & POL'Y 273, 311 (2010).
987 Facts about the Death Penalty, supra note 48.
988 GARY P. GERSHMAN, DEATH PENALTY ON TRIAL: A HANDBOOK WITH CASES, LAWS,
AND DOCUMENTS 16 (2005).
989 DOUGLAS R. EGERTON, GABRIEL'S REBELLION: THE VIRGINIA SLAVE CONSPIRACIES OF
1800 AND 1802, at 111-12, 187 (1993).
990 PHILIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE LYNCHING OF BLACK
AMERICA (2007).
991 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
983

984

448

The Anomaly of Executions
Although the Founding Fathers did not abolish all death penalty laws,
they actively explored alternatives to executions. 992 Indeed, it was during
their time-as well as that of succeeding generations-that America's penitentiary system, on a state-by-state basis, began to be built and then progressively developed. 993 The Walnut Street Prison in Philadelphia opened
only a year before the ratification of the U.S. Bill of Rights/ 94 though other
states were soon to follow Pennsylvania's example. 995 New York passed
legislation in 1796 providing for the construction of the Newgate state
prison in Greenwich Village 996 ; New Jersey completed its state penitentiary
in 1797; and penitentiaries in Virginia and Kentucky opened in 1800, the
same year Massachusetts appropriated money for one. 997 The Maryland
Penitentiary was opened in 1811,998 and construction of other state penitentiaries began in that decade and the ones that followed. 999 In Adam
Hirsch's The Rise of the Penitentiary, the author states that "[t]he penitentiary had its heyday in the United States in the 1830s" as "[f]acilities proliferated. " 1000
Today, state and federal penitentiaries around the country-built with
concrete and iron-are readily available to house violent offenders, making
executions anachronistic and obsolete. In fact, in America, life-withoutparole sentences-now available as a sentencing option in all death penalty
states-have already largely displaced executions as society's preferred
method of punishment. 1001 There are now more than 41,000 offenders in
the U.S. serving life-without-parole sentences. 1002 In comparison, as of January 1, 2013, there were 3,125 death row inmates in the United States,
with even fewer executions-1,343 to be exact-having occurred in the
United States since 1976. 1003 When those numbers are thoughtfully considBESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 66-161.
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ered, the inescapable conclusion is that life-without-parole sentences have
become the typical-or usual-choice of juries, while death sentences and
executions are now unusual, less preferred, and no longer the norm.
At the Jefferson Memorial in Washington, D.C., a series of quotes are
inscribed under the dome. On one panel, Jefferson's familiar and immortal
words from the Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty,
and the pursuit of Happiness." 1004 But another panel contains a lesserknown quotation, an excerpt from a letter Thomas Jefferson wrote in
1816. 1005 That excerpt reads: "I am not an advocate for frequent changes in
laws and constitutions, but laws and institutions must go hand in hand
with the progress of the human mind." 1006 As Jefferson's letter read: "As
that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are
made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the
change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace
with the times. We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which
fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen
of their barbarous ancestors." 1007 Jefferson's words, written as part of the
American Enlightenment, serve as a valuable reminder that the right to life
is to be protected-and that equality and human progress are important
American values.
The genius of the U.S. Constitution's Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause is that it allows each generation of American judges, in their own
time, to evaluate anew what punishments are "cruel and unusual." Every
generation must decide for itself what societal practices will be allowed,
and it that respect, Jefferson's words should be taken to heart. While crime
is about what the offender does, punishment is about how society behaves
and reacts. The absence of cruel and unusual punishments in a society is a
sign of progress that also furthers human dignity, that long-standing Eighth
Amendment touchstone. Indeed, the Constitutional Court of the Republic
of South Africa ruled back in 1995-more than fifteen years ago-that the
death penalty violated principles of human dignity and was thus unconstitutional in that society. 1008
In America, the time has finally come for the U.S. Supreme Court to
put an end to capital punishment once and for all. The death penaltywhether seen as a product of the Dark Ages or a step-child of the peculiar
institutions of slavery or apartheid-must be seen as a vestige of a bygone
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era. Because it has no place in a civilized society, be it in Africa or America,
it should go the way of the stocks, the pillory, and the whipping post. Just
as American society no longer tolerates ear cropping or hand-branding, it
should no longer tolerate executions. Penitentiaries and life-withoutpossibility-of-parole sentences are more than sufficient to protect the public
from violent offenders while allowing us to maintain our own respect for
human dignity and human rights.
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